Follesdal, Andreas: A just yet unequal European Union: A defense of moderate economic inequality. In: Review of Social Economy, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 8-36, 2023. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, John Rawls, Publications)@article{RN52113,What does justice require concerning socio-economic distribution among citizens of the European Union? The EU should reduce cross-national economic inequalities among inhabitants of different member states, but full economic distributive equality or a European ‘Difference Principle,’ may not be required. Individuals’ claim to more political influence over matters controlled by their own state in the quasi-federal EU may permit some economic inequality. Section 1 orients this contribution relative to arguments for a European universal income. Section 2 provides relevant features of the EU. Section 3 considers contractualist arguments against certain forms of economic inequality, while section 4 identifies a further argument in favour of equal shares of benefits of social cooperation, based on an interpretation of ‘social primary goods’ consistent with Rawls’ theory. Section 5 argues that these reasons for economic distributive equality must be weighed against more political influence over matters controlled by the individual’s sub-unit. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity to the Rescue for the European Courts? Resolving tensions between the Margin of Appreciation and Human Rights Protection. In: Heidemann, Dietmar; Stoppenbrink, Katja (Ed.): Join, or Die – Philosophical Foundations of Federalism, pp. 251-272, de Gruyter, Berlin, 2016. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, European Court of Human Rights, Federalism, Human Rights, Margin of Appreciation, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN50196,Protests against how the European Court of Human Rights manages the dilemma between protecting human rights and respecting sovereignty led to Protocol 15, which includes references to ‘subsidiarity and a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights. The article argues that a ‘Principle of Subsidiarity’ can alleviate some of the challenges posed by the margin of appreciation doctrine, in particular that it sacrifices human rights protection on the altar of respect for state sovereignty. Section 1 presents the Margin of appreciation doctrine and some criticism raised against it, section 2 sketches versions of the principle of subsidiarity relevant for this discussion. Section 3 seeks to bring subsidiarity to bear on the question of which authority the ECtHR should enjoy within a multi-level European legal order, and in particular why it should grant states a certain margin of appreciation. Section 4 considers how these arguments concerning a margin of appreciation applies to the European Union—leaving the many other aspects of accession aside. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Curb, Channel and Coordinate: The Constitutionalisation of International Courts and Tribunals. In: Baere, Geert De; Wouters, Jan (Ed.): The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law, pp. 355-369, Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2015. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Human Rights, International courts, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN50186,From the vantage point of normative political philosophy the preceding chapters in this volume offer several lessons and further research questions of how to assess and promote the legitimacy of these ICs. The following comments identify some of these. Several proposals amount to measures of constitutionalisation of ICs. Section I identifies some of the hitherto understudied arenas where the authors remind us that the perceived legitimacy of the ICs matters if they are to secure their various objectives. Section II addresses one central standard of legitimacy: the content of the concept of the Rule of Law, which remains contested both as an objective of ICs, and as a requirement on their operation. I stipulate that two central underlying values justify several if not all rule of law norms: non-domination and stable legitimate expectations. Respect for human rights is a further substantive value which many but not all contributors include in the concept. I then consider two main challenges to the legitimacy of ICs from rule of law standards. One is the possible fragmentation and the legal uncertainty that may ensue. Section III thus summarizes the chapters’ insights about the alleged fragmentation wrought by so many ICs. Section IV considers some further challenges to the objectives and performance of ICs by these rule of law standards. Their multiple objectives require that the judges and arbitrators enjoy a wide berth of discretion in interpretation and adjudication – which raise the risk that states and individuals become subject to domination by the ICs themselves. Individuals may end up not living under the rule of law but under the rule of international lawyers. The following two sections gather several possible strands of responses to these fears. Section V elaborates how the power of ICs is constrained by their complex interrelationship with domestic authorities. Some such interdependence may be assessed by a further popular standard of legitimacy in addition to the rule of law, namely subsidiarity. This concept is often invoked in international law, explicitly so for the European Union4 and in debates concerning the European Convention on Human Rights.5 The section explores how several features of the authority of ICs presented by the authors may be explained and perhaps assessed by some standard of subsidiarity, to reduce the risks wrought by the ICs themselves. Appeals to subsidiarity may not so much lay issues to rest as stimulate more structured and systematic arguments concerning the legitimacy of ICs. Section VI considers several ways to regulate the discretion of the ICs to reduce the risks of fragmentation and domination, garnered from the contributions of this volume. Increased legitimacy of international courts requires perspectives and measures of constitutionalisation: Promote rule of law standards by better checks on the international courts, and channel and coordinate them better. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity and the global order. In: Zimmermann, Augusto; Evans, Michelle (Ed.): Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity, pp. 207-220, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN55344,Subsidiarity has been proposed as an answer to the challenges of globalization and global governance. This chapter addresses some of the strengths and weaknesses of such a principle of subsidiarity for questions of how to allocate and use authority at regional and global levels. The chapter criticizes the ‘state centric’ versions of subsidiarity often appealed to for such global settings. In particular, there are several challenges wrought by states that fail to respect their citizens’ human rights, variously interpreted. More defensible versions of subsidiarity do not provide normative legitimacy to the state centric aspects of the global order. Section 1 sketches some of the remarkably different conceptions of subsidiarity as a background to the usages in the European Union, the Catholic Church and as it allegedly appears in international law. The different versions drastically reduce or enlarge the scope of member unit authority. Section 2 considers some implications for the legitimate allocation of authority in our global order which includes many states that routinely violate their citizens’ fundamental human rights. The function of the European Court of Human Rights offers a helpful contrast. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy, identity, and European public spheres. In: Risse, Thomas (Ed.): European Public Spheres: Politics is Back, pp. 247-262, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN49273,The empirical findings of this volume give evidence of Europeanisation in the form of political contestation about matters European. What is the significance for democracy and for the future European Union, of increased politicization in the sense of contestation in various public spheres among political parties about the European polity and regimes – including the territory and competences of the EU. I suggest that there is a third option, in addition to either unfortunate corrosion and fragmentation of the EU or “normalization” of policy contestation, namely permanent salient contestation about constitutional matters – of which the euro crisis may be only one. