Publications

@inbook{RN32620,

title = {John Rawls},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Eriksen Trond Berg},

year  = {2002},

date = {2002-01-01},

booktitle = {Vestens store tenkere: fra Platon til våre dager},

pages = {505-514 (414-422 i Aschehougs utgivelse)},

publisher = {Aschehoug},

address = {Oslo},

abstract = {oppdatert fra 1993-versjonen},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN29080,

title = {Citizenship: European and Global},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Nigel Dower and John Williams},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-2002-citizenship-global.rtf},

year  = {2002},

date = {2002-01-01},

booktitle = {Global Citizenship},

pages = {71-83},

publisher = {Edinburgh University Press},

address = {Edinburgh},

abstract = {Union citizenship carries clear legal implications fostering freedom of movement and trade, and is intended to supplement, rather than to replace, national citizenship. Dual citizenship also means that the European Union must come to grips with challenges of institutionalisation and multiple loyalties. Reflection on the roles and challenges of Union citizenship may teach lessons for global citizenship. Both forms of citizenship create aspirations to a democratic political order with a scope beyond existing states, and face challenges regarding institutions and political culture aspiring to treat all affected individuals as equals. Section A provides a brief overview of the content of Union Citizenship. Section B discusses the need for trust among individuals creating and sharing European-level institutions. Section C explores how trust can be secured by Union citizenship based on shared commitments rather than on common history and broader culture. Section D draws lessons for the roles and preconditions of global citizenship.},

keywords = {EU - European Union, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN32680,

title = {Federal Inequality among Equals: A Contractualist defense},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Thomas Pogge},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-2001-fed-inequality.rtf},

year  = {2001},

date = {2001-01-01},

booktitle = {Global Justice},

pages = {242-261},

publisher = {Blackwell},

address = {Oxford},

abstract = {Federal political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitans. The paper argues that individuals' interest in equal shares of income and wealth may be legitimately weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by their sub-unit, as long as the inequalities do not engender misery, domination or unfair procedures. The reasons for sub-unit autonomy include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision-making. These arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate sub-units in legitimate federal orders.},

keywords = {Federalism, Gender, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN24100,

title = {Menneskerettigheter og ulike verdisyn: Vestlige mot asiatiske verdier? Gunnerusforelesningen 1999},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskab Forhandlinger},

pages = {105-121},

address = {Trondheim},

abstract = {Få stater vedstår seg at de systematisk og bevisst setter menneskerettighetene til side. Bangkokerklæringen av 1993 brøt med denne offisielle linjen. I denne erklæringen avviste flere land de sivile og politiske menneskerettigheter, som uforenelige med "asiatiske verdier". Utenlandske protester ble også avvist som brudd på staters rett til selvstyre. 

Foredraget drøfter og imøtegår Bangkokerklæringens kritikk. Flere tolkninger av innvendingene mot de internasjonale menneskerettighetene blir identifisert. Disse anklagene blir så vurdert med utgangspunkt i teorier om menneskerettighetenes begrunnelse og innhold. 

Det påståtte skillet mellom asiatiske og vestlige kulturer må avvises, og få innvendinger mot menneskerettighetene kan opprettholdes. De innvendingene som gjenstår forkaster ikke menneskerettighetene, men støtter kanskje noen menneskerettighetsteorier fremfor andre. 

Menneskerettighetene kan derfor ikke avvises som uforsvarlig vestlig ideologisk imperialisme. 

Few states admit that they systematically and deliberately violate international human rights. The Bangkok Declaration of 1993 ended this public consensus. In this declaration several Asian states argued that civil and political human rights must be set aside insofar as they are incompatible with "Asian values". Foreign protests against human rights were also dismissed as violating states' sovereignty. 

The lecture discusses and rebuts the criticism raised in the Bangkok Declaration. Several objections against international human rights are identified and assessed on the basis of theories of human rights. 

Claims to thorough-going differences between Asian and Western cultures do not stand against criticisms, and few objections against human rights can be maintained. The remaining objections do not invalidate human rights, but support some justifications for human rights rather than others. 

