Follesdal, Andreas: Global Distributive Justice? State Boundaries as a Normative Problem. In: Global Constitutionalism, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 261–277, 2012. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, Human Rights, Publications)@article{RN49225,Should state borders matter for claims of distributive justice? The article explores, only to reject, the best reasons for an “Anti-Cosmopolitan” position which grants some minimum international obligations, including social and economic human rights. At the same time this Anti-Cosmopolitanism rejects distinctly distributive principles of justice, familiar from discussions of justice among compatriots: There are no further limits on permissible global inequalities. “Anti-Cosmopolitans” do not deny that the tangled web of domestic and international institutions has a massive impact on individuals, their life plans and opportunities, albeit often indirectly and surreptitiously. What they deny is that claims to equality or limits to inequality should apply across state borders. The article explores what it is about states that can justify such a disjunct in the normative claims individuals have against each other. Several arguments about such alleged salient aspects of states and their constitutions are considered, but are found lacking. The main conclusion is to challenge the reasons Anti-Cosmopolitans offer against bringing distributive principles to the “Global Basic Structure.” |
Follesdal, Andreas: The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A Category Mistake?. In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 46–65, 2011. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, John Rawls, Publications)@article{RN48747,The present article explores ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ arguments, that shared institutions above the state, such as there are, are not of a kind that support or give rise to distributive claims beyond securing minimum needs. The upshot is to rebut certain of these ‘anti-cosmopolitann’ arguments. Section 2 asks under which conditions institutions are subject to distributive justice norms. That is, which sound reasons support claims to a relative share of the benefits of institutions that exist and apply to individuals? Such norms may require strict equality, Rawls’ Difference Principle, or other constraints on inequality. Section 2 considers, and rejects, several arguments why existing international institutions are not thought to meet these conditions. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Human Rights Investment Filters: A defense. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Mestad, Ola; Nystuen, Gro (Ed.): Human Rights, Corporate Complicity and Disinvestment, pp. 132–155, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, Human Rights, Publications, SRI – Socially responsible investing)@inbook{RN48540,Do investors have an obligation to not invest in corporations that contribute to human rights violations? – even when such divestment neither causes changes in the corporations, nor prevents the violations? Is there a justification of divestment that holds up even in the face of general breaches of the norms? Can such a justification avoid reliance on controversial religious views? And are there any grounds to believe that such divestment may be effective against human rights violations, even in the absence of a powerful hegemon that sanctions violations of the norms? The affirmative answers below draw on theories of legitimacy and distributive justice that regard SRI as part of a response to the challenges of globalization. Section 1 frames the issues, drawing on the discussions among Quakers on divesting from the slave trade in the 18th century. Sections 2 and 3 provide a normative defense for some minimal human rights filters on investments under economic globalization. Section 4 addresses several objections. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice, stability and toleration in a Federation of Well-ordered Peoples. In: Martin, Rex; Reidy, David (Ed.): Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A realistic utopia?, pp. 299–317, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, EU – European Union, Federalism, Human Rights, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN40840,How should the European Union express and promote human rights and solidarity? What is the scope of toleration towards states that violate human rights, within and beyond its borders? And what is the scope of permissible economic inequality across states in such a federation of democracies committed to domestic solidarity? … John Rawls contributed to these topics in The Law of Peoples (LP), which stresses the intertwined issues of toleration, stability and legitimacy that face these political relations across political borders. Can this Law of Peoples shed light on the legitimacy of emerging regional political orders such as … the European Union? The account offered here seeks to respect state sovereignty even in the face of some human rights violations, and it accepts a degree of material inequality among individuals in different sub-units of a federation. In particular, the European Union may have a differentiated human rights policy, and solidarity does not require a European-wide Difference Principle. The Difference Principle, even if appropriate for domestic justice, need not apply to a federal order. But the conception of human rights for federations must be more complex than Rawls’ account focused on human rights in a ‘nonfederated’ international order. That difference in domain of application is not a criticism of the Law of Peoples. However, a central weakness of Rawls’ account is that it offers inadequate arguments within its own intended domain of application. International stability for the right reasons requires more than a statement of the limits of toleration about “how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated” |
