Follesdal, Andreas: A just yet unequal European Union: A defense of moderate economic inequality. In: Review of Social Economy, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 8-36, 2023. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, John Rawls, Publications)@article{RN52113,What does justice require concerning socio-economic distribution among citizens of the European Union? The EU should reduce cross-national economic inequalities among inhabitants of different member states, but full economic distributive equality or a European ‘Difference Principle,’ may not be required. Individuals’ claim to more political influence over matters controlled by their own state in the quasi-federal EU may permit some economic inequality. Section 1 orients this contribution relative to arguments for a European universal income. Section 2 provides relevant features of the EU. Section 3 considers contractualist arguments against certain forms of economic inequality, while section 4 identifies a further argument in favour of equal shares of benefits of social cooperation, based on an interpretation of ‘social primary goods’ consistent with Rawls’ theory. Section 5 argues that these reasons for economic distributive equality must be weighed against more political influence over matters controlled by the individual’s sub-unit. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Federalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, no. 2022, 2022. (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@article{RN32630, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Stability and trust in federations with ethnic territories and a secession clause – challenges and opportunities for Ethiopia. In: International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2021. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@article{RN51659,How might Ethiopia maintain its federal structure within present territorial borders? Most federal states experience ‘constitutional contestation’ navigating between complete centralization and secession. We should expect further such instability in Ethiopia especially due to two factors: regions and political parties follow ethnic line; and a secession clause in the Ethiopian Constitution. The article identifies some suggestions for how to increase stability and trust under such circumstances, drawn from tentative international comparisons among ethnic-based federal states. Among the particular concerns are the interests of oppressed minorities and ways to quell calls for secession. … |
Gebrewahd, Meressa Tsehaye; Rowe, Colin; Schutter, Helder; Follesdal, Andreas: Mediating unity and diversity through Federalism in Ethiopia. Special Issue. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2021. (Type: Book | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications, Special issues)@book{RN51662, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Challenges to the legitimacy of the European Union: When and how are European courts also part of the solution?. In: xx, 2019. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Tags: Federalism)@article{RN51449,The legitimacy deficits of the European Union has long been a rallying cry for ‘Eurosceptics’ of various kinds. Section I considers how we are to think about the ‘legitimacy challenges’ of the EU, by bringing to bear Joseph Raz’ service conception. This approach explores ways to reconceptualize and rethink the notion of legitimacy in the EU, characterized as a multilevel legal order whose task is to serve its citizens and others on this globe. This frame may help move the discussion forward, identify more precisely some of the current weaknesses of the EU and what might alleviate them. Section II uses this account to identify some of the legitimacy challenges of the EU, several due to its federal elements. The EU is trusted to promote multiple objectives within various constraints. The federal features of the EU has implications for the appropriate substantive standards of economic solidarity and ‘social cohesion’ across states and regions. The possibilities of secession affects the bargains about tasks, burden sharing, and the willingness to pay some short term costs for the sake of longer term benefits – precisely some of the task political authority is often set up to help resolve. And the EU is an asymmetric legal order: consider the Eurozone, Schengen-Europe, and so forth. One implication is that different states and citizens will correctly hold different views about the appropriate task of the shared institutions, reflecting deep and correct disagreement about what the federation is for. Section III considers how the European courts may alleviate some but not all these challenges. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity to the Rescue for the European Courts? Resolving tensions between the Margin of Appreciation and Human Rights Protection. In: Heidemann, Dietmar; Stoppenbrink, Katja (Ed.): Join, or Die – Philosophical Foundations of Federalism, pp. 251-272, de Gruyter, Berlin, 2016. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, European Court of Human Rights, Federalism, Human Rights, Margin of Appreciation, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN50196,Protests against how the European Court of Human Rights manages the dilemma between protecting human rights and respecting sovereignty led to Protocol 15, which includes references to ‘subsidiarity and a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights. The article argues that a ‘Principle of Subsidiarity’ can alleviate some of the challenges posed by the margin of appreciation doctrine, in particular that it sacrifices human rights protection on the altar of respect for state sovereignty. Section 1 presents the Margin of appreciation doctrine and some criticism raised against it, section 2 sketches versions of the principle of subsidiarity relevant for this discussion. Section 3 seeks to bring subsidiarity to bear on the question of which authority the ECtHR should enjoy within a multi-level European legal order, and in particular why it should grant states a certain margin of appreciation. Section 4 considers how these arguments concerning a margin of appreciation applies to the European Union—leaving the many other aspects of accession aside. |