Thus human rights cannot be dismissed as objectionable exercises of Western ideological imperialism.},

keywords = {Human Rights},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN29050,

title = {Meninger med målløst liv: Noen hovedretninger innen dyreetikk},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Andreas Føllesdal},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {Dyreetikk},

pages = {65-89},

publisher = {Fagbokforlaget},

address = {Oslo},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23950,

title = {Fellesskapsverdienes funksjon i filosofisk perspektiv: Hvorfor og hva slags? (Innlegg på Motverdikonferansen 1999)},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Tor Egil Førland},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {Bidrag til verdienes historie},

pages = {15-39},

publisher = {Pax},

address = {Oslo},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN24040,

title = {Subsidiarity and democratic deliberation},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-2000-subs-dem.rtf},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?},

pages = {85-110},

publisher = {Routledge},

address = {London},

abstract = {Subsidiarity may seem attractive for deliberative democrats concerned with the opportunities for preference formation in "decentralised processes of decision making ... within constitutional political structures." (Bohman 1999:::, 25; Miller 1992: 54, 67). While there are such reasons for supporting subsidiarity, the Amsterdam conception of subsidiarity also conflicts with the concern for democratic deliberation when it comes to institutional arrangements. The paper identifies three main areas of tension between Amsterdam Subsidiarity and deliberative democracy. Firstly, an urgent but unanswered task is how to secure accountable applications of Amsterdam Subsidiarity. Secondly, this conception of subsidiarity seems to grant unwarranted powers to Member States. Other entities, such as sub-state regions, might also appeal to considerations of subsidiarity, yet such applications and arguments are not recognised. Finally, Amsterdam Subsidiarity may hinder the development of trans-European values and commitments necessary for a stable European political order.},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Publications, Subsidiarity},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN28920,

title = {The problem of defining the 'good' in pluralistic societies},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Lourdes Arizpe and Ann-Belinda Preis},

url = {http://follesdal.net/doc/Follesdal-2000-UNESCO.htm 

http://www.unesco.org/culture/worldreport/index.html},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {World Culture Report 2000: Cultural diversity, conflict and pluralism},

pages = {36},

publisher = {UNESCO Publishing},

address = {Paris},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23830,

title = {Global Justice as Impartiality: Whither claims to equal shares?},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Tony Coates},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-2000-glob-imp.rtf},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {International Justice},

pages = {150-166},

publisher = {Ashgate},

address = {Aldershot},

abstract = {Based on ARENA Working Paper 98/8: "Contractualist Egalitarianism: Whence and Whither" 

The paper argues that liberal contractualism can defend the distributive significance of state borders. While unequal shares of certain goods is unreasonable among citizens, some such inequalities are not objectionable in a system of sovereign states. Domestically, a strong case can be made for requiring equal shares of "social primary goods", understood as legal powers within a state characterised by pluralism. However, global regimes need not maximise the share of the globally worst off. Thus a "Global Difference Principle" is not a condition of legitimacy for regimes regulating states in a system of states. 

 The argument shows that claims to equality within liberal contractualism are not robust, as there is no general presumption for equality of condition or of shares of goods. This account thus challenges the received view of liberal contractualism and Justice as Impartiality, which is often thought to justify a general egalitarian baseline for all distributive domains. The paper offers a defence of Rawls' theory of Justice as Fairness, which has been regarded as fundamentally inconsistent in rejecting a Global Difference Principle and in disregarding naturally occurring inequalities. The argument presented defends the consistency of Justice as Fairness, but challenges that theory's relevance for the present world order.},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23970,

title = {Global ethics and respect for culture},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Cheryl Hughes and Yeager Hudson},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-2000-globeth.rtf},

year  = {2000},

date = {2000-01-01},

booktitle = {Cultural integrity and world community},

pages = {3-24},

publisher = {Edwin Mellen},

address = {Lewiston, NY},

abstract = {A plausible normative political theory must stake a course that on the one hand explains the value of existing cultures, and at the same time defends some limits on toleration. The need for such an account is apparent in two recent statements. The report from UNESCO's World Commission on Culture and Development, Our Creative Diversity, reveals some dilemmas concerning how to regard cultures which are incompatible with human rights. The Bangkok Declaration of 1993 gave rise to a debate about "Asian values", concerning whether universal human rights are contrary to Asian culture. 

These dilemmas pose important questions about the normative value of existing cultures and the plausibility of universal rights -- and whether such accounts can be provided without relying on objectionably 'Western' premises. 

The paper sketches some aspects of such a theory, drawing on a conception of liberal contractualism that does not regard individuals as fundamentally autonomous. The main focus is the proper grounds and scope of protection of culture, accounting for the normative significance of local cultural belonging. It is argued that Kymlicka's and O'Neill's valuable contributions rely on a conception of the individual considered as agent, with a strong interest in holding open possibilities of choice. This assumption may be avoided by exploring the role of culture in shaping expectations, thus deflecting the criticism of a Western bias. 