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democratic standards in an asymmetric Union. In: Cramme, Olaf; Hobolt, Sara B. (Ed.): Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress, pp. 199 -216, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN49578,Throughout the present Eurozone crisis, worries about legitimacy and democracy have been particularly vocal, albeit often conflated, and not always very clear. What are we to make of such concerns, and the proposals brought forward? Discussions about the democratic deficit often target the wrong problems, either because the alleged problems are misinterpreted, or because they are in fact not problems at all. Nevertheless, it remains the case (and notwithstanding the contestability of some of the evidence) that the EU is insufficiently democratically accountable. While some weaknesses may be temporary, others seem to be more entrenched in the constitutional structure of the EU. In particular, we need to reconsider our democratic standards if the scholars who say that we must expect the EU to keep features of an asymmetrical federal order, with differentiated integration, are right. My comments concerning the prospects of a sufficiently legitimate EU are clustered under the rubrics of Symptoms, Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Prognosis. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Will the Reform Treaty Combat the Union’s Legitimacy Crisis?. In: Merle, Jean-Christophe (Ed.): Die Legitimität von supranationalen Institutionen der EU, pp. 112-129, LIT-Verlag, Münster, 2012. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN48050,The Constitutional Treaty (CT) and the Reform Treaty (RT) does take several valuable steps to ensure that the European Union becomes more trustworthy and comes ‘closer to the people’ – though I register some ambivalence. Section 1 provides some fragments of the history of the European Union, to justify the diagnosis that it needs increased levels of trust and arrangements for trustworthiness among Europeans and their political leaders. Section 2 argues that the European Union has certain federal elements that require four peculiar forms of ‘balancing’. Section 4 discusses the increased need for trust among Europeans. Section 4 addresses the role of the Charter on Fundamental Rights as a trust building mechanism. Sections 5 to 7 address how the CT and the RT contribute or detract from each of these three forms of balancing. The conclusion is that certain elements of the CT and of the RT would help European institutions create and maintain their own support among European citizens and officials. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The Legitimacy Challenges for New Modes of Governance: Trustworthy Responsiveness. In: Government and Opposition, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 81-100, 2011, (First as 2008 NEWGOV Report DTF/D09 , http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/DDTFD09_Legitimacy_Challenges_for_NMG.pdf). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@article{RN48670,Of particular normative concern are two typical features of NMG: a) the delegation of regulatory activities to independent regulatory authorities at the national and the European level; and b) regulatory networks outside the legislative arenas, with both private and public actors. These features tend to make the NMG less democratically accountable. Yet some hold that NMG can confer legitimacy onto the European Union, especially because they secure ‘output’ more effectively than democratic arrangements, even though they lack any ‘input’ from voters. The present paper challenges these normative claims made on behalf of NMGs: the alleged benefits of NMG may be less than often claimed. And democratic accountability measures are less of a challenge to effectiveness and credibility, properly conceived. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Non-State Oriented Political Theory: A Critical Assessment. In: Neyer, Jurgen; Wiener, Antje (Ed.): Political Theory of the European Union, pp. 205-212, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN48744,What standards of normative legitimacy are required to assess whether such multilevel, non-state political orders are just and legitimate?—that is: what conditions must be satisfied, if its subjects are to have a moral obligation to obey the authorities and institutions, and so that non-members have a moral obligation to recognize it as deserving of standing and immunity as a member of the international and global order? This chapter discusses four central topics high on the research agenda, topics illuminated by the other contributions of the volume, but which merit even further attention. |
Follesdal, Andreas; Wind, Marlene: Introduction: Nordic Reluctance towards Judicial Review under Siege. In: Nordic Journal of Human Rights, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 131-141, 2009. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights, Publications)@article{RN48800,Is judicial review in accordance with our democratic sensibilities? In a Nordic context this question has caused much public consternation in all five countries in recent years,…. Not only has the European Court of Justice cemented its powers with the EU’s enlargement and with EU legislation on the rise and becoming increasingly open to interpretation; the Strasbourg court and other international dispute-settlement bodies have also become more powerful. In the Nordic countries, judicial review has generated a wide debate not only among specialists but equally among the wider public…. Of central concern in this special issue … is the effect on the Nordic countries and what we refer to as European Judicial Review: review of domestic legislative acts on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Treaties, on the basis of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Constitutional and judicial review covers several other topics, and the two courts pose several further important challenges beyond our current concern: … the normative legitimacy of European Judicial Review and the way judicial review by courts has been received in the Nordic democracies. |
Follesdal, Andreas: European Union Citizenship. In: EU research in social sciences and humanities : Policy Synthesis of EU Research Results, 2008. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Consultancy, EU – European Union, Public policy, Publications)@article{RN48787,This policy review on the first wave of research projects on citizenship is the work of an independent scholar, Andreas Follesdal, and took place in the context of a broader exercise of reviewing results of projects funded under the 5th Framework Programme in the social sciences. |
Follesdal, Andreas: How to Organize Democracy in Multi-level and Multi-cultural States: Can it be done? Should it be done? [In Chinese]. In: Hong, Zhou; Kohler-Koch, Beate (Ed.): EU Governance Model, pp. 102-126, Social Science Academy Press Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, 2008. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Human Rights, Publications)@inbook{RN47700,Section 1 provides some background of the history of the European Union that explains the increased need for trust and trustworthiness among Europeans and their political leaders. Section 2 gives a brief sketch of some reasons for democratic rule, constrained by human rights. Furthermore, I also indicate where we find some of these claims in ancient Confucian thought. Sections 3 and 4 consider some objections: why democracy might not be thought appropriate for the large and complex European order. I shall argue that these objections do not stand up to scrutiny. Section 5 concludes by considering why and how the Reformed Treaty might enhance democratic accountability and human rights promotion within the EU. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Human Rights, Democracy and Federalism – part of the problem or part of the solution? Securing stability in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. In: Current Politics and Economics of Asia, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 211-236, 2008. (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Human Rights, Publications)@article{RN47730, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Legitimacy Deficits beyond the State: Diagnoses and Cures. In: Hurrelmann, Achim; Schneider, Steffen; Steffek, Jens (Ed.): Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, pp. 211-228, Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2007. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN45260,To what extent should the terms and institutions of normative legitimacy and legitimation apply to entities ‘beyond the state’: international or transnational public or private bodies in general, and the European Union in particular?…the academic and political debates about the Legitimacy Deficit of the European Union have revealed deep disagreements about alleged symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions to alleviate such a deficit as there might be. The present paper first considers the claim, only to deny it, that attempts at applying considerations of legitimacy to such bodies are fundamentally misguided. Section 2 seeks to provide an overview of these disagreements, and then offers some suggestions for how to alleviate those deficits there may be.. Section 4 offers some reflections on how institutions may bolster the requisite forms of legitimacy, especially democratic accountability, and indicates some of the main challenges that face efforts to enhance the democratic legitimacy of international and transnational bodies. