Føllesdal, Andreas: On role demands and common morality. 1992, (Oslo Handelshøyskole Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: talk)@misc{RN55169, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om forhandlingsetikk. 1992, (Innkjøpsledere, NIMA – Norsk forbund for innkjøp og logistikk/Norsk Hydro). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Consultancy, talk)@misc{RN55168, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om politisk etikk. 1992, (Kommunenes Sentralforbund/Telemark ordførere). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Consultancy, talk)@misc{RN55167, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Menneskeverd og menneskerettigheter. 1992, (HF, UiO Etikkseminar Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Human Rights, talk)@misc{RN55166, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om forskningsetikk i samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora. 1992, (Kristiansand lærerhøyskole Kristiansand). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Research policy, talk)@misc{RN55171, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Næringslivsetikk: Synsing, forkynnelse, forskning?. 1992, (NAVFs Etikkprogram og Norges Handelshøgskole, Bergen). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: talk)@misc{RN55164, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om økokrim og etikk. 1992, (Norsk Øko-forum Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Consultancy, talk)@misc{RN55165, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Hvordan begrunne menneskerettighetene?. In: Mennesker og rettigheter, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 258-268, 1992. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Tags: Human Rights)@article{RN8530, Kan internasjonale menneskerettigheter begrunnes i en verden av stater, preget av uforenelige livssyn? Menneskerettighetene truer normen om suverene stater. Dype tverrkulturelle konflikter, blant annet om individets verdi, illustrerer denne spenningen. ønsket om å begrunne og presisere menneskerettighetene øker motsetningen mellom disse rettighetene og ønsket om å respektere ulike kulturer. En begrunnelse for menneskerettighetene som alle kan akseptere er ikke oppnåelig, men heller ikke nødvendig. En tilfredsstillende begrunnelse som gir oss tilstrekkelig klarhet om menneskerettighetenes innhold kan bygge på overlappende enighet mellom de livssyn som respekterer annerledes tenkende. Ut fra dette perspektivet fremstår menneskerettighetene som krav om lovfestede beskyttelser av individenes grunnbehov mot de trusler statsmakten og verdenssamfunnet representerer. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls’ contractualism. In: Wetlesen, Jon (Ed.): Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver, pp. 109-127, Universitetet I Oslo, Oslo, 1992. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Human Rights, John Rawls)@inbook{RN9250, I sketch how international human rights can be understood and be justified on the basis of human worth within a contractualist perspective similar to that presented in John Rawls’ theory of domestic distributive justice. The present sketch addresses the subject of the relationship between states, and the role of human rights in that regard (cf. Follesdal 1991 for a more elaborate presentation.) I shall be particularly concerned to show that the contractualist tradition, which emphasizes human worth and certain institutional kinds of equality among citizens, nevertheless can permit larger economic inequalities among individuals of different states. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Notes on the nature of impact arguments (unpublished). 1992. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls)@unpublished{RN9450, Develops the contractualist notion of “impact argument”, defends such arguments against two objections: that they are inconsistent with John Rawls’ work, thus not compatible with one of the major contractualist theorists; and that impact arguments render the relation “more just than” cyclical. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om konflikter mellom rollekrav og almennmoral i bedrifter. 1992, (Norges Handelshøgskole, Bergen Bergen). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: talk)@misc{RN55163, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om den nasjonale forskningsetiske komite fon samfunnsfag og humaniora, og om forskningsetiske problemer innen bioteknologi. 1991, (Den nasjonale komite for bioteknologi, Radiumhospitalet Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Research policy, talk)@misc{RN55174, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om Rawls. 1991, (Institutt for sammenlignende politikk, Universitetet i Bergen Bergen). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: John Rawls, talk)@misc{RN55173, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om forhandlingsetikk. 1991, (Senter for teknologi og menneskelige verdier TMV, UiO Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: talk)@misc{RN55172, |