If this account is accepted, it suggests that at least three issues in UNESCOs report require clarification: 

- The value of culture need not be based on a conception of persons as centrally concerned with autonomy. 

- The reasons for valuing culture may not require that pluralism must be lauded. 

- The endorsement of corporatism requires further argument.},

keywords = {Human Rights},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN24050,

title = {Suverenitet - utydelig og uunngåelig},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Dag Harald Claes and Bent Sofus Tranøy},

year  = {1999},

date = {1999-01-01},

booktitle = {Utenfor, annerledes og suveren? Norge under EØS-avtalen},

pages = {269-279},

publisher = {Fagbokforlaget},

address = {Oslo},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23400,

title = {Makt i John Rawls' teori om Rettferdighet som rimelighet},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Fredrik Engelstad},

year  = {1999},

date = {1999-01-01},

booktitle = {Maktbegrepet: Teori og kritikk},

volume = {Makt- og demokratiutredningen},

pages = {262-290},

publisher = {AdNotam Gyldendal},

address = {Oslo},

abstract = {Del 1 skisserer antagelser om de grunnleggende samfunnsinstitusjonene og livssynsmangfoldet, for å forstå hvorfor teorien har dette som tema og premiss. Rawls' teori Rettferdighet som rimelighet legger stor vekt på institusjonenes rolle: de preger våre verdier og forventninger på fundamentale måter, og påvirker maktfordelingen oss imellom i samfunnet. Om institusjonene dermed utøver 'makt' er et definisjonsspørsmål. Del 2 skisserer enkelte sider ved Rawls' teori, og del 3 ser kort på hvordan samfunnsinstitusjonenes betydning forklarer den sterke likhetorienteringen i rettferdighetsprinsippene. Del 4 peker på noen aspekter av teorien av betydning for forståelse av maktbegrepet, og del 5 skisserer noen konsekvenser for demokratiske ordninger. Del 6 nevner noen hovedinnvendinger mot teorien.},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23910,

title = {Third country nationals as Euro-citizens - the case defended},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Dennis Smith and Sue Wright},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1998-3rdcntry.rtf},

year  = {1999},

date = {1999-01-01},

booktitle = {Whose Europe? The turn towards democracy},

pages = {104-122},

publisher = {Blackwell},

address = {London},

abstract = {Previous versions published as EUI Paper MIG/19 1998. ARENA WP 98/9. 

The Amsterdam Treaty bolsters Union Citizenship in order to bring the European Union closer to the citizens of Europe. Inadvertently, this strategy gives citizens of non-EU states an inferior status in the European Union, even though they may be semi-permanent residents in a Member State. Union Citizenship increases the social and political exclusion of third country nationals, in violation of the basic democratic principle that those affected by social institutions should also enjoy political levers of influence. 

The paper first briefly sketches a Liberal Contractualist defence for awarding this group full citizenship in the relevant Member State, arguing in particular for three somewhat contested issues, that 

a) third country nationals should not only enjoy Union Citizenship, but also be given national citizenship in the Member State of residence. 

b) Member states may impose conditions, oaths etc. on such prospective citizens. 

c) Member States may withhold some privileges from those resident third country nationals who refuse to be naturalised. 

The paper goes on to present and discuss, only to dismiss, the most plausible arguments offered in defence of current practice within the context of a Europe of open borders for Member State citizens. These arguments seek to deny citizenship to third country nationals in order 

a) To protect national and locally endorsed values ensuring social homogeneity of the community; 

b) To exclude people with non-liberal values; 

c) To ensure commitment to a shared future which warrants democratic rights in the first place; 

d) To avoid instability caused by citizens with conflicting multiple loyalties; 

e) To ensure and foster the ideal of active political participation, impossible for dual citizens; 

f) To avoid backlash problems among current EU citizens which threaten the stability of welfare policies of Member States and the EU.},

keywords = {EU - European Union, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN24060,

title = {Sustainable Development, State Sovereignty and International Justice},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {William M. Lafferty and Oluf Langhelle},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1999-sust-dev.rtf},

year  = {1999},

date = {1999-01-01},

booktitle = {Sustainable development: On the aims of development and conditions of sustainability},

pages = {70-83},

publisher = {Macmillan},

address = {Houndsmills},

abstract = {The present paper seeks to elaborate and justify the priority of basic needs over environment and sovereignty. This thesis, the Primacy of Human Rights, holds that development strategies should secure the basic needs for today’s poor through respecting human rights - if necessary at the expense of protecting the environment. Moreover, such development strategies may require international aid with ties, contrary to traditional conceptions of state sovereignty. 