Follesdal, Andreas: A common European identity for European citizenship?. In: German Law Journal, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 765-775, 2014, (Nivå 1). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@article{RN49871,What sort of shared European identity is required for Union citizenship to be part of a sustainable, just European political and legal order? Which substantive values and beliefs should be shared? And is there a need for “unique” values and beliefs, exclusive among those who share citizenship? Section 1 affirms the need for some shared values. Section 2 explores aspects of such a shared identity. Section 3 denies the need for a shared “thick” cultural identity. Likewise, section 4 questions the need for unique values. Finally, section 5 points to several challenges concerning identity and citizenship in a Union with asymmetric federal elements, especially when it is subject to asymmetric shocks. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Federalism and Human Rights in Nepal’s Constitutional Design: Challenges for the Judiciary. In: Ehlers, Dirk; Glaser, Hennig; Prokati, Kittisak (Ed.): Constitutionalism and good governance: Western and Eastern perspectives, vol. 1, pp. 193-203, Nomos, Baden Baden, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Human Rights, Nepal, Publications)@inbook{RN49661,The article addresses one of the difficult tasks of the Nepal Judiciary, which it shares in part with the Constituent Assembly: how to interpret the idea and mechanisms of federalism in ways that are faithful to the best interests of the Nepal people. The CA must create the constitution of a democratic, human rights-respecting Nepal republic, in light of how the constitution will in turn be interpreted and applied by the judiciary. The reflections in this article concern four varieties of federal elements, discussing arguments in favor and against each drawn from an interpretation of other states’ experiences. Two of the four are territorial: Constitutional – an entrenched split of powers – and Political: decentralised autonomy. Two are non-territorial: Minority Rights, and Minority Representation in common decision making bodies. Some of these arguments and lessons may be helpful also for Nepal’s challenges, two features of which are especially noteworthy: there are very many different groups that must be accommodated fairly. And members of these groups very often live side by side on the same territory. Human rights protections combined with federal elements of Nepal’s new constitution must serve to prevent future domination, especially by the centres, over these many ethnic groups and castes. The new constitution therefore creates several new tasks and challenges for Nepal’s judiciary, several of which are identified. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity. In: Fleming, James E.; Levy, Jacob T. (Ed.): Nomos LV: Federalism and Subsidiarity, pp. 214-230, New York University Press, New York, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: European Court of Human Rights, Federalism, Human Rights, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN49271,Appeals to a Principle of Subsidiarity has become popular due to its aspirations to address the allocation or use of authority within a political order, typically those where authority is dispersed between a centre and various member units. However, considerations of subsidiarity will seldom resolve disagreements about the allocation of authority. To illustrate how different conceptions of subsidiarity have profoundly different implications for constitutional and institutional design, the article first consider four different theories before turning to some implications as seen in the discussions about US federalism, debates in Europe about the EU and the European Court of Human Rights, and international law. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democratic standards in an asymmetric Union. In: Cramme, Olaf; Hobolt, Sara B. (Ed.): Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress, pp. 199 -216, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN49578,Throughout the present Eurozone crisis, worries about legitimacy and democracy have been particularly vocal, albeit often conflated, and not always very clear. What are we to make of such concerns, and the proposals brought forward? Discussions about the democratic deficit often target the wrong problems, either because the alleged problems are misinterpreted, or because they are in fact not problems at all. Nevertheless, it remains the case (and notwithstanding the contestability of some of the evidence) that the EU is insufficiently democratically accountable. While some weaknesses may be temporary, others seem to be more entrenched in the constitutional structure of the EU. In particular, we need to reconsider our democratic standards if the scholars who say that we must expect the EU to keep features of an asymmetrical federal order, with differentiated integration, are right. My comments concerning the prospects of a sufficiently legitimate EU are clustered under the rubrics of Symptoms, Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Prognosis. