Follesdal, Andreas: A just yet unequal European Union: A defense of moderate economic inequality. In: Review of Social Economy, 2021. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: federalism, John Rawls, publication)@article{RN52113, What does justice require concerning socio-economic distribution among citizens of the European Union? The EU should reduce cross-national economic inequalities among inhabitants of different member states, but full economic distributive equality or a European ‘Difference Principle,’ may not be required. Individuals’ claim to more political influence over matters controlled by their own state in the quasi-federal EU may permit some economic inequality. Section 1 orients this contribution relative to arguments for a European universal income. Section 2 provides relevant features of the EU. Section 3 considers contractualist arguments against certain forms of economic inequality, while section 4 identifies a further argument in favour of equal shares of benefits of social cooperation, based on an interpretation of ‘social primary goods’ consistent with Rawls’ theory. Section 5 argues that these reasons for economic distributive equality must be weighed against more political influence over matters controlled by the individual’s sub-unit. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Social Primary Goods. In: Mandle, Jon; Reidy, David (Ed.): The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, pp. 643-647, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: gender, John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN49151, Rawls’ theory of justice concerns the scope of required equalities and permitted inequalities engendered by the basic social structure (BS) of a society. this subject requires an index of benefits and burdens that allows publicly accessible interpersonal comparisons of citizens’ well-being, in the relevant sense, among representative members of various social groups. Rawls’ answer is to focus on how the basic structure of society distributes Social primary goods. The entry discusses this account. |
Follesdal, Andreas: John Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness. In: Fløistad, Guttorm (Ed.): Philosophy of Justice, pp. 311-328, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN49430, When do citizens have a moral duty to obey the government and support the institutions of society? This question is central to political philosophy. One of the 20 century’s main response was John Rawls’ theory of justice, “Justice as fairness”, in the book A Theory of Justice, published 1971. The book Justice as Fairness was an improved and shorter presentation of Rawls’ theory, published 2001 with editorial support by Erin Kelly, one of his former students. …This introduction of Rawls falls into eight parts. After a brief biographical introduction, Part 2 presents the allocation principles he advocated. Part 3 presents Rawls’ conception of society and the individual, as an introduction to the rest of the argument presented in part 4 Section 5 takes up his theory of justification, and part 6 points to three areas where the more recent book Justice as Fairness differs somewhat from A Theory of Justice. Section 7 presents some of the criticisms that have been raised, and section 8 points to some lasting contributions of Rawls’ theory. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A Category Mistake?. In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 46-65, 2011. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@article{RN48747, The present article explores ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ arguments, that shared institutions above the state, such as there are, are not of a kind that support or give rise to distributive claims beyond securing minimum needs. The upshot is to rebut certain of these ‘anti-cosmopolitann’ arguments. Section 2 asks under which conditions institutions are subject to distributive justice norms. That is, which sound reasons support claims to a relative share of the benefits of institutions that exist and apply to individuals? Such norms may require strict equality, Rawls’ Difference Principle, or other constraints on inequality. Section 2 considers, and rejects, several arguments why existing international institutions are not thought to meet these conditions. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: “Hva slags likhet, hvorfor likhet? Amartya Sen, John Rawls og Hilde Bojer om funksjoner, rettigheter og mulighetsrom”. In: Hylland, Aanund; Bjerkholt, Olav; Skrede, Kari; Ofstad, Bjørg (Ed.): Rettferd og politikk, pp. 71-88, Emilia, Oslo, 2009. (Type: Book Chapter | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN48560, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice, stability and toleration in a Federation of Well-ordered Peoples. In: Martin, Rex; Reidy, David (Ed.): Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A realistic utopia?, pp. 299-317, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: federalism, Human Rights, John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN40840, How should the European Union express and promote human rights and solidarity? What is the scope of toleration towards states that violate human rights, within and beyond its borders? And what is the scope of permissible economic inequality across states in such a federation of democracies committed to domestic solidarity? … John Rawls contributed to these topics in The Law of Peoples (LP), which stresses the intertwined issues of toleration, stability and legitimacy that face these political relations across political borders. Can this Law of Peoples shed light on the legitimacy of emerging regional political orders such as … the European Union? The account offered here seeks to respect state sovereignty even in the face of some human rights violations, and it accepts a degree of material inequality among individuals in different sub-units of a federation. In particular, the European Union may have a differentiated human rights policy, and solidarity does not require a European-wide Difference Principle. The Difference Principle, even if appropriate for domestic justice, need not apply to a federal order. But the conception of human rights for federations must be more complex than Rawls’ account focused on human rights in a ‘nonfederated’ international order. That difference in domain of application is not a criticism of the Law of Peoples. However, a central weakness of Rawls’ account is that it offers inadequate arguments within its own intended domain of application. International stability for the right reasons requires more than a statement of the limits of toleration about “how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated” |
Follesdal, Andreas; Pogge, Thomas: Introduction. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Pogge, Thomas (Ed.): Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights Standards and Institutions, pp. 1-19, Springer, Doordrecht, 2005, (Author Role: eds.). (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Human Rights, John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN42580, This volume discusses principles of global justice, their normative grounds, and the social institutions they require. John Rawls’s classic A Theory of Justice firmly established social institutions as a separate domain of moral assessment, associated with the terms justice and social justice. The concept of global justice breaks down the traditional separation of intranational and international relations and extends institutional moral analysis to the whole field. In the traditional framework, we generally bear no responsibility for the violence and poverty inflicted upon foreigners within the black box of their own state. The new philosophical framework, associated with the expression “global justice,” may not be so comfortable. Central to this framework is the causal impact of the design of the global institutional order upon the conditions under which human beings worldwide are living. Within this general global-justice approach, distinct conceptions of global justice will differ in the specific criteria of global justice they propose. But such criteria will coincide in their emphasis on the question of how well our global institutional order is doing, compared to its feasible alternatives, in regard to the fundamental human interests that matter from a moral point of view. Extending institutional moral analysis beyond the state, this question focuses attention on how the massive incidence of extreme poverty and violence in the world today might be reduced not merely through better government behavior, internally and internationally, but also, and much more effectively, through global institutional reforms that would, among other things, elevate such government behavior by modifying the options governments have and the incentives they face. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Liberal Contractualism – Partial and Particularist, Impartial and Cosmopolitan. In: Caney, Simon; Lehning, Percy (Ed.): International Distributive Justice: Cosmopolitanism and its Critics, Routledge, London, 2004, ISBN: 978-0-415-23441-2. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN26140, Several authors have explored or defended moderate nationalism, characterised by limited partiality for fellow nationals or fellow citizens, and loyalty to the laws and institutions of one’s own society. Critics have argued that such loyalties are incompatible with ‘cosmopolitan’ universalist liberalism, on at least two grounds. The article seeks to rebut these objections from a liberal contractualist position similar to that of Rawls, Dworkin and Scanlon. Liberal theories are thought to disallow deviations from impartial treatment and therefore rule out substantive special claims among compatriots. The scope for contractualist partiality is the subject of section 2. Liberal theories are also considered unable to account for political duties — the duty to comply with the just laws and institutions of one’s own state. The contractualist grounds for political allegiance are addressed in section 3. This is not to say that liberal contractualism endorses nationalism understood as a principle of political order, that political and cultural/ethnic boundaries should coincide. A brief sketch of some elements of Liberal Contractualism is presented in section 1. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Innledning. In: transl Swensen, Kai (Ed.): John Rawls: Rettferdighet som rimelighet (Justice as Fairness), Pax, Oslo, 2003. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN34300, Når har innbyggere moralsk plikt til å adlyde myndighetene og slutte opp om samfunnsinstitusjonene? Dette spørsmålet står sentralt i politisk filosofi. Et av det 20. århundrets viktigste svar var John Rawls’ teori om rettferdighet, “Rettferdighet som rimelighet”, i boken A Theory of Justice som kom i 1971. I 2001 kom en forbedret og kortere fremstilling av Rawls’ teori, i boken Justice as Fairness som Rawls skrev med redaksjonell støtte fra Erin Kelly, en av hans tidligere studenter. Det er denne oppdaterte presentasjonen som nå foreligger på norsk, svært dyktig oversatt av Kai Swensen, og med støtte fra Norges forskningsråds Verdinett. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om John Rawls’ teori om rettferdighet som rimelighet. In: Kelly, (Ed.): John Rawls: Rettferdighet som rimelighet, pp. 11-36, Pax, Oslo, 2003, (Author, Subsidiary: Kelly (ed.) Erin; Swensen (transl.) Kai). (Type: Book Chapter | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN31010, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: John Rawls. In: Berg, Eriksen Trond (Ed.): Vestens store tenkere: fra Platon til våre dager, pp. 505-514 (414-422 i Aschehougs utgivelse), Aschehoug, Oslo, 2002. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN32620, oppdatert fra 1993-versjonen |