Section 2 outlines aspects of a theory of justice providing a systematic perspective for addressing these concerns. Section 3 defends the Primacy of Human Rights for development strategies. Section 4 addresses the conflicts between human rights and development, while section 5 discusses conflicts regarding human rights and sovereignty. Industrialised countries have obligations towards developing countries if necessary for ecologically justifiable development strategies that also respect human rights. But international aid need not be unconditional: It may be necessary to influence internal conditions in developing countries through economic pressure. Section 6 reflects on some principled objections against the Primacy of Human Rights. We consider an alternative, the Primacy of the Environment, sometimes argued by deep ecologists, which holds that environmental concerns should be of primary importance in the choice of development strategies, and if necessary at the expense of today’s poor. A complete rebuttal of this view is beyond the scope of this paper. The aim is rather to identify the areas of disagreement.},

keywords = {Human Rights},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23870,

title = {Internasjonale forpliktelser og demokrati},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Knut Midgaard and Bjørn Erik Rasch},

year  = {1998},

date = {1998-01-01},

booktitle = {Demokrati - vilkår og virkninger},

volume = {ARENA Reprint 98/6},

pages = {337-352},

publisher = {Fagbokforlaget},

address = {Bergen},

abstract = {Demokrati-teorier må utvides ved landegrensene, både med en teori om internasjonalt demokrati og med en teori om internasjonal fordelingsrettferdighet. Artikkelen bidrar til dette, med utgangspunkt i begrunnelsene for demokratiske ordninger innenfor den liberale kontraktetiske tradisjon fra Kant, Locke og Rawls. Artikkelen avslutter med å drøfte noen konflikter som oppstår mellom kravene om lik politisk kontroll og likeverdige levekår innenfor EU, der nasjonalt selvstyre og internasjonal likhet kommer i konflikt.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN16220,

title = {Democracy, legitimacy and majority rule in the EU},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-dem-maj.rtf},

year  = {1998},

date = {1998-01-01},

booktitle = {Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, constitutional choice and citizenship},

pages = {34-48},

publisher = {Routledge},

address = {London},

abstract = {When it is said that the European Union has suffered from a democratic deficit, the term 'democracy' is used to lament several separate lacunas. The aim of the present paper is to explore the relations between two of the senses in which 'democracy' is said to have been missing in the European Union.Democracy as Legitimacy: Institutions, as all other rules that regulate behaviour, should be legitimate in several senses. We are only morally obligated to obey normatively legitimate institutions. That is: they must be justifiable to the 'demos', to all affected parties. Normative legitimacy requires a presentation and justification of such principles of legitimacy for the European Union, as well as transparency of its institutions. Only then can the public assess whether principles of legitimacy are satisfied. At present, we have neither such a theory of justice, nor the requisite transparency. Democracy as Majority Rule: 'Democracy' is also used to describe the decision procedures of institutions whereby the preference of the majority of the electorate determines the result. Suggestions abound that the institutions should be changed to increase the role of majority rule as a central structure for citizen participation. The precise relations and implications between these two senses of democracy – of normative legitimacy and of majority rule – are contested and obscure.The aim of this paper is to explore these relations from a particular contractualist perspective, addressing some specific issues regarding the relevance of consent, and indicating how this approach frames the practical arguments about institutional reform witnessed in the Amsterdam Treaty and beyond. Section 1 provides a sketch of a Liberal Contractualist theory of normative legitimacy. Section 2 brings this perspective to bear on claims to majoritarian mechanisms, and section 3 considers some contractualist constraints on majority rule. In conclusion I note how the contested ends of the European Union are central to a satisfactory resolution of these issues. As long as the explicit aim of the union was economic, increased efficiency was easily interpreted as Pareto-improvements within a utilitarian setting. The task of the European Union was previously predominantly to secure peace and stability through free markets, leaving matters of distribution and authority aside, in accordance with standard (though by no means uncontroversial) economic theory. The European Union now has much broader political aspirations. Its objectives, criteria of efficiency, and the role of majoritarian mechanisms must be reconsidered accordingly. The choice of means become more important as economic benefit is supplemented by other political goals. Transparency and the rule of law, majority rule, distributive justice, and human rights all become central issues. They cannot be regarded merely as ideals to be pursued on a par with economic efficiency, but are conditions of justice if the European Union indeed is to become and appear legitimate.},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Human Rights, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN17830,