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Will the Reform Treaty Combat the Union’s Legitimacy Crisis?. In: Merle, Jean-Christophe (Ed.): Die Legitimität von supranationalen Institutionen der EU, pp. 112-129, LIT-Verlag, Münster, 2012. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN48050,The Constitutional Treaty (CT) and the Reform Treaty (RT) does take several valuable steps to ensure that the European Union becomes more trustworthy and comes ‘closer to the people’ – though I register some ambivalence. Section 1 provides some fragments of the history of the European Union, to justify the diagnosis that it needs increased levels of trust and arrangements for trustworthiness among Europeans and their political leaders. Section 2 argues that the European Union has certain federal elements that require four peculiar forms of ‘balancing’. Section 4 discusses the increased need for trust among Europeans. Section 4 addresses the role of the Charter on Fundamental Rights as a trust building mechanism. Sections 5 to 7 address how the CT and the RT contribute or detract from each of these three forms of balancing. The conclusion is that certain elements of the CT and of the RT would help European institutions create and maintain their own support among European citizens and officials. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Federalism, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Nepal – Or: Althusius meets Acharya. In: International Journal of Minority and Group Rights, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 335-342, 2011. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Human Rights, Nepal, Public policy, Publications)@article{RN48871,The article addresses one of the difficult tasks of the Nepal Constituent Assembly: how to translate the idea and mechanisms of federalism in ways that are faithful to the best interests of the Nepal people into a constitution of a democratic, human rights-respecting Nepal republic. The reflections concern four varieties of federal elements, discussing arguments in favour and against each drawn from an interpretation of other states’ experiences. Two of the four are territorial: constitutional: an entrenched split of powers, and political: decentralised autonomy. Two are non-territorial: minority rights and minority representation in common decision making bodies. Some of these arguments and lessons may be helpful also for Nepal’s challenges, two features of which are especially noteworthy: there are very many diff erent groups that must be accommodated fairly. And members of these groups very often live side by side on the same territory. Human rights protections combined with federal elements of Nepal’s new Constitution must serve to prevent future domination, especially by the centres, over these many ethnic groups and castes. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Föderalismus. In: Hartmann, Martin; Offe, Claus (Ed.): Politische Theorie und Politische Philosophie, pp. 95-98, C.H.Beck, Munich, 2011. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN48990,(In German) In federal political orders political authority is divided, often constitutionally, between at least two levels so that units at each level have final authority and can be self governing in some issue area. …… |
Follesdal, Andreas: Nepal’s Constitution Writing Process: Rebuilding the Ship while at Sea. In: International Journal of Minority and Group Rights, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 287-291, 2011. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Nepal, Publications)@article{RN49023,In order to understand the recent political and constitutional events of Nepal, and to discern feasible and fair ways to move forward, it is essential to consider the complex composition, circumstances and potential for conflicts by and among the many groups and minorities that constitute the people of Nepal. The future inclusion of marginalized groups requires the drafters of the constitution to attend closely to various models and mechanisms for managing group claims and conflicts. They include a federal Nepal, various group rights, and a voting system of proportional representation. Closer scrutiny reveals that these demands may be interpreted and institutionalized in several ways consistent with the objectives and needs of the population, especially the desire to prevent domination by a predatory centre, and to bolster local autonomy. To understand and facilitate these developments, the present special issue explores several perspectives and analyses. |