Follesdal, Andreas: The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation). UMI No. 9211679, Harvard University, 1991. (Type: Book | Abstract | Tags: Human Rights, John Rawls)@book{RN5400, What can foreigners claim of each other as a matter of justice? On reflection, many will agree that the international distributive institutions, domestic and international, should ensure the satisfaction of certain basic needs for all. That each year millions die of starvation is not only a tragedy, but also a matter of injustice. This continuing disaster is not due to global shortages of food, but to poverty and lack of basic medical care under unjust domestic and international social institutions. At the same time, we also harbor another strongly held conviction: that domestic social institutions can legitimately favor fellow compatriots over foreigners. Foreigners can claim less from us than our fellow citizens can. These two intuitions are difficult to reconcile in a principled way within a contractualist moral theory. Institutions, as other general rules regulating behavior, must be justifiable to all. But why should state borders affect the weight or reasonableness of individuals’ claims? Considerations of justice would seem to require that we reject the social institution of state borders as yet another source of unjustified bias, like racism or sexism. How, in particular, can arbitrary state borders possibly restrict Rawls’ argument for equality among individuals? If some needs of foreigners should count when reflecting on international distributive justice, foreigners should be able to claim equal shares of income and wealth, or indeed a distribution which maximized the share of the Globally worst off. Rawlsian theories of global justice have therefore tended to endorse a “Global Difference Principle.” On this view, a global set of social institutions is just only if no other set of institutions improves the economic plight of the (representative) globally least advantaged. Compatriots may have special duties towards one another, but only insofar as the global set of distributive institutions still serves to maximize the income and wealth of the globally worst off. A Response: The Bounded Significance of State Borders Alternatively, we must provide a contractualist account of the moral significance of state borders which explain why borders should temper foreigners claims on goods. This dissertation offers such an explanation. The present Theory of Global Justice defends the Bounded Significance of State Borders for matters of distributive justice. On this view, state borders are significant in the following sense: Justice requires that the global distributive institutions must attempt to satisfy what I call the Determinate Human Needs of all. This requirement takes priority over all other claims. But state borders affect the reasonableness of compatriots and foreigners’ further claims, e.g. to equal shares of income and wealth. Rawls’ Difference Principle regulates the distribution of income and wealth among citizens, but the global set of institutions need not distribute economic benefits to maximize the advantage of the globally worst of: there is no Global Difference Principle. This intermediary position is stable because the claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders to support the Difference Principle, but does not require a Global Difference Principle among individuals in different states. Nevertheless, political control over international economic institutions must be distributed equally among participants. The Theory of Global Justice thus illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualist theories. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The ethics of deception in negotiation. 1990, (Medium Designator: Paper submitted for publication
Call Number: (A)). (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls)@unpublished{RN5390, Addresses a topic often discussed in the literature of negotiation technique. I argue that strategic misrepresentations about one’s interests, plans and bargaining set is not morally objectionable as part of professional negotiating practices — though often unnecessary and sometimes unwise. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Justifying human rights. 1989, (Lecture, Institutt for menneskerettigheter, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Human Rights, talk)@misc{RN55176, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Aristotle’s dialectic method of reflective equilibrium (Unpublished). 1985. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: )@unpublished{RN9540, Argues that Aristotle’s main aim is to achieve wide reflective equilibrium among all the beliefs held in his society. He attempts to combine science and ethics into one coherent system of beliefs, using the dialectic method. I argue that this aim integrates and governs scientific theorizing, and gives his ethics certain constructivist features. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Kripke on Davidson (Unpublished). 1985. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: )@unpublished{RN9550, Kripke holds that the standard solution for explaining apparently contingent necessary identity statements does not work for identity theories, including Davidson’s. I argue that Kripke misinterprets Davidson, but I also suggest certain defects in Davidson’s theory concerning the anomalism of the mental. |