title = {Communitarian criticisms of Liberal Contractualism: an account and a defense},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Frank Brinkhuis and Sasha Talmor},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1998-commcrit.rtf},

year  = {1998},

date = {1998-01-01},

booktitle = {Memory, History and Critique: European Identity at the Millennium},

pages = {10},

publisher = {MIT},

address = {Cambridge, Mass.},

abstract = {The normative significance of Europe and its member states is shifting. This paper considers and rebuts several communitarian objections against contractualist theories of global distributive justice, which can be brought to bear on the issues. Communitarian theories must draw on contractualist or similar traditions in order to illuminate the normative aspects of Europeanisation. The communitarian approaches, focussing on shared practices, constitutive identities and embedded loyalties, are ill equipped to assess the alternatives and agenda currently facing Europe. 

 Communitarians stress that we have special duties, "obligations of membership", towards our own community or society, partly because it helps constitute our common life, which is an important good. It is said that contractualism cannot account for these important features of our moral life in the proper way. It fails to acknowledge our "embedded" nature, with loyalties we are born into and instead assumes that we are "atomistic" individuals, and community is not recognized as a good. Moreover, contractualism is criticized because such theories impose external standards, alien to the existing culture, which do not permit cultural variations. 

 These criticisms fail to hold against some contractualist theories, which recognize that our common life -- the institutions, practices and roles that surround us -- is an important good. Moreover, I argue that John Rawls' theory of Justice as Fairness, a central contribution of liberal contractualism, is itself communitarian, if only in the particular sense that it is exclusively concerned with the important internal goods of communities and social institutions.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23750,

title = {Strategier mot diskriminering og rasisme: Likestilling som mål, rettighetsfesting og holdningskampanjer som middel?},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Holdningsdannelse og etniske minoriteter},

pages = {36-44},

publisher = {Dansk Flygtningehjælp -},

address = {København},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23780,

title = {The Welfare State under Siege},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Hans De Geer and Silfverberg},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Citizens' Trust and Authorities' Choices - Ethics in the Public Service},

pages = {65-70},

publisher = {Stockholm School of Economics, Center for Ethics and Economics},

address = {Stockholm},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN17020,

title = {The standing of illiberal states: Stability and toleration in John Rawls' "Law of Peoples"},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {P. Koller and K. Puhl},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-lawpeopl.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Current Issues in Political Philosophy: Justice in Society and World Order},

pages = {165-174},

publisher = {Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky},

address = {Vienna},

series = {Schriftenreie der Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft vol. 24.},

abstract = {Based on "The Standing of States" 1996. 

John Rawls' "Law of Peoples" (1993) extends the theory of Justice as Fairness to the relations between states. A satisfactory extension must alleviate worries about stability of the world order, as well as delimit the scope of toleration towards non-liberal states. These concerns are important, but the account of liberal toleration presented in '"Law of Peoples" fails to offer a satisfactory response. Moreover, it is incompatible with the normative individualism underpinning Rawls' approach regarding domestic justice. The Law of Peoples awards moral standing to some political communities, "hierarchical societies", which deny basic liberties and justify institutions by appeal to one comprehensive conception of the good. A more satisfactory alternative theory of justice for international relations justifies more extensive universal asprations and distributive implications. It is argued that this alternative theory of global justice is not unduly liberal, and does not threaten the stability of a just world order.},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN15900,

title = {Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Andreas Follesdal and Peter Koslowski},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-welfboun.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy},

pages = {145-163},

publisher = {Springer},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {Shifting notions of sovereignty may affect the scope of application and content of principles of just distribution: the scope of our welfare obligations may legitimately be affected by state borders. The article takes for granted the egalitarian commitment of many welfare states, and pursue the international implications of this commitment. In section 2 I summarize various arguments offered in favor of the Priority of Compatriots. In section 3 I present several arguments against domestic inequality. Section 4 argues that a further claim to equal shares, is a reasonable demand to make among citizens of democratic welfare states. John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) offers what is perhaps the most convincing defense of the liberal egalitarian welfare state. However, his contribution takes as its prime subject domestic justice, leaving aside the implications for global distribution. My defense of equal shares is compatible with Rawls' account, and it allows us, in section 5, to bring the arguments against inequality and for equality to bear on the issue of global and regional distribution. I conclude that legitimate global regimes must secure the satisfaction of the basic needs of all, but not necessarily secure equal shares for all participants. 