Follesdal, Andreas: Rawls in the Nordic Countries. In: Rawls in Europe, special issue of European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 181-198, 2002. (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@article{RN30430, |
Follesdal, Andreas: The future Soul of Europe: Nationalism or Just Patriotism? On David Miller’s Defence of Nationality. In: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 503-518, 2000. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@article{RN26150, The paper criticises David Miller’s recent defence of national identity needed to secure the trust required for redistributive welfare arrangements. His argument does not support his conclusion: The shared bases among citizens need not include a broad range of values and cultural belonging, but might plausibly be restricted to Just Patriotism of the kind suggested by Habermas or Rawls in the Liberal Contractualist tradition. One upshot is that Miller’s pessimism regarding the prospects of redistributive regimes in the European Union is unwarranted. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Global Justice as Impartiality: Whither claims to equal shares?. In: Coates, Tony (Ed.): International Justice, pp. 150-166, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN23830, Based on ARENA Working Paper 98/8: “Contractualist Egalitarianism: Whence and Whither” The paper argues that liberal contractualism can defend the distributive significance of state borders. While unequal shares of certain goods is unreasonable among citizens, some such inequalities are not objectionable in a system of sovereign states. Domestically, a strong case can be made for requiring equal shares of “social primary goods”, understood as legal powers within a state characterised by pluralism. However, global regimes need not maximise the share of the globally worst off. Thus a “Global Difference Principle” is not a condition of legitimacy for regimes regulating states in a system of states. The argument shows that claims to equality within liberal contractualism are not robust, as there is no general presumption for equality of condition or of shares of goods. This account thus challenges the received view of liberal contractualism and Justice as Impartiality, which is often thought to justify a general egalitarian baseline for all distributive domains. The paper offers a defence of Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness, which has been regarded as fundamentally inconsistent in rejecting a Global Difference Principle and in disregarding naturally occurring inequalities. The argument presented defends the consistency of Justice as Fairness, but challenges that theory’s relevance for the present world order. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Liberal Nationalism – defending the very idea. 2000. (Type: Miscellaneous | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@misc{RN28740, Alleged tensions between liberalism and nationalism have recently received sustained attention. Several authors have explored or defended moderate views. Yet liberal theories are considered unable to account for political allegiance — the duty to comply with the just laws and institutions of one’s own state. I assume that political allegiance is central to the very idea of nationalism. If it is incompatible with “cosmopolitan” universalist liberalism, the critics are right. The article seeks to respond from a liberal contractualist position similar to that of Rawls, Barry, Dworkin or Scanlon (Rawls 1971, 1971, Barry 1995, Dworkin 1978, Scanlon 1998). This is the main content of section 2. This is not to say that liberal contractualism endorses nationalism understood as a principle of political order, that political and cultural/ethnic boundaries should coincide. In order to bring this out, section 3 of the article includes some considerations concerning the grounds for recognising national groups’ claims to some measures of political autonomy. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Hvorfor likhet, hva slags likhet? Normative føringer på forskning om makt og demokrati (Why Equality – Equality of What? Normative Guidelines for Research on Power and Democracy). In: Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 123-147, 1999. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@article{RN22330, The article explores the ideal of equality said to underpin the Scandinavian welfare states. Equality is not one, but multiple ideals. There are at least five reasons for equality of various kinds, with important different implications for choice of quality of life measures, for democratic arrangements, and for standards of legitimate distribution of power within a society. Most reasons for equality are best regarded as arguments against certain large inequalities of particular kinds, to prevent domination and procedural mishaps. The best reason for securing equal shares is offered in John Rawls’ theory Justice as Fairness, focusing on Social Primary Goods – civil and political rights, income and wealth, and fair equality of opportunity. These arguments for limiting inequality underscore the need for research on quality of life. The article pursues some implications for choice of indicators, focusing on the added constraint of pervasive pluralism of conceptions of the good. Finally, some implications are presented with regard to the study of democracy and power. Democracy is important for securing some forms of equality and for a legitimate distribution of many benefits and burdens generally. But some interpretations of democracy, such as of participatory democracy, must be revised. |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Makt i John Rawls’ teori om Rettferdighet som rimelighet. In: Engelstad, Fredrik (Ed.): Maktbegrepet: Teori og kritikk, vol. Makt- og demokratiutredningen, pp. 262-290, AdNotam Gyldendal, Oslo, 1999. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN23400, Del 1 skisserer antagelser om de grunnleggende samfunnsinstitusjonene og livssynsmangfoldet, for å forstå hvorfor teorien har dette som tema og premiss. Rawls’ teori Rettferdighet som rimelighet legger stor vekt på institusjonenes rolle: de preger våre verdier og forventninger på fundamentale måter, og påvirker maktfordelingen oss imellom i samfunnet. Om institusjonene dermed utøver ‘makt’ er et definisjonsspørsmål. Del 2 skisserer enkelte sider ved Rawls’ teori, og del 3 ser kort på hvordan samfunnsinstitusjonenes betydning forklarer den sterke likhetorienteringen i rettferdighetsprinsippene. Del 4 peker på noen aspekter av teorien av betydning for forståelse av maktbegrepet, og del 5 skisserer noen konsekvenser for demokratiske ordninger. Del 6 nevner noen hovedinnvendinger mot teorien. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy, pp. 145-163, Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN15900, Shifting notions of sovereignty may affect the scope of application and content of principles of just distribution: the scope of our welfare obligations may legitimately be affected by state borders. The article takes for granted the egalitarian commitment of many welfare states, and pursue the international implications of this commitment. In section 2 I summarize various arguments offered in favor of the Priority of Compatriots. In section 3 I present several arguments against domestic inequality. Section 4 argues that a further claim to equal shares, is a reasonable demand to make among citizens of democratic welfare states. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) offers what is perhaps the most convincing defense of the liberal egalitarian welfare state. However, his contribution takes as its prime subject domestic justice, leaving aside the implications for global distribution. My defense of equal shares is compatible with Rawls’ account, and it allows us, in section 5, to bring the arguments against inequality and for equality to bear on the issue of global and regional distribution. I conclude that legitimate global regimes must secure the satisfaction of the basic needs of all, but not necessarily secure equal shares for all participants. In section 6 I consider some peculiar normative issues arising within the European Union, where states have partly pooled their sovereignty. I suggest that the shared institutions of the EU support claims to equal shares among the inhabitants: the same egalitarian arguments appear to hold among them as hold among fellow citizens of a state. Equal shares of political power, of social opportunities, and of income and wealth, among citizens in the EU is a requirement of justice, based on the nature of their social co-operation under the four freedoms. Thus a legitimate EU may not be limited to maintaining a free market: ‘real’ convergence and solidarity within the EU must go beyond the alleviation of poverty, towards securing equal standards of living. State sovereignty must therefore be restricted, for the benefit of central institutions aiming to secure equality. The claims to equality I sketch do not exhaust the normative relevance of political borders. In conclusion, in section 7, I therefore note countervailing considerations and further important areas of normative reflection regarding a theory of global distributive justice. For instance, our concern for equality comes into conflict with another important of our interests: democratic self-governance, allowing a diversity of social arrangements. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The standing of illiberal states: Stability and toleration in John Rawls’ “Law of Peoples”. In: Koller, P.; Puhl, K. (Ed.): Current Issues in Political Philosophy: Justice in Society and World Order, pp. 165-174, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN17020, Based on “The Standing of States” 1996. John Rawls’ “Law of Peoples” (1993) extends the theory of Justice as Fairness to the relations between states. A satisfactory extension must alleviate worries about stability of the world order, as well as delimit the scope of toleration towards non-liberal states. These concerns are important, but the account of liberal toleration presented in ‘”Law of Peoples” fails to offer a satisfactory response. Moreover, it is incompatible with the normative individualism underpinning Rawls’ approach regarding domestic justice. The Law of Peoples awards moral standing to some political communities, “hierarchical societies”, which deny basic liberties and justify institutions by appeal to one comprehensive conception of the good. A more satisfactory alternative theory of justice for international relations justifies more extensive universal asprations and distributive implications. It is argued that this alternative theory of global justice is not unduly liberal, and does not threaten the stability of a just world order. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The standing of states: On John Rawls’ “Law of Peoples”. In: Koller, Peter; Puhl, Klaus (Ed.): Current issues in political philosophy, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, 1996, (Volume ID: 4