Follesdal, Andreas: On Jaegwon Kim’s “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory” (Unpublished). 1985. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: )@unpublished{RN9560, Responds to Kim’s criticism of the identity theory by arguing that the weaknesses he points to have to do more with his theory of events than with the identity theory itself: a Davidsonian theory of events may be combined with a modified identity theory, so that Kim’s criticisms are avoided. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The theory of reflective equilibrium ('Second Year Paper'). 1985. (Type: Unpublished | Links | Tags: John Rawls)@unpublished{RN9360, |
Follesdal, Andreas: On Frege’s theory of understanding (Unpublished). 1984. (Type: Unpublished | Tags: )@unpublished{RN23480, |
Follesdal, Andreas: On Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History (Unpublished). 1984. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: )@unpublished{RN9510, Sketches Putnam’s argument against metaphysical realism, for internal realism; discusses the consequences for the role of science and the the humanities in society. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Paul Guyer on Dieter Henrich on the Transcendental Deduction (Unpublished). 1984. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: )@unpublished{RN9520, Defends Henrich’s interpretation of Kant against Guyer’s criticisms by showing that Henrich needs not hold the view which Guyer opposes. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Richard Rorty on W. V. Quine in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Unpublished). 1984. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: )@unpublished{RN9530, Rorty defends the intellectual respectability of the “Geisteswissenschaften” against what he considers a mistaken objection by Quine. I defend Quine against Rorty’s criticisms by arguing that Rorty misinterprets Quine. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Hvordan blir menneskerettighetene begrunnet, og hvordan bør de begrunnes?. 1982, (Prøveforelesning til Mag. Art., Filosofisk Institutt, Universitetet i Oslo). (Type: Miscellaneous | Tags: Human Rights, talk)@misc{RN55175, |
Talks
On role demands and common morality. 1992, (Oslo Handelshøyskole Oslo). | :
Om forhandlingsetikk. 1992, (Innkjøpsledere, NIMA – Norsk forbund for innkjøp og logistikk/Norsk Hydro). | :
Om politisk etikk. 1992, (Kommunenes Sentralforbund/Telemark ordførere). | :
Menneskeverd og menneskerettigheter. 1992, (HF, UiO Etikkseminar Oslo). | :
Om forskningsetikk i samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora. 1992, (Kristiansand lærerhøyskole Kristiansand). | :
Næringslivsetikk: Synsing, forkynnelse, forskning?. 1992, (NAVFs Etikkprogram og Norges Handelshøgskole, Bergen). | :
Om økokrim og etikk. 1992, (Norsk Øko-forum Oslo). | :
Hvordan begrunne menneskerettighetene?. In: Mennesker og rettigheter, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 258-268, 1992. | :
Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls’ contractualism. In: Wetlesen, Jon (Ed.): Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver, pp. 109-127, Universitetet I Oslo, Oslo, 1992. | :
Notes on the nature of impact arguments (unpublished). 1992. | :
Om konflikter mellom rollekrav og almennmoral i bedrifter. 1992, (Norges Handelshøgskole, Bergen Bergen). | :
Om den nasjonale forskningsetiske komite fon samfunnsfag og humaniora, og om forskningsetiske problemer innen bioteknologi. 1991, (Den nasjonale komite for bioteknologi, Radiumhospitalet Oslo). | :
Om Rawls. 1991, (Institutt for sammenlignende politikk, Universitetet i Bergen Bergen). | :
Om forhandlingsetikk. 1991, (Senter for teknologi og menneskelige verdier TMV, UiO Oslo). | :
The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation). UMI No. 9211679, Harvard University, 1991. | :
The ethics of deception in negotiation. 1990, (Medium Designator: Paper submitted for publication Call Number: (A)). | :
Justifying human rights. 1989, (Lecture, Institutt for menneskerettigheter, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo). | :
Aristotle’s dialectic method of reflective equilibrium (Unpublished). 1985. | :
Kripke on Davidson (Unpublished). 1985. | :
On Jaegwon Kim’s “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory” (Unpublished). 1985. | :
The theory of reflective equilibrium ('Second Year Paper'). 1985. | :
On Frege’s theory of understanding (Unpublished). 1984. | :
On Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History (Unpublished). 1984. | :
Paul Guyer on Dieter Henrich on the Transcendental Deduction (Unpublished). 1984. | :
Richard Rorty on W. V. Quine in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Unpublished). 1984. | :
Hvordan blir menneskerettighetene begrunnet, og hvordan bør de begrunnes?. 1982, (Prøveforelesning til Mag. Art., Filosofisk Institutt, Universitetet i Oslo). | :