In section 6 I consider some peculiar normative issues arising within the European Union, where states have partly pooled their sovereignty. I suggest that the shared institutions of the EU support claims to equal shares among the inhabitants: the same egalitarian arguments appear to hold among them as hold among fellow citizens of a state. Equal shares of political power, of social opportunities, and of income and wealth, among citizens in the EU is a requirement of justice, based on the nature of their social co-operation under the four freedoms. Thus a legitimate EU may not be limited to maintaining a free market: 'real' convergence and solidarity within the EU must go beyond the alleviation of poverty, towards securing equal standards of living. State sovereignty must therefore be restricted, for the benefit of central institutions aiming to secure equality. 

The claims to equality I sketch do not exhaust the normative relevance of political borders. In conclusion, in section 7, I therefore note countervailing considerations and further important areas of normative reflection regarding a theory of global distributive justice. For instance, our concern for equality comes into conflict with another important of our interests: democratic self-governance, allowing a diversity of social arrangements.},

keywords = {EU - European Union, John Rawls, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23700,

title = {Democracy and the European Union: Challenges},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Follesdal Andreas and Peter Koslowski},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-dem-bkgd.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy},

pages = {1-10},

publisher = {Springer},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {The legitimacy of trans-state institutions in the European Union can hardly be determined without keen regard for whether and why they should exist, and whence they arose. 

Theories of democracy have not only endorsed universal suffrage, but also justified more specific details. The commonplaces include constitutionally specified procedures and constraints, including the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers; transparency; accountability of elected representatives to the electorate; and majority rule. 

The European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy, and poses fundamental challenges to the established concepts and principles of democratic theory. The mere existence of the EU proves that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Indeed, the very conception of sovereignty is at stake in current disputes about the proper scope and legal powers to be transferred to central European institutions, without divesting traditional member states of all powers. Pivotal parts of the decisions of the EU are subject to neither watch nor control by the citizens of member states, neither directly nor by their representatives. Furthermore, what control and accountability there is runs counter to received democratic theory. 

The project of European integration may be only the latest fain attempt at embodying the ancient ideals of democratic rule in polities far from the Greek polis. But the democratic deficit of the European Union need not herald tragic choices among incompatible values. For the issue of designing political institutions of Europe, it is simply too early to tell. 

Creative and politically astute research and negotiations may increase the range of institutional alternatives. And careful and well-informed deliberations in normative political theory must be brought to bear on the range of alternatives. The present volume contributes to this important task.},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23690,

title = {Democracy and Federalism in the EU: a Liberal Contractualist Perspective},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Andreas Follesdal and Peter Koslowski},

url = {msFollesdal-1997-fed-dem.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy},

volume = {ARENA Reprint 98/9},

pages = {231-253},

publisher = {Springer},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {The status of states in the European Union raises fundamental normative questions for a theory of federalism. The normative issue of concern here arise in federal arrangements where member states differ in population size, as in the EU. The central decision procedures may accord all member states equal power, or make the voting power of all Europeans equal, but not both. Should states or citizens be equal? 

	A normative theory of federations must address two main topics. Institutions should recognize and authorize communities or states only insofar as such allocation of authority are sound ways of securing the interests of some individuals of these states. Standards of legitimacy must be developed, either to hold for all federations, or to serve as guides for the elaboration of specific criteria for each particular federation. Unfortunately, neither kind of principles have yet been developed. 

	Secondly, federal arrangements appear to run afoul of the norms of equal political rights and majority rule. Consider: by entrenching the equality of states, a minority of voters living in several less populated states may override a majority of the citizens in the federation. This clearly runs counter to the normative bases for majoritarian voting procedures, which insist that the vote of each individual should count the same. 

I sketch a contractualist defense for the equal political rights of states within federal arrangements. On this view it is consistent with liberal contractualism that small states in federal arrangements wield powers out of proportion with their population size. This contractualist argument is contingent on empirical claims which must eventually be supported by evidence beyond the auspices of normative political theory; the task here is only to sketch the argumentative strategy and defend it against certain objections. 

	Section II sketches some fragments of a contractualist normative theory, focusing on the motivational assumptions and the case for majority rule. To allow a better grasp of the normative implications of this view, section III considers some of the arguments traditionally offered in favor of federal arrangements. Section IV brings liberal contractualism to bear on the puzzle of federalism.},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Federalism, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23680,

title = {Citizenship and Political Rights in the European Union: Consensus and Questions},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Reiner Bauböck and Josef Melchior},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-citpoleu.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union},

pages = {43-51},

publisher = {Institut für Höhere Studien.},

address = {Wien},

abstract = {Proceedings of the Austrian Dialogue on Political and Social Rights in the EU. 