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Normative Political Theory and the European Union. In: Jorgensen, Knud Erik; Pollack, Mark A.; Rosamund, Ben (Ed.): Handbook of European Union Politics, pp. 317-335, Sage, London, 2007. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN44540,The French and Dutch referendum rejections of the Constitutional Treaty on Europe brought political attention to simmering academic debates about the EU’s legitimacy and identity, which form core topics of normative political theory. This review presents some of the central approaches and research issues of the political theory of the European Union. The “normative turn in EU studies” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003) is evident in several research topics addressed by normative political theorists. Section 1 gives a brief overview. The field.has a long though meagre pedigree, some highlights are sketched in section 2. Worries about a ‘democratic deficit’ did not emerge in response to the Constitutional Treaty. To the contrary, such concerns fuelled the call for such a constitution, and they gained political salience already in response to the contentious Maastricht Treaty ratification process. That recent history is sketched in section 3. Popular and legal conflicts strengthened the claims of many politicians and scholars that the European Union suffered from a ‘legitimacy deficit’ that had yet to be resolved. Section 4 dissolves this apparent consensus by exploring experts’ different choices of symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions regarding this deficit. Section 5 provides a taxonomy of concepts of legitimacy, institutional mechanisms of legitimation, and objects of legitimacy. Section 6 combines several though not all – of these disjointed insights into a somewhat unified perspective that incorporates empirical concepts of legitimacy as compliance in an account of citizens’ political obligation to obey normatively legitimate political orders regarded as an assurance problem faced by ‘conditional compliers’ under complex structures of interdependence. Section 7 concludes with a sketch of some current normative research on the European Union |
Follesdal, Andreas: The Constitutional Treaty: the Answer to the European Union’s Quest for a Consistent Human Rights Policy?. In: International Journal on minority and group rights, no. 3-4, pp. 209-222, 2006. (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Human Rights, Publications)@article{RN43150, |
Follesdal, Andreas: EU legitimacy and Normative Political Theory. In: Cini, Michelle; Bourne, Angela (Ed.): Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, pp. 151-173, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN36260, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice, stability and toleration in a Federation of Well-ordered Peoples. In: Martin, Rex; Reidy, David (Ed.): Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A realistic utopia?, pp. 299-317, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Human Rights, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN40840,How should the European Union express and promote human rights and solidarity? What is the scope of toleration towards states that violate human rights, within and beyond its borders? And what is the scope of permissible economic inequality across states in such a federation of democracies committed to domestic solidarity? … John Rawls contributed to these topics in The Law of Peoples (LP), which stresses the intertwined issues of toleration, stability and legitimacy that face these political relations across political borders. Can this Law of Peoples shed light on the legitimacy of emerging regional political orders such as … the European Union? The account offered here seeks to respect state sovereignty even in the face of some human rights violations, and it accepts a degree of material inequality among individuals in different sub-units of a federation. In particular, the European Union may have a differentiated human rights policy, and solidarity does not require a European-wide Difference Principle. The Difference Principle, even if appropriate for domestic justice, need not apply to a federal order. But the conception of human rights for federations must be more complex than Rawls’ account focused on human rights in a ‘nonfederated’ international order. That difference in domain of application is not a criticism of the Law of Peoples. However, a central weakness of Rawls’ account is that it offers inadequate arguments within its own intended domain of application. International stability for the right reasons requires more than a statement of the limits of toleration about “how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated” |
Follesdal, Andreas: The Legitimacy Deficits of the European Union. In: Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 441-468, 2006. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@article{RN42960,The legitimacy of the European Union has become a popular academic and political issue, stimulating debate about alleged symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions. This article presents some of the central approaches and research issues, as well as an account of legitimacy that accommodates several but not all contributions. The ‘normative turn in EU studies’ has tended to address how the European level institutions should be governed.1 This subject gained political salience largely in response to the contentious Maastricht Treaty ratification process, sketched in Section I. Popular and legal conflicts strengthened the claims of politicians and scholars that the European Union suffered from a ‘legitimacy deficit’ that has yet to be resolved. Section II dissolves this apparent consensus by exploring experts’ different choices of symptoms, diagnosis and prescriptions regarding this deficit. Section III provides a taxonomy of concepts of legitimacy, institutional mechanisms of legitimation and objects of legitimacy. Section IV perhaps over-ambitiously seeks to combine several of these disjointed insights into a somewhat unified perspective. It incorporates empirical concepts of legitimacy as compliance in an account of citizens’ political obligation to obey normatively legitimate political orders. On this account, a normative duty to obey political commands requires firstly, that the commands, rulers and regime are normatively legitimate, and secondly, that citizens also have reason to trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with such commands and regimes. To merit obedience, institutions must thus address the assurance problems faced by ‘conditional compliers’ under complex structures of interdependence. I suggest that this perspective helps address some – though not all – of the central tensions between empirical and normative concepts of legitimacy, and the conflicts between problem solving efficiency and democratic accountability. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The value added of theories of deliberative democracy: where (not) to look. In: Besson, Samantha; Martí, José Luis (Ed.): Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents, pp. 57-72, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN41930,At least five theoretical issues deserve attention if we want empirical research to confirm or disconfirm particular Theories of Deliberative Democracy (TDD) (1) What are the characteristics and the main claims of interesting and distinct TDD? (2) Which are the best alternative theories and their implications? (3) Does deliberation actually occur in ways that only some TDD can explain? (4) Which institutional and cultural factors are conducive to normatively attractive deliberation, and under what conditions? (5) How just, reasonable or legitimate are the outcomes of a proposed theory, both when its norms are generally complied with and under conditions of partial compliance? The present brief reflections contribute to the first two of these topics, to help identify the theoretical work required to proceed with relevant empirical research. I shall argue that this task requires a reconfiguration of the theoretical ideal types and distinctions prevalent in the literature on TDD. This focus on the explanatory value added of TDD by means of an empirical research agenda highlights two weaknesses of some of the literature. Section 2 explains how some of the influential literature on deliberative democracy uses “deliberation” in a too broad sense. This point is briefly substantiated by Jon Elster’s influential discussion. A second weakness is that the competing theories used as backdrop for statements of TDD are presented as “ideal type” straw men rather than selected as the best competitors. Section 3 shows how TDD often have been contrasted with a particularly narrow version of rational choice theory and bargaining theory, instead of more plausible competitors. Unfortunately, this straw man has been labeled “liberal” in ways that has caused confusion. Some research on alleged sightings of deliberation in the European Union institutions illustrates the methodological challenges of such skewed comparisons. Section 4 argues that TDDs must identify their main claims more carefully against the best contenders in each case so as to allow better empirical research. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Legitymizacja regulacyjnej komitologii (The Legitimacy of Regulatory Comitology – Reflections on the promises and pitfalls of strategies of legitimation). In: Karasinska-Fendler, Maria (Ed.): Komitety i komitologia, pp. 197-239, Foundation for European Studies – European Institute, Lodz, 2005. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN26500,The question with what right Europeans can expect compliance of one another emerges with full strength as the European Union unmistakably takes on more and more characteristics of a new legal order with binding public practices – indeed, claiming overriding authority over a well-neigh unconstrained domain of issues through the doctrines of Direct Effect, Supremacy and Implied Powers. The challenge is particularly striking with regards to comitology, one of most perplexing and by some lights most worrisome elements of the European institutions. Dehousse notes the links between compliance and legitimacy when remarking that “Comitology’s legitimacy is not merely a normative issue: it is likely to become a political problem.” The present essay explores some problems involved in the first of these two challenges, by presenting and critically assessing two recent attempts at justifying comitology, those of Majone – Regulatory State and deliberative democratic- Deliberative Supranationalism. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The Seven Habits of Highly Legitimate New Modes of Governance. In: NEWGOV Presentation, 2005. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@article{RN43010,How might ‘New Modes of Governance’ in the European Union be made more legitimate? The following reflections suggest seven ways to enhance the legitimacy of ‘New Modes of Governance’ and hence the legitimacy of the EU. … Section 1 presents an overview of the wideranging discussions of the legitimacy deficit of the EU, with an eye to extrapolate some insights to NMG. For our purposes it is of some importance to be able to distinguish the two questions of of whether an arrangement is democratic and whether it is normatively legitimate. In that spirit, section 2 sketches a unifying account of normative legitimacy that draws on the “assurance game” literature. Long-term support for the EU requires not only present compliance and support, but also long term trust in the general compliance of others both citizens and officials – and shared acceptance of the legality and normative legitimacy of the regime. Suggestions for enhancing legitimacy of the EU – and of NMG – may best be assessed in light of how they jointly can contribute to such trustworthiness. Section 3 points to seven areas where NMG should be modified or supplemented to further enhance trust and trustworthiness in the EU, and hence its legitimacy: – facilitate civil society – be simple and transparent – be sufficiently effective and efficient – socialize to overarching loyalty – monitor problem solving – sanction non-compliance – monitor compliance by citizens and authorities |
Christiansen, Thomas; Follesdal, Andreas; Piattoni, Simona: Informal Governance in the European Union: An Introduction. In: Christiansen, Thomas; Piattoni, Simona (Ed.): Informal governance in the European Union, pp. 1-21, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2004. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN38150,..an important undercurrent to the formal integration process. This concerns the operation of informal networks which link policy-makers to client groups as well as actors across EU, national and sub-national institutions, and influence (or at least seek to influence) decision-making in the EU. … Observers have pointed to the potentially self-defeating competition between rival interest groups to gain access to, and be heard by, the Commission official(s) in charge of their ‘dossier’ … one may criticise the very closeness (or cosiness?) of the relationship between policy-makers and interest groups as a violation of the principles of representative democracy, such as one-person-one-vote and political equality. In terms of this critique, the precise nature of the relationship between Commission officials and interest groups then takes centre stage…. This volume provides a systematic examination of the informal aspects of EU governance which are either in the margins of traditional analyses or ignored altogether. Building on the insights developed above, we consider informal governance as the operation of networks of individual and collective, public and private actors pursuing common goals which lead to cooperation, patterned relations and public decisions – through regular though non-codified and not publicly sanctioned exchanges in the institutional context of the European Union. … In sum, informal governance must strike a balance between transparency and opaqueness, democracy and aristocracy, inclusiveness and selectiveness. Governance fails to spell out how a balance is drawn, how it is reached, and why it should be respected by citizens as legitimate and authoritative. Because of its practically expeditious, yet normatively dubious, nature, governance has more than family resemblance with several political phenomena of long standing in Europe: pluralism and neo-corporatism as mentioned above, and clientelism addressed below Drawing in part on normative analysis of pluralism, neo-corporatism and clientelism, we can identify several issues that are problematic with regards to the legitimacy of informal governance:…Authority…. Participation …Assurance … … a system relying as heavily on informal governance as does the European Union will not only find it difficult to gain the legitimacy of a wider public expecting democratic accountability from formal institutions. … |
Dobson, Lynn; Follesdal, Andreas: Political Theory and the European Constitution. Routledge, London, 2004. (Type: Book | Abstract | Links | Tags: Edited books, EU – European Union, Publications)@book{RN40220,In June 2003, the Convention on the Future of Europe released what may become the Constitution of the European Union. This highly timely volume provides one of the first critical assessments of the draft Constitution from the vantage point of political theory. The work combines detailed institutional analysis with normative political theory, bringing theoretical analysis to bear on the pressing issues of institutional design answered – or bypassed – by the draft Constitution. |
Dobson, Lynn; Follesdal, Andreas: Introduction. In: Dobson, Lynn; Follesdal, Andreas (Ed.): Political Theory and the European Constitution, Routledge, London, 2004. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN40400,The EU poses at least two challenges to a traditional conception of sovereignty …. First, the EU involves multiple territorial levels of decision-making, reminiscent and perhaps prescient – of federal political orders of a kind known as ‘coming together federations’ … Secondly, EU institutions often include private actors in public decision-making in order to increase responsiveness and proximity to affected parties. … we grapple with the major philosophical questions: what kind of polity? And with what moral right, if any, do European politicians now rule, and claim citizens’ compliance? .. We explore topics already well established in the EU literature: subsidiarity, diversity, democratic and legitimacy deficits, and institutional balances of power. · Constitutionalism: should the Union have a Constitution? If so what should it contain? How was the draft text arrived at and what does that process tell us? · European values: are there any common values, and, if so, what are they? How might they co-exist with particular (e.g. national) values? In particular, should religious heritage(s) be mentioned in the Constitution? · Liberty and power(s): different actors, ideologies, and states pursue different forms of liberty, with resulting theoretical and political tensions – between sovereignty as freedom to act, and immunity understood as non-domination; and differing imperatives for centre, large states, and small states; for majorities and minorities. · Common or European interest: lofty sentiments regarding common European objectives are often muddled or conflated, different actors intending quite different things. What clarifications of the different senses of these terms can we offer? These essays contribute towards a systematic understanding of the sometimes profound differences in conceptions of what legitimacy requires, and what political power is for, in the European Union. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Citizenship: European and Global. In: Dower, Nigel; Williams, John (Ed.): Global Citizenship, pp. 71-83, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2002. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN29080,Union citizenship carries clear legal implications fostering freedom of movement and trade, and is intended to supplement, rather than to replace, national citizenship. Dual citizenship also means that the European Union must come to grips with challenges of institutionalisation and multiple loyalties. Reflection on the roles and challenges of Union citizenship may teach lessons for global citizenship. Both forms of citizenship create aspirations to a democratic political order with a scope beyond existing states, and face challenges regarding institutions and political culture aspiring to treat all affected individuals as equals. Section A provides a brief overview of the content of Union Citizenship. Section B discusses the need for trust among individuals creating and sharing European-level institutions. Section C explores how trust can be secured by Union citizenship based on shared commitments rather than on common history and broader culture. Section D draws lessons for the roles and preconditions of global citizenship. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Constructing a European Civic Society: Vaccination for Trust in a Fair, Multi-Level Europe. In: Studies in East European Thought, vol. 54, pp. 303-324, 2002. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@article{RN32070,Draws on Proceedings of Workshop on European citizenship: beyond borders, across identities http://ftp.cordis.lu/pub/improving/docs/ser_citizen_follesdal.pdfftp://ftp.cordis.lu/pub/improving/docs/ser_citizen_follesdal.pdf Expansion of the EU adds urgency to some issues of long standing on the agenda of reform in the European Union.The steep increase in Member States requires drastic reconfiguration of Union institutions, to ensure adequate representation and accountability while maintaining sufficient action capability. The prospect of enlargement is also one cause of the renewed attention and concern for a European identity, to be nurtured by European citizens within a European civic society. Such an identity, citizenship and society seem to be sought for as a medicine or vaccination for some illness, partly in preparation for expansion of the European Union. I seek to clarify the grounds and some desiderata of a European civic society with an eye to the eastward expansion of the Union. Central elements of these searches for a civic society, citizenship and identity are worthy of reflection: what are the symptoms, what is the diagnosis, and which vaccines are sought for and which are not? It is often not necessary to convince citizens that fundamental issues of justice and legitimate institutional design are at stake. Instead, ordinary citizens, within present Member States and in applicant states, often raise fundamental questions concerning the roles and responsibilities of the European Union, the Member States, and individual Europeans. A European civic society worthy of the name must provide opportunities to discuss and assess such issues, standards, ideals and options among citizens who thereby can come to see themselves as equal, full citizens of Europe. Such vaccinations are continually required to secure trust and eternal vigilance for a fair European Union worthy of allegiance.
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Follesdal, Andreas: Drafting a European Constitution Challenges and Opportunitites. 2002. (Type: Miscellaneous | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@misc{RN32660,Whether the European Union needs a constitution is widely debated. However, much of the debate is off target: the central issue is not whether the EU should have a constitution, because for most intents and purposes it already has one. Instead, the crucial issues concern the substantial content such a constitution should have, and how to best obtain it. The current Convention on the Future of Europe is central in this process; its composition avoids some pitfalls but creates others. Section 1 identifies five tasks of a constitution; section 2 presents arguments pro et contra a written constitution for Europe. Section 3 provides a first line of response on the basis of claims that the Union already has a de facto constitution. Section 4 considers challenges for the process of constitutionalisation, and section 5 identifies some possible weaknesses of the resulting constitution. Section 6 draws some lessons, including the role of national parliaments and civil society in the Convention currently underway. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Sami Claims to Land and Water – Special Issue. 2001. (Type: Book | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications, Special issues)@book{RN24030,Contents: Andreas Follesdal: On Saami Claims to Land and Water (103-106) Henry Minde: Sami Land Rights in Norway: A Test Case for Indigenous Peoples (107-125) Asbjørn Eide: Legal and Normative Bases for Saami Claims to Land in the Nordic Countries. (127-149) Else Grete Broderstad: Political Autonomy and Integration of Authority: The Understanding of Saami Self-Determination (151-175) Anne Julie Semb: How Norms Affect Policy The Case of Sami Policy in Norway (177-222) Kirsti Strøm Bull: The Right to Herd Reindeer in the light of the Report of the Saami Law Committee (223-234) Nils Oskal: Political Inclusion of the Saami as Indigenous People in Norway (235-261) Lukas H. Meyer: Transnational Autonomy. Responding to Historical Injustice in the Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples (263-301) Reetta Toivanen: Saami in the European Union (303-323) |
Follesdal, Andreas: Union Citizenship – Special Issue. Law and Philosophy, 2001. (Type: Book | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications, Special issues)@book{RN24080,European Union citizenship raises important questions, opportunities and challenges regarding the future development of the European Union. Indeed, the significance of Union citizenship itself is contested: If Union citizenship the answer, what is the question? The contributions to this special issue of Law and Philosophy explore the plausibility and preconditions of various conceptions of Union citizenship, regarded as a response to the need to foster stability, attachment and direction to the European political order. Contributors include Percy Lehning, Jos de Beus, Andreas Follesdal, and Carlos Closa. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Union Citizenship: Conceptions, Conditions and Preconditions. Introduction to Special issue on Union Citizenship. In: Law and Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 233-237, 2001. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@article{RN31100,European Union citizenship raises important questions, opportunities and challenges regarding the future development of the European Union. Indeed, the significance of Union citizenship itself is contested: If Union citizenship the answer, what is the question? The contributions to this special issue of Law and Philosophy explore the plausibility and preconditions of various conceptions of Union citizenship, regarded as a response to the need to foster stability, attachment and direction to the European political order. Contributors include Percy Lehning, Jos de Beus, Andreas Follesdal, and Carlos Closa. http://www.wkap.nl/oasis.htm/353611 |
Follesdal, Andreas: The future Soul of Europe: Nationalism or Just Patriotism? On David Miller’s Defence of Nationality. In: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 503-518, 2000. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, John Rawls, Publications)@article{RN26150,The paper criticises David Miller’s recent defence of national identity needed to secure the trust required for redistributive welfare arrangements. His argument does not support his conclusion: The shared bases among citizens need not include a broad range of values and cultural belonging, but might plausibly be restricted to Just Patriotism of the kind suggested by Habermas or Rawls in the Liberal Contractualist tradition. One upshot is that Miller’s pessimism regarding the prospects of redistributive regimes in the European Union is unwarranted. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice: Global and European. In: Global Society, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 591-609, 2000. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN26380,The first section of this paper lays out some aspects of liberal contractualism. Section 2 points to some relevant differences in the subject matters of international and European political order. Section 3 indicates that the research questions are interestingly different for the two subjects. At least three central topics must be addressed by a normative theory of federalism when brought to bear on the issues of europeanisation. Democratic theory must be rethought, and the concepts developed for nation-state parameters must be reconfigured. Distributive justice must consider the normative significance of non-unitary modes of governance. Claims to equal shares may have to be tempered by an account of when sub-units must take responsibility for their worst-off, rather than expecting other individuals in the political order as a whole to do so. A third important topic concerns the allocation of authority between the central level and sub-units. In the context of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced to resolve these issues, first in the Maastricht Treaty and most recently elaborated in the Amsterdam Treaty. The principle of subsidiarity places the burden of proof on those who seeks to centralise authorities. However, the principle is contested, can be interpreted in conflicting ways, and can apply in a variety of fields. It merits more attention by political philosophers. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity and democratic deliberation. In: Eriksen, Erik Oddvar; Fossum, John Erik (Ed.): Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, pp. 85-110, Routledge, London, 2000. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN24040,Subsidiarity may seem attractive for deliberative democrats concerned with the opportunities for preference formation in “decentralised processes of decision making … within constitutional political structures.” (Bohman 1999:::, 25; Miller 1992: 54, 67). While there are such reasons for supporting subsidiarity, the Amsterdam conception of subsidiarity also conflicts with the concern for democratic deliberation when it comes to institutional arrangements. The paper identifies three main areas of tension between Amsterdam Subsidiarity and deliberative democracy. Firstly, an urgent but unanswered task is how to secure accountable applications of Amsterdam Subsidiarity. Secondly, this conception of subsidiarity seems to grant unwarranted powers to Member States. Other entities, such as sub-state regions, might also appeal to considerations of subsidiarity, yet such applications and arguments are not recognised. Finally, Amsterdam Subsidiarity may hinder the development of trans-European values and commitments necessary for a stable European political order. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Theories of Democracy for Europe: Multi-level Challenges for Multi-level Governance. 2000. (Type: Miscellaneous | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@misc{RN28750,The European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy, and poses fundamental challenges to the established concepts and principles of democratic theory. The mere existence of the EU proves that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Indeed, the very conception of sovereignty is at stake in current disputes about the proper scope and legal powers to be transferred to central European institutions, without divesting traditional member states of all powers (Jachtenfuchs 1998). European institutions are not designed to replace domestic nodes of governance, but instead turn Europe into a system of multi-level governance. The role of democratic decision procedures and consent must be rethought, both for domestic and multi-level governance, to consider why and in what sense legitimate government must rest on consent of the governed. A central issue must then be the proper scope of democratic decision procedures at the EU level. It is important to get a good sense of the wide range of federal arrangements, so as not to block institutional creativity and political theory prematurely – and so as to realise the perplexing challenges to democratic theory. The EU appears clearly to have features of such non-hierarchical dual sovereignty, yet Member States remain Masters of the Treaties at the IGCs. One central normative issue for multi-level governance is which competences should be placed with each level. A Europe of variable geometry or Europe a la carte becomes especially difficult to square with standard elements of democratic theory, in particular transparency and accountability. Competing politicians or parties can only with great difficulty be held accountable in a multi-level shell game of accountability. Such problems hinder deliberation and interest formation, thus posing extra challenges to the democratic concern that voters and politicians should shape their views in light of arguments concerning the common weal. Finally, increased European mobility appear to challenge some fundamental assumptions and arrangements of democratic theory, possibly reducing the weight of citizens’ claims to democratic decisionmaking. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Third country nationals as Euro-citizens – the case defended. In: Smith, Dennis; Wright, Sue (Ed.): Whose Europe? The turn towards democracy, pp. 104-122, Blackwell, London, 1999. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN23910,Previous versions published as EUI Paper MIG/19 1998. ARENA WP 98/9. The Amsterdam Treaty bolsters Union Citizenship in order to bring the European Union closer to the citizens of Europe. Inadvertently, this strategy gives citizens of non-EU states an inferior status in the European Union, even though they may be semi-permanent residents in a Member State. Union Citizenship increases the social and political exclusion of third country nationals, in violation of the basic democratic principle that those affected by social institutions should also enjoy political levers of influence. The paper first briefly sketches a Liberal Contractualist defence for awarding this group full citizenship in the relevant Member State, arguing in particular for three somewhat contested issues, that a) third country nationals should not only enjoy Union Citizenship, but also be given national citizenship in the Member State of residence. b) Member states may impose conditions, oaths etc. on such prospective citizens. c) Member States may withhold some privileges from those resident third country nationals who refuse to be naturalised. The paper goes on to present and discuss, only to dismiss, the most plausible arguments offered in defence of current practice within the context of a Europe of open borders for Member State citizens. These arguments seek to deny citizenship to third country nationals in order a) To protect national and locally endorsed values ensuring social homogeneity of the community; b) To exclude people with non-liberal values; c) To ensure commitment to a shared future which warrants democratic rights in the first place; d) To avoid instability caused by citizens with conflicting multiple loyalties; e) To ensure and foster the ideal of active political participation, impossible for dual citizens; f) To avoid backlash problems among current EU citizens which threaten the stability of welfare policies of Member States and the EU. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity. In: Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 190-218, 1998. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN19890,The principle of subsidiarity regulates authority within a political order, placing the burden of argument with attempts to centralize authority. It has come to recent political prominence through its inclusion in the Maastricht treaty on European Union., intended to quell fears of centralization. However, the principle increases and shapes such tensions due to disagreement about formulations and possible institutional roles. Alternative accounts have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of sub-units, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. The need for a political theory of subsidiarity thus established, five alternative normative justifications of conceptions of subsidiarity are presented and assessed, illustrated by reference to the European Union. Few of the arguments constitute full theories addressing all issues of interpretation and application. Two arguments from liberty – Althusius and Confederalism – are addressed, one argument from efficiency (fiscal or economic federalism), and two arguments from justice: a Catholic argument based on Personalism and liberal contractualism. The order roughly reflects the decreasing autonomy of sub-units granted by each argument.. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy, legitimacy and majority rule in the EU. In: Weale, Albert; Nentwich, Michael (Ed.): Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, constitutional choice and citizenship, pp. 34-48, Routledge, London, 1998. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Human Rights, Publications)@inbook{RN16220,When it is said that the European Union has suffered from a democratic deficit, the term ‘democracy’ is used to lament several separate lacunas. The aim of the present paper is to explore the relations between two of the senses in which ‘democracy’ is said to have been missing in the European Union.Democracy as Legitimacy: Institutions, as all other rules that regulate behaviour, should be legitimate in several senses. We are only morally obligated to obey normatively legitimate institutions. That is: they must be justifiable to the ‘demos’, to all affected parties. Normative legitimacy requires a presentation and justification of such principles of legitimacy for the European Union, as well as transparency of its institutions. Only then can the public assess whether principles of legitimacy are satisfied. At present, we have neither such a theory of justice, nor the requisite transparency. Democracy as Majority Rule: ‘Democracy’ is also used to describe the decision procedures of institutions whereby the preference of the majority of the electorate determines the result. Suggestions abound that the institutions should be changed to increase the role of majority rule as a central structure for citizen participation. The precise relations and implications between these two senses of democracy – of normative legitimacy and of majority rule – are contested and obscure.The aim of this paper is to explore these relations from a particular contractualist perspective, addressing some specific issues regarding the relevance of consent, and indicating how this approach frames the practical arguments about institutional reform witnessed in the Amsterdam Treaty and beyond. Section 1 provides a sketch of a Liberal Contractualist theory of normative legitimacy. Section 2 brings this perspective to bear on claims to majoritarian mechanisms, and section 3 considers some contractualist constraints on majority rule. In conclusion I note how the contested ends of the European Union are central to a satisfactory resolution of these issues. As long as the explicit aim of the union was economic, increased efficiency was easily interpreted as Pareto-improvements within a utilitarian setting. The task of the European Union was previously predominantly to secure peace and stability through free markets, leaving matters of distribution and authority aside, in accordance with standard (though by no means uncontroversial) economic theory. The European Union now has much broader political aspirations. Its objectives, criteria of efficiency, and the role of majoritarian mechanisms must be reconsidered accordingly. The choice of means become more important as economic benefit is supplemented by other political goals. Transparency and the rule of law, majority rule, distributive justice, and human rights all become central issues. They cannot be regarded merely as ideals to be pursued on a par with economic efficiency, but are conditions of justice if the European Union indeed is to become and appear legitimate. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy, pp. 145-163, Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN15900,Shifting notions of sovereignty may affect the scope of application and content of principles of just distribution: the scope of our welfare obligations may legitimately be affected by state borders. The article takes for granted the egalitarian commitment of many welfare states, and pursue the international implications of this commitment. In section 2 I summarize various arguments offered in favor of the Priority of Compatriots. In section 3 I present several arguments against domestic inequality. Section 4 argues that a further claim to equal shares, is a reasonable demand to make among citizens of democratic welfare states. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) offers what is perhaps the most convincing defense of the liberal egalitarian welfare state. However, his contribution takes as its prime subject domestic justice, leaving aside the implications for global distribution. My defense of equal shares is compatible with Rawls’ account, and it allows us, in section 5, to bring the arguments against inequality and for equality to bear on the issue of global and regional distribution. I conclude that legitimate global regimes must secure the satisfaction of the basic needs of all, but not necessarily secure equal shares for all participants. In section 6 I consider some peculiar normative issues arising within the European Union, where states have partly pooled their sovereignty. I suggest that the shared institutions of the EU support claims to equal shares among the inhabitants: the same egalitarian arguments appear to hold among them as hold among fellow citizens of a state. Equal shares of political power, of social opportunities, and of income and wealth, among citizens in the EU is a requirement of justice, based on the nature of their social co-operation under the four freedoms. Thus a legitimate EU may not be limited to maintaining a free market: ‘real’ convergence and solidarity within the EU must go beyond the alleviation of poverty, towards securing equal standards of living. State sovereignty must therefore be restricted, for the benefit of central institutions aiming to secure equality. The claims to equality I sketch do not exhaust the normative relevance of political borders. In conclusion, in section 7, I therefore note countervailing considerations and further important areas of normative reflection regarding a theory of global distributive justice. For instance, our concern for equality comes into conflict with another important of our interests: democratic self-governance, allowing a diversity of social arrangements. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Citizenship and Political Rights in the European Union: Consensus and Questions. In: Bauböck, Reiner; Melchior, Josef (Ed.): Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union, pp. 43-51, Institut für Höhere Studien., Wien, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN23680,Proceedings of the Austrian Dialogue on Political and Social Rights in the EU. 1) Fragments of a Democratic Theory of Europe acceptable argument for democracy and majority rule must show that such distribution of political control are to our knowledge the most reliable mechanisms for securing and promoting the interests of all affected parties to an acceptable degree. Such a defence is comparative and cautious. All those affected by social institutions, should have an equal say in how these institutions should operate. Majority rule among all affected parties, carefully circumscribed, is the best flawed institutional arrangement securing the equal worth and respect of all affected parties. An argument of this form also seems to hold at the European level. For citizens in the European Union today, domestic democratic arrangements are insufficient. The domestic electorate and the affected no longer match. 2) Can such a theory command consensus? Four objections can be mentioned, all of which can receive adequate response. a) No appeal to shared history or destiny? b) Stretches altruism and empathy too far? c) Outsiders? d) Means of Will Formation? 3) Challenges to such a Democratic Theory of Europe a) Theory of justice for Europe: what are common good and civic virtues? b) The future of the Member States and state citizenship c) Allocation of powers among individuals, states, and EU institutions d) Outsiders: Non-EU permanent residents |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy and Federalism in the EU: a Liberal Contractualist Perspective. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, vol. ARENA Reprint 98/9, pp. 231-253, Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN23690,The status of states in the European Union raises fundamental normative questions for a theory of federalism. The normative issue of concern here arise in federal arrangements where member states differ in population size, as in the EU. The central decision procedures may accord all member states equal power, or make the voting power of all Europeans equal, but not both. Should states or citizens be equal? A normative theory of federations must address two main topics. Institutions should recognize and authorize communities or states only insofar as such allocation of authority are sound ways of securing the interests of some individuals of these states. Standards of legitimacy must be developed, either to hold for all federations, or to serve as guides for the elaboration of specific criteria for each particular federation. Unfortunately, neither kind of principles have yet been developed. Secondly, federal arrangements appear to run afoul of the norms of equal political rights and majority rule. Consider: by entrenching the equality of states, a minority of voters living in several less populated states may override a majority of the citizens in the federation. This clearly runs counter to the normative bases for majoritarian voting procedures, which insist that the vote of each individual should count the same. I sketch a contractualist defense for the equal political rights of states within federal arrangements. On this view it is consistent with liberal contractualism that small states in federal arrangements wield powers out of proportion with their population size. This contractualist argument is contingent on empirical claims which must eventually be supported by evidence beyond the auspices of normative political theory; the task here is only to sketch the argumentative strategy and defend it against certain objections. Section II sketches some fragments of a contractualist normative theory, focusing on the motivational assumptions and the case for majority rule. To allow a better grasp of the normative implications of this view, section III considers some of the arguments traditionally offered in favor of federal arrangements. Section IV brings liberal contractualism to bear on the puzzle of federalism. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy and the European Union: Challenges. In: Andreas, Follesdal; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, pp. 1-10, Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Publications)@inbook{RN23700,The legitimacy of trans-state institutions in the European Union can hardly be determined without keen regard for whether and why they should exist, and whence they arose. Theories of democracy have not only endorsed universal suffrage, but also justified more specific details. The commonplaces include constitutionally specified procedures and constraints, including the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers; transparency; accountability of elected representatives to the electorate; and majority rule. The European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy, and poses fundamental challenges to the established concepts and principles of democratic theory. The mere existence of the EU proves that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Indeed, the very conception of sovereignty is at stake in current disputes about the proper scope and legal powers to be transferred to central European institutions, without divesting traditional member states of all powers. Pivotal parts of the decisions of the EU are subject to neither watch nor control by the citizens of member states, neither directly nor by their representatives. Furthermore, what control and accountability there is runs counter to received democratic theory. The project of European integration may be only the latest fain attempt at embodying the ancient ideals of democratic rule in polities far from the Greek polis. But the democratic deficit of the European Union need not herald tragic choices among incompatible values. For the issue of designing political institutions of Europe, it is simply too early to tell. Creative and politically astute research and negotiations may increase the range of institutional alternatives. And careful and well-informed deliberations in normative political theory must be brought to bear on the range of alternatives. The present volume contributes to this important task. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy in the European Union: The Need for Theory. In: Center for offentlig organisasjon og styring, Denmark, no. Report 2/1997, 1997. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Publications)@article{RN23710,The legitimacy of the trans-national institutions born by European integration has so far received some, but scant attention. The task of normative political theory is to offer concepts, arguments and criteria that further these debate, addressing problems of principle. |
Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter: Democracy and the European Union. Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book | Abstract | Tags: Democratic theory, Edited books, EU – European Union, Publications)@book{RN19900,The European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy, and poses fundamental challenges to the established concepts and principles of democratic theory. The mere existence of the EU proves that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Indeed, the very conception of sovereignty is at stake in current disputes about the proper scope and legal powers to be transferred to central European institutions, without divesting traditional member states of all powers. The question of legitimate governance is raised anew, regarding the exercise of legal powers in Europe. The legitimacy of such transnational institutions born by political integration has so far received some, but scant attention. The task of normative political theory is to offer concepts, arguments and criteria that further these debate, addressing problems of principle. The peoples of Europe, weaned on democratic institutions at home, are alarmed by the transfer of powers out of their reach. Careful and well-informed deliberations in normative political theory must be brought to bear on the range of alternatives. The present volume contributes to this important task. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Handmaiden, gadfly, midwife? The roles of normative political theory. 1996. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Publications)@unpublished{RN17030,The paper considers the role of normative political theory and its relationships to empirical social science research, arguing for the possibility, plausibility and fruitfulness of normative political theory regarded as providing a somewhat independent stance for critical assessment of existing social institutions. The central topics occasioning these reflections are the intertwined issues of legitimacy, democracy and stability within the European Union. Part 1 delineates various important conceptions of ‘legitimacy’, part 2 considers the notion of democracy. Part 3 sketches some alternative conceptions of the role of political theory, and part 4 pursues the implications of these views for why research in normative political theory appears important. Part 5 expands on one alternative to strict functionalist accounts of political theory, indicating how Normative Contractualism may be brought to bear on central issues facing Europe. Part 6 concludes the paper by indicating where this kind of normative political theory relies on empirical research. |
Publications
| : A just yet unequal European Union: A defense of moderate economic inequality. In: Review of Social Economy, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 8-36, 2023. |
| : Subsidiarity to the Rescue for the European Courts? Resolving tensions between the Margin of Appreciation and Human Rights Protection. In: Heidemann, Dietmar; Stoppenbrink, Katja (Ed.): Join, or Die – Philosophical Foundations of Federalism, pp. 251-272, de Gruyter, Berlin, 2016. |
| : Curb, Channel and Coordinate: The Constitutionalisation of International Courts and Tribunals. In: Baere, Geert De; Wouters, Jan (Ed.): The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law, pp. 355-369, Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2015. |
| : Subsidiarity and the global order. In: Zimmermann, Augusto; Evans, Michelle (Ed.): Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity, pp. 207-220, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. |
| : Democracy, identity, and European public spheres. In: Risse, Thomas (Ed.): European Public Spheres: Politics is Back, pp. 247-262, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. |
| : Democratic standards in an asymmetric Union. In: Cramme, Olaf; Hobolt, Sara B. (Ed.): Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress, pp. 199 -216, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. |
| : Will the Reform Treaty Combat the Union’s Legitimacy Crisis?. In: Merle, Jean-Christophe (Ed.): Die Legitimität von supranationalen Institutionen der EU, pp. 112-129, LIT-Verlag, Münster, 2012. |
| : The Legitimacy Challenges for New Modes of Governance: Trustworthy Responsiveness. In: Government and Opposition, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 81-100, 2011, (First as 2008 NEWGOV Report DTF/D09 , http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/DDTFD09_Legitimacy_Challenges_for_NMG.pdf). |
| : Non-State Oriented Political Theory: A Critical Assessment. In: Neyer, Jurgen; Wiener, Antje (Ed.): Political Theory of the European Union, pp. 205-212, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. |
| : Introduction: Nordic Reluctance towards Judicial Review under Siege. In: Nordic Journal of Human Rights, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 131-141, 2009. |
| : European Union Citizenship. In: EU research in social sciences and humanities : Policy Synthesis of EU Research Results, 2008. |
| : How to Organize Democracy in Multi-level and Multi-cultural States: Can it be done? Should it be done? [In Chinese]. In: Hong, Zhou; Kohler-Koch, Beate (Ed.): EU Governance Model, pp. 102-126, Social Science Academy Press Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, 2008. |
| : Human Rights, Democracy and Federalism – part of the problem or part of the solution? Securing stability in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. In: Current Politics and Economics of Asia, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 211-236, 2008. |
| : Legitimacy Deficits beyond the State: Diagnoses and Cures. In: Hurrelmann, Achim; Schneider, Steffen; Steffek, Jens (Ed.): Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, pp. 211-228, Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2007. |
| : Normative Political Theory and the European Union. In: Jorgensen, Knud Erik; Pollack, Mark A.; Rosamund, Ben (Ed.): Handbook of European Union Politics, pp. 317-335, Sage, London, 2007. |
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