Call Number: (A)). (Type: Book Chapter | Tags: John Rawls)@inbook{RN23660, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: John Rawls: Beskjeden banebryter. In: Norsk Statsvitenskaplig Tidsskrift, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 105-111, 1994. (Type: Journal Article | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@article{RN13630, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: John Rawls: bibliografi. In: Norsk Statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 261-263, 1994, (Call Number: (D)). (Type: Journal Article | Tags: John Rawls)@article{RN23590, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: Om Rawls og lokal rettferdighet. In: Norsk Statsvitenskaplig Tidsskrift, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 223-239, 1994. (Type: Journal Article | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@article{RN11530, |
Føllesdal, Andreas: John Rawls. In: Berg, Eriksen Trond (Ed.): Vestens Tenkere, vol. Bind 3, pp. 439-451, Aschehoug, Oslo, 1993. (Type: Book Chapter | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN7120, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls’ contractualism. In: Wetlesen, Jon (Ed.): Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver, pp. 109-127, Universitetet I Oslo, Oslo, 1992. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Human Rights, John Rawls, publication)@inbook{RN9250, I sketch how international human rights can be understood and be justified on the basis of human worth within a contractualist perspective similar to that presented in John Rawls’ theory of domestic distributive justice. The present sketch addresses the subject of the relationship between states, and the role of human rights in that regard (cf. Follesdal 1991 for a more elaborate presentation.) I shall be particularly concerned to show that the contractualist tradition, which emphasizes human worth and certain institutional kinds of equality among citizens, nevertheless can permit larger economic inequalities among individuals of different states. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Notes on the nature of impact arguments (unpublished). 1992. (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@unpublished{RN9450, Develops the contractualist notion of “impact argument”, defends such arguments against two objections: that they are inconsistent with John Rawls’ work, thus not compatible with one of the major contractualist theorists; and that impact arguments render the relation “more just than” cyclical. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation). UMI No. 9211679, Harvard University, 1991. (Type: Book | Abstract | Tags: Human Rights, John Rawls, publication)@book{RN5400, What can foreigners claim of each other as a matter of justice? On reflection, many will agree that the international distributive institutions, domestic and international, should ensure the satisfaction of certain basic needs for all. That each year millions die of starvation is not only a tragedy, but also a matter of injustice. This continuing disaster is not due to global shortages of food, but to poverty and lack of basic medical care under unjust domestic and international social institutions. At the same time, we also harbor another strongly held conviction: that domestic social institutions can legitimately favor fellow compatriots over foreigners. Foreigners can claim less from us than our fellow citizens can. These two intuitions are difficult to reconcile in a principled way within a contractualist moral theory. Institutions, as other general rules regulating behavior, must be justifiable to all. But why should state borders affect the weight or reasonableness of individuals’ claims? Considerations of justice would seem to require that we reject the social institution of state borders as yet another source of unjustified bias, like racism or sexism. How, in particular, can arbitrary state borders possibly restrict Rawls’ argument for equality among individuals? If some needs of foreigners should count when reflecting on international distributive justice, foreigners should be able to claim equal shares of income and wealth, or indeed a distribution which maximized the share of the Globally worst off. Rawlsian theories of global justice have therefore tended to endorse a “Global Difference Principle.” On this view, a global set of social institutions is just only if no other set of institutions improves the economic plight of the (representative) globally least advantaged. Compatriots may have special duties towards one another, but only insofar as the global set of distributive institutions still serves to maximize the income and wealth of the globally worst off. A Response: The Bounded Significance of State Borders Alternatively, we must provide a contractualist account of the moral significance of state borders which explain why borders should temper foreigners claims on goods. This dissertation offers such an explanation. The present Theory of Global Justice defends the Bounded Significance of State Borders for matters of distributive justice. On this view, state borders are significant in the following sense: Justice requires that the global distributive institutions must attempt to satisfy what I call the Determinate Human Needs of all. This requirement takes priority over all other claims. But state borders affect the reasonableness of compatriots and foreigners’ further claims, e.g. to equal shares of income and wealth. Rawls’ Difference Principle regulates the distribution of income and wealth among citizens, but the global set of institutions need not distribute economic benefits to maximize the advantage of the globally worst of: there is no Global Difference Principle. This intermediary position is stable because the claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders to support the Difference Principle, but does not require a Global Difference Principle among individuals in different states. Nevertheless, political control over international economic institutions must be distributed equally among participants. The Theory of Global Justice thus illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualist theories. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The ethics of deception in negotiation. 1990, (Medium Designator: Paper submitted for publication