1) Fragments of a Democratic Theory of Europe 

acceptable argument for democracy and majority rule must show that such distribution of political control are to our knowledge the most reliable mechanisms for securing and promoting the interests of all affected parties to an acceptable degree. Such a defence is comparative and cautious. All those affected by social institutions, should have an equal say in how these institutions should operate. Majority rule among all affected parties, carefully circumscribed, is the best flawed institutional arrangement securing the equal worth and respect of all affected parties. An argument of this form also seems to hold at the European level. 

For citizens in the European Union today, domestic democratic arrangements are insufficient. The domestic electorate and the affected no longer match. 

2) Can such a theory command consensus? 

Four objections can be mentioned, all of which can receive adequate response. 

a) No appeal to shared history or destiny? 

b) Stretches altruism and empathy too far? 

c) Outsiders? 

d) Means of Will Formation? 

3) Challenges to such a Democratic Theory of Europe 

a) Theory of justice for Europe: what are common good and civic virtues? 

b) The future of the Member States and state citizenship 

c) Allocation of powers among individuals, states, and EU institutions 

d) Outsiders: Non-EU permanent residents},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23660,

title = {The standing of states: On John Rawls' "Law of Peoples"},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Peter Koller and Klaus Puhl},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Current issues in political philosophy},

publisher = {The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society},

address = {Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria},

note = {Volume ID: 4 

Call Number: (A)},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN15360,

title = {Hvordan sikre likeverd når noen er likere enn andre},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal and Lars Gunnar Lingås and Liv London},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Likhet eller likeverd? En kritikk av det nye kristendomsfaget i grunnskolen},

pages = {115-134},

publisher = {Humanist Forlag},

address = {Oslo},

abstract = {Artikkelen tar for seg en av livssynspluralismens store utfordringer: spørsmålet om religionsfrihet i skolen, slik den kommer til uttrykk i den nye Læreplan for faget "Kristendomskunnskap med religions- og livssynsorientering". Jeg vil argumentere for at det er et stykke igjen før vi har en læreplan som vi bør godta i et samfunn som skal være tuftet på likeverd og respekt for livssynsforskjeller. Et kristent livssyn preger både formuleringer og innholdsbestemmelsen av faget på uforsvarlige måter. Departementets forslag og Stortingets vedtak går klart ut over det en livssynsmajoritet bør tillate seg i et rettferdig samfunn. 

Livssynspluralismens utfordringer kan også gi en økt innsikt i hvordan Norge 'europeiseres'. Vi har lenge vært underlagt lovgiving på det europeiske plan, lovgivning som etterhvert får økende betydning. Dette bør få virkninger både for innholdet i landets lover, for mandatene til offentlige utvalg, og for saksbehandling og høringsrunder. Et slående eksempel på dagens praksis er diskusjonen -- og fraværet av diskusjon -- av skolens kristne formålsparagraf.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN16140,

title = {Minoriteters levekår: Hva må vi vite, og hvorfor? En normativ opptakt},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Tor Aase},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Metodologiske tilnærminger til studiet av fordommer og diskriminering},

publisher = {Norges forskningsråd},

address = {Oslo},

series = {SEFOS},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN16130,

title = {Minority Rights: A Liberal Contractualist Case},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Juha Raikka},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1996-minorit.rtf},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Do We Need Minority Rights? Conceptual Issues},

pages = {59-83},

publisher = {Kluwer Law International},

address = {The Hague},

abstract = {This article seeks to bring liberal contractualism to bear on some of the philosophical issues raised by the claims regarding cultural protection by minorities in Europe. The aim is to explore what our commitment to equal respect entails with regards to legal protection and promotion of minority cultures. Section 1 presents some of the central philosophical and practical challenges facing such a normative theory of cultural rights: aThe interests in culture, bScope of toleration for groups, cThe significance of choice of minority status, dThe case for human rights protecting minority culture. 

 Section 2 sketches a liberal contractualist perspective regarding the value of cultural membership within a liberal framework. Section 3 develops some responses to the philosophical issues. I suggest that we may insist on the value of cultural membership, and in particular that individuals have an interest in controlling cultural change. However, this interest does not support claims that institutions must ensure equal contexts of choice for all citizens. Equal capabilities or opportunities of this kind is beyond what justice requires, partly due to problems of measurability. However, the interest in controlling cultural change may in principle ground rights of several kinds. 