Follesdal, Andreas: The principle of subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in international law. In: Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/11, 2011. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN49138,This paper explores Subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in international law. A principle of subsidiarity regulates how to allocate or use authority within a political or legal order, and holds that the burden of argument lies with attempts to centralize authority. In EU law, a principle of subsidiarity is explicitly part of EU law at least since the Maastricht Treaty. Principles of subsidiarity are also found in the constitutions of many federal states. Some authors have appealed to a principle of subsidiarity in order to defend the legitimacy of several striking features of international law, such as the centrality of state consent, the leeway in assessing state compliance and weak sanctions in its absence. The article presents such defenses of state centric aspects of international/ law by appeals to subsidiarity, and find them wanting. Different interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of subunits, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. Five different interpretations are explored, drawn from Althusius, the US Federalists, Pope Leo XIII, and others. The choice among them has drastic implications for the appropriate authority of international law and institutions vs domestic authorities – and thus for what sorts of institutional or constitutional reconfiguration should be pursued. One upshot is that the Principle of Subsidiarity cannot provide normative legitimacy to the state centric aspects of current international law on its own. It stands in need of substantial interpretation, which must be guided by normative considerations. While some versions of subsidiarity may match current practices of public international law, these are more questionable than the accounts that grant states a less central role in a legitimate multi-level legal and political order. If subsidiarity is to serve as a ‘constitutional principle’ for public international law, many crucial aspects of our legal order must be reconsidered – in particular the standing and scope of state sovereignty. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Human Rights, Democracy and Federalism – part of the problem or part of the solution? Securing stability in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. In: Current Politics and Economics of Asia, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 211-236, 2008. (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Human Rights, Publications)@article{RN47730, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Federalism. In: Goodin, Robert E.; Pettit, Philip; Pogge, Thomas (Ed.): A companion to contemporary political philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007. (Type: Book Chapter | Links | Tags: Federalism)@inbook{RN42420, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Toward self-sustaining stability? How the Constitutional Treaty would enhance forms of institutional and national balance. In: Regional and federal studies, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 353-374, 2007. (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@article{RN47690, |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice, stability and toleration in a Federation of Well-ordered Peoples. In: Martin, Rex; Reidy, David (Ed.): Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A realistic utopia?, pp. 299-317, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Human Rights, John Rawls, Publications)@inbook{RN40840,How should the European Union express and promote human rights and solidarity? What is the scope of toleration towards states that violate human rights, within and beyond its borders? And what is the scope of permissible economic inequality across states in such a federation of democracies committed to domestic solidarity? … John Rawls contributed to these topics in The Law of Peoples (LP), which stresses the intertwined issues of toleration, stability and legitimacy that face these political relations across political borders. Can this Law of Peoples shed light on the legitimacy of emerging regional political orders such as … the European Union? The account offered here seeks to respect state sovereignty even in the face of some human rights violations, and it accepts a degree of material inequality among individuals in different sub-units of a federation. In particular, the European Union may have a differentiated human rights policy, and solidarity does not require a European-wide Difference Principle. The Difference Principle, even if appropriate for domestic justice, need not apply to a federal order. But the conception of human rights for federations must be more complex than Rawls’ account focused on human rights in a ‘nonfederated’ international order. That difference in domain of application is not a criticism of the Law of Peoples. However, a central weakness of Rawls’ account is that it offers inadequate arguments within its own intended domain of application. International stability for the right reasons requires more than a statement of the limits of toleration about “how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated” |
Follesdal, Andreas: Towards a Stable Federal Finalité? Forms and Arenas of Institutional and National Balances in the Constitutional Treaty for Europe. In: Trechsel, Alexander (Ed.): Towards a Federal Europe?, 2006. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN48582,First published in Journal of European Public Policy 2005, June |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity, Democracy and Human rights in the Constitutional Treaty for Europe. In: Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 37, pp. 61-80, 2006, (Special issue on Globalisation and Democracy). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, Federalism, Human Rights, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN43210,The article discusses whether three particular arrangements of this Constitutional Treaty indeed increase the normative legitimacy of the EU. The mechanisms that increase subsidiarity, democracy, and human rights do enhance the legitimacy of the EU, but they are incompletely developed in the document; they stand in some internal tension, and seem partly at odds with standard normative theory. These challenges may also be relevant for other attempts at creating other transnational, legitimate forms of governance at the regional or global levels. Section 1 provides some background as to the historical development of the EU, the tasks of constitutions, and federalism and the complex forms of trustworthiness needed in these political orders. The next three sections discuss subsidiarity, democracy, and human rights, respectively. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Towards a Stable Federal Finalité? Forms and Arenas of Institutional and National Balances in the Constitutional Treaty for Europe. In: Journal of European Public Policy – Special Issue: Towards a Federal Europe?, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 572-589, 2005, (June). (Type: Journal Article | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications)@article{RN41150, |
Dobson, Lynn; Follesdal, Andreas: Introduction. In: Dobson, Lynn; Follesdal, Andreas (Ed.): Political Theory and the European Constitution, Routledge, London, 2004. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@inbook{RN40400,The EU poses at least two challenges to a traditional conception of sovereignty …. First, the EU involves multiple territorial levels of decision-making, reminiscent and perhaps prescient – of federal political orders of a kind known as ‘coming together federations’ … Secondly, EU institutions often include private actors in public decision-making in order to increase responsiveness and proximity to affected parties. … we grapple with the major philosophical questions: what kind of polity? And with what moral right, if any, do European politicians now rule, and claim citizens’ compliance? .. We explore topics already well established in the EU literature: subsidiarity, diversity, democratic and legitimacy deficits, and institutional balances of power. · Constitutionalism: should the Union have a Constitution? If so what should it contain? How was the draft text arrived at and what does that process tell us? · European values: are there any common values, and, if so, what are they? How might they co-exist with particular (e.g. national) values? In particular, should religious heritage(s) be mentioned in the Constitution? · Liberty and power(s): different actors, ideologies, and states pursue different forms of liberty, with resulting theoretical and political tensions – between sovereignty as freedom to act, and immunity understood as non-domination; and differing imperatives for centre, large states, and small states; for majorities and minorities. · Common or European interest: lofty sentiments regarding common European objectives are often muddled or conflated, different actors intending quite different things. What clarifications of the different senses of these terms can we offer? These essays contribute towards a systematic understanding of the sometimes profound differences in conceptions of what legitimacy requires, and what political power is for, in the European Union. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Achieving Balance? Forms and Arenas of Institutional and National Balances in the Draft Constitutional Treaty. In: no. 2004, 2004. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN40490,The Draft Constitutional Treaty furthers important forms of stable balance, between the Member States and the Union institutions, among the Union institutions, and among Member States within the Union institutions. The challenge of creeping centralisation typical of federations could have been addressed even more fully by broadening the competence of national parliaments to appeal Union applications of the principle of subsidiarity. Effectiveness and efficiency can only be determined on the basis of specified objectives – which include complex mixes of legitimate ‘European’ and ‘national’ interests. Member States blocking unwarranted centralising decisions is thus not a case of ineffectiveness per se. The DCT changes the balance among Union institutions, It remains unclear how this balance is to be assessed, especially because Member States may legitimately pursue other objectives than the common European interest, and this may lead the Member State government to prefer other candidates than those favoured by the European Parliament. The ambiguity concerning the Draft’s reference to the European interest thus has implications for assessing this shift in balance. Interpreting the European political order as a federal system entails that the ‘national interests’ can not legitimately be dismissed as unbecoming a ‘post-national’ political order. Member State necessary for the long term support for a multi-level or federal political order, and for authorities’ ability to govern. The Draft Constitutional Treaty improves on the Nice Treaty in many regards. In particular, it goes some way toward creating a federal European political order that is more likely to facilitate trust and trustworthiness among Europeans. Importantly, such a revised European political order may also merit such increased trust. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Federal Inequality among Equals: A Contractualist defense. In: Metaphilosophy, pp. 236-255, 2003, (ARENA 01/21
Notes: Føderale ordninger innebærer ofte en spenning mellom idealer om likhet og politisk selvstyre, siden individer i ulike deler ofte har forskjellig levestandard. Slik føderal ulikhet kan synes uforenelig med likhetsorienterte kosmopolitiske teorier. Artikkelen argumenterer mot dette, så lenge ulikhetene ikke forårsaker fattigdom, avmakt eller urimelige prosedyrer.