Call Number: (A)). (Type: Unpublished | Abstract | Tags: John Rawls)@unpublished{RN5390, Addresses a topic often discussed in the literature of negotiation technique. I argue that strategic misrepresentations about one’s interests, plans and bargaining set is not morally objectionable as part of professional negotiating practices — though often unnecessary and sometimes unwise. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The theory of reflective equilibrium ('Second Year Paper'). 1985. (Type: Unpublished | Links | Tags: John Rawls, publication)@unpublished{RN9360, |
Follesdal, Andreas: John Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience (unpublished Mag Art dissertation). Filosofisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo, 1982. (Type: Book | Abstract | Links | Tags: civil disobedience, John Rawls, publication)@book{RN9470, A systematic presentation of Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience, with a discussion of most of the criticism that has been presented against it. |
Publications
A just yet unequal European Union: A defense of moderate economic inequality. In: Review of Social Economy, 2021. | :
Social Primary Goods. In: Mandle, Jon; Reidy, David (Ed.): The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, pp. 643-647, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. | :
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness. In: Fløistad, Guttorm (Ed.): Philosophy of Justice, pp. 311-328, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. | :
The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A Category Mistake?. In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 46-65, 2011. | :
“Hva slags likhet, hvorfor likhet? Amartya Sen, John Rawls og Hilde Bojer om funksjoner, rettigheter og mulighetsrom”. In: Hylland, Aanund; Bjerkholt, Olav; Skrede, Kari; Ofstad, Bjørg (Ed.): Rettferd og politikk, pp. 71-88, Emilia, Oslo, 2009. | :
Justice, stability and toleration in a Federation of Well-ordered Peoples. In: Martin, Rex; Reidy, David (Ed.): Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A realistic utopia?, pp. 299-317, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006. | :
Introduction. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Pogge, Thomas (Ed.): Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights Standards and Institutions, pp. 1-19, Springer, Doordrecht, 2005, (Author Role: eds.). | :
Liberal Contractualism – Partial and Particularist, Impartial and Cosmopolitan. In: Caney, Simon; Lehning, Percy (Ed.): International Distributive Justice: Cosmopolitanism and its Critics, Routledge, London, 2004, ISBN: 978-0-415-23441-2. | :
Innledning. In: transl Swensen, Kai (Ed.): John Rawls: Rettferdighet som rimelighet (Justice as Fairness), Pax, Oslo, 2003. | :
Om John Rawls’ teori om rettferdighet som rimelighet. In: Kelly, (Ed.): John Rawls: Rettferdighet som rimelighet, pp. 11-36, Pax, Oslo, 2003, (Author, Subsidiary: Kelly (ed.) Erin; Swensen (transl.) Kai). | :
John Rawls. In: Berg, Eriksen Trond (Ed.): Vestens store tenkere: fra Platon til våre dager, pp. 505-514 (414-422 i Aschehougs utgivelse), Aschehoug, Oslo, 2002. | :
Rawls in the Nordic Countries. In: Rawls in Europe, special issue of European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 181-198, 2002. | :
The future Soul of Europe: Nationalism or Just Patriotism? On David Miller’s Defence of Nationality. In: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 503-518, 2000. | :
Global Justice as Impartiality: Whither claims to equal shares?. In: Coates, Tony (Ed.): International Justice, pp. 150-166, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000. | :
Liberal Nationalism – defending the very idea. 2000. | :
Hvorfor likhet, hva slags likhet? Normative føringer på forskning om makt og demokrati (Why Equality – Equality of What? Normative Guidelines for Research on Power and Democracy). In: Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 123-147, 1999. | :
Makt i John Rawls’ teori om Rettferdighet som rimelighet. In: Engelstad, Fredrik (Ed.): Maktbegrepet: Teori og kritikk, vol. Makt- og demokratiutredningen, pp. 262-290, AdNotam Gyldendal, Oslo, 1999. | :
Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy, pp. 145-163, Springer, Berlin, 1997. | :
The standing of illiberal states: Stability and toleration in John Rawls’ “Law of Peoples”. In: Koller, P.; Puhl, K. (Ed.): Current Issues in Political Philosophy: Justice in Society and World Order, pp. 165-174, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1997. | :
The standing of states: On John Rawls’ “Law of Peoples”. In: Koller, Peter; Puhl, Klaus (Ed.): Current issues in political philosophy, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, 1996, (Volume ID: 4 Call Number: (A)). | :
John Rawls: Beskjeden banebryter. In: Norsk Statsvitenskaplig Tidsskrift, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 105-111, 1994. | :
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