- rights may be needed to provide a threshold of legal protections enabling minorities to explore, share and convey their culture to each other. Examples may include parents' right to teach their children about their culture, their language and their religion. 

- rights may be needed to protect a culture from undue outside forces with regards to change and development. Such rights may prohibit government interference in internal minority affairs except to protect individuals' human rights. In other circumstances, minority representation on political bodies may be appropriate, particularly because the conflicts can arise in unpredictable ways. 

- Transparency regarding the use of government discretion is often important. Minorities' interests may support a requirement that governments develop a public policy regarding treatment of minorities, or that the government funds impact statements to discover harmful effects on minorities' culture. Thus one might argue that states should have international reporting obligations concerning the institutions that regulate minority cultures. Such obligations provide domestic minorities with leverage against governmental abuses. International audiences and public expressions of commitments reduce the risks that a government will abuse its domestic authority. Reporting also provides states of good will with a forum for receiving constructive suggestions about institutional design.},

keywords = {Human Rights},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN14520,

title = {Forskningsetikk -- moralfilosofiske perspektiver},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1995-forsketi.rtf},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {Seks innlegg om forskningsetikk i samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora},

pages = {7-22},

address = {Oslo},

series = {NESH - Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komite for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN13480,

title = {Bærekraftig utvikling og internasjonal rettferdighet (Sustainable Development and International Justice)},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Oluf Langhelle and William Lafferty},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {Bærekraftig utvikling -- om utviklingens mål og bærekraftens betingelser},

pages = {77-92},

publisher = {Ad Notam Gyldendal},

address = {Oslo},

abstract = {Dersom det oppstår konflikter mellom grunnbehovene til verdens fattige og hensynet til miljø, bør grunnbehov gis første prioritet. Dette er Brundtlandkommisjonens standpunkt. Artikkelen tar sikte på å forsvare og utdype denne prioriteringen, som jeg skal kalle menneskerettighetenes primat for utviklingsstrategi. Utviklingsstrategier bør sikre grunnbehovene for dagens fattige, gjennom å respektere menneskerettighetene -- om nødvendig på bekostning av å sikre miljøet.},

keywords = {Climate, Policy advice},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN12800,

title = {Velvære, ressurser eller muligheter? Hvilke krav stiller normative teorier til måling av levekår?},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Fredrik Engelstad},

year  = {1994},

date = {1994-01-01},

booktitle = {Levekår og fordelingsproblemer},

pages = {30-53},

address = {Oslo},

series = {Institutt for samfunnsforskning},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN12830,

title = {Om forskningsetikk i miljø- og utviklingsforskning},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Tove Strand Gerhardsen and Anette Haug},

year  = {1994},

date = {1994-01-01},

booktitle = {Etiske problemstillinger innen miljø og utvikling},

pages = {7-13},

address = {Oslo},

series = {Norges forskningsråd},

keywords = {Climate, Policy advice},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN12820,

title = {Philosophers as ethics consultants: Contributions to a code of ethics},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Andreas Follesdal and Heidi Hoivik},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1994-consultant},

year  = {1994},

date = {1994-01-01},

booktitle = {Ethics and Consultancy: European Perspectives},

pages = {253-260},

publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},

address = {Dordrecht},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN7120,

title = {John Rawls},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Eriksen Trond Berg},

year  = {1993},

date = {1993-01-01},

booktitle = {Vestens Tenkere},

volume = {Bind 3},

pages = {439-451},

publisher = {Aschehoug},

address = {Oslo},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN9250,

title = {Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls' contractualism},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Jon Wetlesen},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1992-humanwor.rtf},

year  = {1992},

date = {1992-01-01},

booktitle = {Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver},

pages = {109-127},

publisher = {Universitetet I Oslo},

address = {Oslo},

series = {Skriftserie for HFs etikkseminar <1>},

abstract = {I sketch how international human rights can be understood and be justified on the basis of human worth within a contractualist perspective similar to that presented in John Rawls' theory of domestic distributive justice. The present sketch addresses the subject of the relationship between states, and the role of human rights in that regard (cf. Follesdal 1991 for a more elaborate presentation.) I shall be particularly concerned to show that the contractualist tradition, which emphasizes human worth and certain institutional kinds of equality among citizens, nevertheless can permit larger economic inequalities among individuals of different states.},

keywords = {Human Rights, John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}