Follesdal, Andreas; Pogge, Thomas: Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions. Springer, Doordrecht, 2005. (Type: Book | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, Edited books, Human Rights, Publications)@book{RN40530,The volume addresses four main topics regarding global justice: the grounds for moral claims about the global institutional order, substantive normative principles for a legitimate such order, the role of legal human rights standards, and ideas for reshaping global social institutions so as to render them less unjust. Contributors: 1 Introduction Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge 2 Poverty and Global Justice: Some Challenges Ahead Hilde F. Johnson 3 Justice, Morality and Power in the Global Context Rainer Forst 4 “Saving Amina”: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue Alison M. Jaggar 5 Poverty as a Human Rights Violation and the Limits of Nationalism Geert Demuijnck 6 International or Global Justice? Evaluating the Cosmopolitan Approach Thomas Mertens 7 Understanding and Evaluating the Contribution Principle Christian Barry 8 World Poverty and Moral Responsibility Ser-Min Shei 9 The Principle of Subsidiarity Stefan Gosepath 10 “It’s the Power, Stupid!” On the Unmentioned Precondition of Social Justice Alessandro Pinzani 11 Egalitarian Global Distributive Justice or Minimal Standard? Pogge’s Position .Véronique Zanetti 12 Responsibility and International Distributive Justice Alexander Cappelen 13 From Natural Law to Human Rights — Some Reflections on Thomas Pogge and Global Justice Henrik Syse 14 Deliberation or Negotiation? Remarks on the Justice of Global and Regional Human Rights Agreements Regina Kreide 15 Human Rights and Relativism Andreas Follesdal 16 The Nature of Human Rights Leif Wenar 17 Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation — Weak and Strong Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians 18 The First UN Millennium Development Goal: A Cause for Celebration? Thomas Pogge 19 Can Global Distributive Justice be Minimalist and Consensual? Jean-Christophe Merle 20 Redistributing Responsibilities — The UN Global Compact with Corporations . Andrew Kuper |
Follesdal, Andreas: Liberal Contractualism – Partial and Particularist, Impartial and Cosmopolitan. In: Caney, Simon; Lehning, Percy (Ed.): International Distributive Justice: Cosmopolitanism and its Critics, Routledge, London, 2004, ISBN: 978-0-415-23441-2. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN26140,Several authors have explored or defended moderate nationalism, characterised by limited partiality for fellow nationals or fellow citizens, and loyalty to the laws and institutions of one’s own society. Critics have argued that such loyalties are incompatible with ‘cosmopolitan’ universalist liberalism, on at least two grounds. The article seeks to rebut these objections from a liberal contractualist position similar to that of Rawls, Dworkin and Scanlon. Liberal theories are thought to disallow deviations from impartial treatment and therefore rule out substantive special claims among compatriots. The scope for contractualist partiality is the subject of section 2. Liberal theories are also considered unable to account for political duties – the duty to comply with the just laws and institutions of one’s own state. The contractualist grounds for political allegiance are addressed in section 3. This is not to say that liberal contractualism endorses nationalism understood as a principle of political order, that political and cultural/ethnic boundaries should coincide. A brief sketch of some elements of Liberal Contractualism is presented in section 1. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice: Global and European. In: Global Society, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 591–609, 2000. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, Distributive justice, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN26380,The first section of this paper lays out some aspects of liberal contractualism. Section 2 points to some relevant differences in the subject matters of international and European political order. Section 3 indicates that the research questions are interestingly different for the two subjects. At least three central topics must be addressed by a normative theory of federalism when brought to bear on the issues of europeanisation. Democratic theory must be rethought, and the concepts developed for nation-state parameters must be reconfigured. Distributive justice must consider the normative significance of non-unitary modes of governance. Claims to equal shares may have to be tempered by an account of when sub-units must take responsibility for their worst-off, rather than expecting other individuals in the political order as a whole to do so. A third important topic concerns the allocation of authority between the central level and sub-units. In the context of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced to resolve these issues, first in the Maastricht Treaty and most recently elaborated in the Amsterdam Treaty. The principle of subsidiarity places the burden of proof on those who seeks to centralise authorities. However, the principle is contested, can be interpreted in conflicting ways, and can apply in a variety of fields. It merits more attention by political philosophers. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Communitarian criticisms of Liberal Contractualism: an account and a defense. In: Brinkhuis, Frank; Talmor, Sasha (Ed.): Memory, History and Critique: European Identity at the Millennium, pp. 10, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1998. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, EU – European Union, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN17830,The normative significance of Europe and its member states is shifting. This paper considers and rebuts several communitarian objections against contractualist theories of global distributive justice, which can be brought to bear on the issues. Communitarian theories must draw on contractualist or similar traditions in order to illuminate the normative aspects of Europeanisation. The communitarian approaches, focussing on shared practices, constitutive identities and embedded loyalties, are ill equipped to assess the alternatives and agenda currently facing Europe. Communitarians stress that we have special duties, “obligations of membership”, towards our own community or society, partly because it helps constitute our common life, which is an important good. It is said that contractualism cannot account for these important features of our moral life in the proper way. It fails to acknowledge our “embedded” nature, with loyalties we are born into and instead assumes that we are “atomistic” individuals, and community is not recognized as a good. Moreover, contractualism is criticized because such theories impose external standards, alien to the existing culture, which do not permit cultural variations. These criticisms fail to hold against some contractualist theories, which recognize that our common life – the institutions, practices and roles that surround us – is an important good. Moreover, I argue that John Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness, a central contribution of liberal contractualism, is itself communitarian, if only in the particular sense that it is exclusively concerned with the important internal goods of communities and social institutions. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy, legitimacy and majority rule in the EU. In: Weale, Albert; Nentwich, Michael (Ed.): Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, constitutional choice and citizenship, pp. 34–48, Routledge, London, 1998. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Authority, Democratic theory, Distributive justice, EU – European Union, Human Rights, Publications)@inbook{RN16220,When it is said that the European Union has suffered from a democratic deficit, the term ‘democracy’ is used to lament several separate lacunas. The aim of the present paper is to explore the relations between two of the senses in which ‘democracy’ is said to have been missing in the European Union.Democracy as Legitimacy: Institutions, as all other rules that regulate behaviour, should be legitimate in several senses. We are only morally obligated to obey normatively legitimate institutions. That is: they must be justifiable to the ‘demos’, to all affected parties. Normative legitimacy requires a presentation and justification of such principles of legitimacy for the European Union, as well as transparency of its institutions. Only then can the public assess whether principles of legitimacy are satisfied. At present, we have neither such a theory of justice, nor the requisite transparency. Democracy as Majority Rule: ‘Democracy’ is also used to describe the decision procedures of institutions whereby the preference of the majority of the electorate determines the result. Suggestions abound that the institutions should be changed to increase the role of majority rule as a central structure for citizen participation. The precise relations and implications between these two senses of democracy – of normative legitimacy and of majority rule – are contested and obscure.The aim of this paper is to explore these relations from a particular contractualist perspective, addressing some specific issues regarding the relevance of consent, and indicating how this approach frames the practical arguments about institutional reform witnessed in the Amsterdam Treaty and beyond. Section 1 provides a sketch of a Liberal Contractualist theory of normative legitimacy. Section 2 brings this perspective to bear on claims to majoritarian mechanisms, and section 3 considers some contractualist constraints on majority rule. In conclusion I note how the contested ends of the European Union are central to a satisfactory resolution of these issues. As long as the explicit aim of the union was economic, increased efficiency was easily interpreted as Pareto-improvements within a utilitarian setting. The task of the European Union was previously predominantly to secure peace and stability through free markets, leaving matters of distribution and authority aside, in accordance with standard (though by no means uncontroversial) economic theory. The European Union now has much broader political aspirations. Its objectives, criteria of efficiency, and the role of majoritarian mechanisms must be reconsidered accordingly. The choice of means become more important as economic benefit is supplemented by other political goals. Transparency and the rule of law, majority rule, distributive justice, and human rights all become central issues. They cannot be regarded merely as ideals to be pursued on a par with economic efficiency, but are conditions of justice if the European Union indeed is to become and appear legitimate. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy, pp. 145–163, Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, EU – European Union, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN15900,Shifting notions of sovereignty may affect the scope of application and content of principles of just distribution: the scope of our welfare obligations may legitimately be affected by state borders. The article takes for granted the egalitarian commitment of many welfare states, and pursue the international implications of this commitment. In section 2 I summarize various arguments offered in favor of the Priority of Compatriots. In section 3 I present several arguments against domestic inequality. Section 4 argues that a further claim to equal shares, is a reasonable demand to make among citizens of democratic welfare states. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) offers what is perhaps the most convincing defense of the liberal egalitarian welfare state. However, his contribution takes as its prime subject domestic justice, leaving aside the implications for global distribution. My defense of equal shares is compatible with Rawls’ account, and it allows us, in section 5, to bring the arguments against inequality and for equality to bear on the issue of global and regional distribution. I conclude that legitimate global regimes must secure the satisfaction of the basic needs of all, but not necessarily secure equal shares for all participants. In section 6 I consider some peculiar normative issues arising within the European Union, where states have partly pooled their sovereignty. I suggest that the shared institutions of the EU support claims to equal shares among the inhabitants: the same egalitarian arguments appear to hold among them as hold among fellow citizens of a state. Equal shares of political power, of social opportunities, and of income and wealth, among citizens in the EU is a requirement of justice, based on the nature of their social co-operation under the four freedoms. Thus a legitimate EU may not be limited to maintaining a free market: ‘real’ convergence and solidarity within the EU must go beyond the alleviation of poverty, towards securing equal standards of living. State sovereignty must therefore be restricted, for the benefit of central institutions aiming to secure equality. The claims to equality I sketch do not exhaust the normative relevance of political borders. In conclusion, in section 7, I therefore note countervailing considerations and further important areas of normative reflection regarding a theory of global distributive justice. For instance, our concern for equality comes into conflict with another important of our interests: democratic self-governance, allowing a diversity of social arrangements. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls’ contractualism. In: Wetlesen, Jon (Ed.): Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver, pp. 109–127, Universitetet I Oslo, Oslo, 1992. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Distributive justice, Human Rights, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN9250,I sketch how international human rights can be understood and be justified on the basis of human worth within a contractualist perspective similar to that presented in John Rawls’ theory of domestic distributive justice. The present sketch addresses the subject of the relationship between states, and the role of human rights in that regard (cf. Follesdal 1991 for a more elaborate presentation.) I shall be particularly concerned to show that the contractualist tradition, which emphasizes human worth and certain institutional kinds of equality among citizens, nevertheless can permit larger economic inequalities among individuals of different states. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation). UMI No. 9211679, Harvard University, 1991. (Type: Book | Abstract | Tags: Distributive justice, Human Rights, John Rawls, Publications)@book{RN5400,What can foreigners claim of each other as a matter of justice? On reflection, many will agree that the international distributive institutions, domestic and international, should ensure the satisfaction of certain basic needs for all. That each year millions die of starvation is not only a tragedy, but also a matter of injustice. This continuing disaster is not due to global shortages of food, but to poverty and lack of basic medical care under unjust domestic and international social institutions. At the same time, we also harbor another strongly held conviction: that domestic social institutions can legitimately favor fellow compatriots over foreigners. Foreigners can claim less from us than our fellow citizens can. These two intuitions are difficult to reconcile in a principled way within a contractualist moral theory. Institutions, as other general rules regulating behavior, must be justifiable to all. But why should state borders affect the weight or reasonableness of individuals’ claims? Considerations of justice would seem to require that we reject the social institution of state borders as yet another source of unjustified bias, like racism or sexism. How, in particular, can arbitrary state borders possibly restrict Rawls’ argument for equality among individuals? If some needs of foreigners should count when reflecting on international distributive justice, foreigners should be able to claim equal shares of income and wealth, or indeed a distribution which maximized the share of the Globally worst off. Rawlsian theories of global justice have therefore tended to endorse a “Global Difference Principle.” On this view, a global set of social institutions is just only if no other set of institutions improves the economic plight of the (representative) globally least advantaged. Compatriots may have special duties towards one another, but only insofar as the global set of distributive institutions still serves to maximize the income and wealth of the globally worst off. A Response: The Bounded Significance of State Borders Alternatively, we must provide a contractualist account of the moral significance of state borders which explain why borders should temper foreigners claims on goods. This dissertation offers such an explanation. The present Theory of Global Justice defends the Bounded Significance of State Borders for matters of distributive justice. On this view, state borders are significant in the following sense: Justice requires that the global distributive institutions must attempt to satisfy what I call the Determinate Human Needs of all. This requirement takes priority over all other claims. But state borders affect the reasonableness of compatriots and foreigners’ further claims, e.g. to equal shares of income and wealth. Rawls’ Difference Principle regulates the distribution of income and wealth among citizens, but the global set of institutions need not distribute economic benefits to maximize the advantage of the globally worst of: there is no Global Difference Principle. This intermediary position is stable because the claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders to support the Difference Principle, but does not require a Global Difference Principle among individuals in different states. Nevertheless, political control over international economic institutions must be distributed equally among participants. The Theory of Global Justice thus illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualist theories. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods. |
| : Global Distributive Justice? State Boundaries as a Normative Problem. In: Global Constitutionalism, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 261–277, 2012. |
| : The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A Category Mistake?. In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 46–65, 2011. |
| : Human Rights Investment Filters: A defense. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Mestad, Ola; Nystuen, Gro (Ed.): Human Rights, Corporate Complicity and Disinvestment, pp. 132–155, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. |
| : Justice, stability and toleration in a Federation of Well-ordered Peoples. In: Martin, Rex; Reidy, David (Ed.): Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A realistic utopia?, pp. 299–317, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006. |
| : Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions. Springer, Doordrecht, 2005. |
| : Liberal Contractualism – Partial and Particularist, Impartial and Cosmopolitan. In: Caney, Simon; Lehning, Percy (Ed.): International Distributive Justice: Cosmopolitanism and its Critics, Routledge, London, 2004, ISBN: 978-0-415-23441-2. |
| : Justice: Global and European. In: Global Society, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 591–609, 2000. |
| : Communitarian criticisms of Liberal Contractualism: an account and a defense. In: Brinkhuis, Frank; Talmor, Sasha (Ed.): Memory, History and Critique: European Identity at the Millennium, pp. 10, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1998. |
| : Democracy, legitimacy and majority rule in the EU. In: Weale, Albert; Nentwich, Michael (Ed.): Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, constitutional choice and citizenship, pp. 34–48, Routledge, London, 1998. |
| : Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy, pp. 145–163, Springer, Berlin, 1997. |
| : Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls’ contractualism. In: Wetlesen, Jon (Ed.): Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver, pp. 109–127, Universitetet I Oslo, Oslo, 1992. |
| : The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation). UMI No. 9211679, Harvard University, 1991. |