Call Number: (A)). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism)@article{RN26700,Federal political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitans. The paper argues that individuals’ interest in equal shares of income and wealth may be legitimately weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by their sub-unit, as long as the inequalities do not engender misery, domination or unfair procedures. The reasons for sub-unit autonomy include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision-making. These arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate sub-units in legitimate federal orders. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Federal Inequality among Equals: A Contractualist defense. In: Pogge, Thomas (Ed.): Global Justice, pp. 242-261, Blackwell, Oxford, 2001. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Federalism, Gender, Publications)@inbook{RN32680,Federal political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitans. The paper argues that individuals’ interest in equal shares of income and wealth may be legitimately weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by their sub-unit, as long as the inequalities do not engender misery, domination or unfair procedures. The reasons for sub-unit autonomy include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision-making. These arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate sub-units in legitimate federal orders. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Justice: Global and European. In: Global Society, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 591-609, 2000. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN26380,The first section of this paper lays out some aspects of liberal contractualism. Section 2 points to some relevant differences in the subject matters of international and European political order. Section 3 indicates that the research questions are interestingly different for the two subjects. At least three central topics must be addressed by a normative theory of federalism when brought to bear on the issues of europeanisation. Democratic theory must be rethought, and the concepts developed for nation-state parameters must be reconfigured. Distributive justice must consider the normative significance of non-unitary modes of governance. Claims to equal shares may have to be tempered by an account of when sub-units must take responsibility for their worst-off, rather than expecting other individuals in the political order as a whole to do so. A third important topic concerns the allocation of authority between the central level and sub-units. In the context of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced to resolve these issues, first in the Maastricht Treaty and most recently elaborated in the Amsterdam Treaty. The principle of subsidiarity places the burden of proof on those who seeks to centralise authorities. However, the principle is contested, can be interpreted in conflicting ways, and can apply in a variety of fields. It merits more attention by political philosophers. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Theories of Democracy for Europe: Multi-level Challenges for Multi-level Governance. 2000. (Type: Miscellaneous | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@misc{RN28750,The European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy, and poses fundamental challenges to the established concepts and principles of democratic theory. The mere existence of the EU proves that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Indeed, the very conception of sovereignty is at stake in current disputes about the proper scope and legal powers to be transferred to central European institutions, without divesting traditional member states of all powers (Jachtenfuchs 1998). European institutions are not designed to replace domestic nodes of governance, but instead turn Europe into a system of multi-level governance. The role of democratic decision procedures and consent must be rethought, both for domestic and multi-level governance, to consider why and in what sense legitimate government must rest on consent of the governed. A central issue must then be the proper scope of democratic decision procedures at the EU level. It is important to get a good sense of the wide range of federal arrangements, so as not to block institutional creativity and political theory prematurely – and so as to realise the perplexing challenges to democratic theory. The EU appears clearly to have features of such non-hierarchical dual sovereignty, yet Member States remain Masters of the Treaties at the IGCs. One central normative issue for multi-level governance is which competences should be placed with each level. A Europe of variable geometry or Europe a la carte becomes especially difficult to square with standard elements of democratic theory, in particular transparency and accountability. Competing politicians or parties can only with great difficulty be held accountable in a multi-level shell game of accountability. Such problems hinder deliberation and interest formation, thus posing extra challenges to the democratic concern that voters and politicians should shape their views in light of arguments concerning the common weal. Finally, increased European mobility appear to challenge some fundamental assumptions and arrangements of democratic theory, possibly reducing the weight of citizens’ claims to democratic decisionmaking. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Subsidiarity. In: Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 190-218, 1998. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | Tags: EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications, Subsidiarity)@article{RN19890,The principle of subsidiarity regulates authority within a political order, placing the burden of argument with attempts to centralize authority. It has come to recent political prominence through its inclusion in the Maastricht treaty on European Union., intended to quell fears of centralization. However, the principle increases and shapes such tensions due to disagreement about formulations and possible institutional roles. Alternative accounts have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of sub-units, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. The need for a political theory of subsidiarity thus established, five alternative normative justifications of conceptions of subsidiarity are presented and assessed, illustrated by reference to the European Union. Few of the arguments constitute full theories addressing all issues of interpretation and application. Two arguments from liberty – Althusius and Confederalism – are addressed, one argument from efficiency (fiscal or economic federalism), and two arguments from justice: a Catholic argument based on Personalism and liberal contractualism. The order roughly reflects the decreasing autonomy of sub-units granted by each argument.. |
Follesdal, Andreas: Democracy and Federalism in the EU: a Liberal Contractualist Perspective. In: Follesdal, Andreas; Koslowski, Peter (Ed.): Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, vol. ARENA Reprint 98/9, pp. 231-253, Springer, Berlin, 1997. (Type: Book Chapter | Abstract | Links | Tags: Democratic theory, EU – European Union, Federalism, Publications)@inbook{RN23690,The status of states in the European Union raises fundamental normative questions for a theory of federalism. The normative issue of concern here arise in federal arrangements where member states differ in population size, as in the EU. The central decision procedures may accord all member states equal power, or make the voting power of all Europeans equal, but not both. Should states or citizens be equal? A normative theory of federations must address two main topics. Institutions should recognize and authorize communities or states only insofar as such allocation of authority are sound ways of securing the interests of some individuals of these states. Standards of legitimacy must be developed, either to hold for all federations, or to serve as guides for the elaboration of specific criteria for each particular federation. Unfortunately, neither kind of principles have yet been developed. Secondly, federal arrangements appear to run afoul of the norms of equal political rights and majority rule. Consider: by entrenching the equality of states, a minority of voters living in several less populated states may override a majority of the citizens in the federation. This clearly runs counter to the normative bases for majoritarian voting procedures, which insist that the vote of each individual should count the same. I sketch a contractualist defense for the equal political rights of states within federal arrangements. On this view it is consistent with liberal contractualism that small states in federal arrangements wield powers out of proportion with their population size. This contractualist argument is contingent on empirical claims which must eventually be supported by evidence beyond the auspices of normative political theory; the task here is only to sketch the argumentative strategy and defend it against certain objections. Section II sketches some fragments of a contractualist normative theory, focusing on the motivational assumptions and the case for majority rule. To allow a better grasp of the normative implications of this view, section III considers some of the arguments traditionally offered in favor of federal arrangements. Section IV brings liberal contractualism to bear on the puzzle of federalism. |
Publications
| : A just yet unequal European Union: A defense of moderate economic inequality. In: Review of Social Economy, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 8-36, 2023. |
| : Federalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, no. 2022, 2022. |
| : Stability and trust in federations with ethnic territories and a secession clause – challenges and opportunities for Ethiopia. In: International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2021. |
| : Mediating unity and diversity through Federalism in Ethiopia. Special Issue. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2021. |
| : Challenges to the legitimacy of the European Union: When and how are European courts also part of the solution?. In: xx, 2019. |
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