Follesdal, Andreas: The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation). UMI No. 9211679, Harvard University, 1991. @book{RN5400,
title = {The significance of state borders for international distributive justice (PhD dissertation)},
author = {Andreas Follesdal},
year = {1991},
date = {1991-01-01},
publisher = {UMI No. 9211679},
address = {Harvard University},
abstract = {What can foreigners claim of each other as a matter of justice?
On reflection, many will agree that the international distributive institutions, domestic and international, should ensure the satisfaction of certain basic needs for all. That each year millions die of starvation is not only a tragedy, but also a matter of injustice. This continuing disaster is not due to global shortages of food, but to poverty and lack of basic medical care under unjust domestic and international social institutions.
At the same time, we also harbor another strongly held conviction: that domestic social institutions can legitimately favor fellow compatriots over foreigners. Foreigners can claim less from us than our fellow citizens can.
These two intuitions are difficult to reconcile in a principled way within a contractualist moral theory. Institutions, as other general rules regulating behavior, must be justifiable to all. But why should state borders affect the weight or reasonableness of individuals' claims? Considerations of justice would seem to require that we reject the social institution of state borders as yet another source of unjustified bias, like racism or sexism. How, in particular, can arbitrary state borders possibly restrict Rawls' argument for equality among individuals? If some needs of foreigners should count when reflecting on international distributive justice, foreigners should be able to claim equal shares of income and wealth, or indeed a distribution which maximized the share of the Globally worst off. Rawlsian theories of global justice have therefore tended to endorse a "Global Difference Principle." On this view, a global set of social institutions is just only if no other set of institutions improves the economic plight of the (representative) globally least advantaged. Compatriots may have special duties towards one another, but only insofar as the global set of distributive institutions still serves to maximize the income and wealth of the globally worst off.
A Response: The Bounded Significance of State Borders
Alternatively, we must provide a contractualist account of the moral significance of state borders which explain why borders should temper foreigners claims on goods. This dissertation offers such an explanation.
The present Theory of Global Justice defends the Bounded Significance of State Borders for matters of distributive justice. On this view, state borders are significant in the following sense: Justice requires that the global distributive institutions must attempt to satisfy what I call the Determinate Human Needs of all. This requirement takes priority over all other claims. But state borders affect the reasonableness of compatriots and foreigners' further claims, e.g. to equal shares of income and wealth. Rawls' Difference Principle regulates the distribution of income and wealth among citizens, but the global set of institutions need not distribute economic benefits to maximize the advantage of the globally worst of: there is no Global Difference Principle.
This intermediary position is stable because the claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders to support the Difference Principle, but does not require a Global Difference Principle among individuals in different states. Nevertheless, political control over international economic institutions must be distributed equally among participants.
The Theory of Global Justice thus illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualist theories. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods.},
keywords = {Human Rights, John Rawls},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
What can foreigners claim of each other as a matter of justice?
On reflection, many will agree that the international distributive institutions, domestic and international, should ensure the satisfaction of certain basic needs for all. That each year millions die of starvation is not only a tragedy, but also a matter of injustice. This continuing disaster is not due to global shortages of food, but to poverty and lack of basic medical care under unjust domestic and international social institutions.
At the same time, we also harbor another strongly held conviction: that domestic social institutions can legitimately favor fellow compatriots over foreigners. Foreigners can claim less from us than our fellow citizens can.
These two intuitions are difficult to reconcile in a principled way within a contractualist moral theory. Institutions, as other general rules regulating behavior, must be justifiable to all. But why should state borders affect the weight or reasonableness of individuals’ claims? Considerations of justice would seem to require that we reject the social institution of state borders as yet another source of unjustified bias, like racism or sexism. How, in particular, can arbitrary state borders possibly restrict Rawls’ argument for equality among individuals? If some needs of foreigners should count when reflecting on international distributive justice, foreigners should be able to claim equal shares of income and wealth, or indeed a distribution which maximized the share of the Globally worst off. Rawlsian theories of global justice have therefore tended to endorse a “Global Difference Principle.” On this view, a global set of social institutions is just only if no other set of institutions improves the economic plight of the (representative) globally least advantaged. Compatriots may have special duties towards one another, but only insofar as the global set of distributive institutions still serves to maximize the income and wealth of the globally worst off.
A Response: The Bounded Significance of State Borders
Alternatively, we must provide a contractualist account of the moral significance of state borders which explain why borders should temper foreigners claims on goods. This dissertation offers such an explanation.
The present Theory of Global Justice defends the Bounded Significance of State Borders for matters of distributive justice. On this view, state borders are significant in the following sense: Justice requires that the global distributive institutions must attempt to satisfy what I call the Determinate Human Needs of all. This requirement takes priority over all other claims. But state borders affect the reasonableness of compatriots and foreigners’ further claims, e.g. to equal shares of income and wealth. Rawls’ Difference Principle regulates the distribution of income and wealth among citizens, but the global set of institutions need not distribute economic benefits to maximize the advantage of the globally worst of: there is no Global Difference Principle.
This intermediary position is stable because the claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders to support the Difference Principle, but does not require a Global Difference Principle among individuals in different states. Nevertheless, political control over international economic institutions must be distributed equally among participants.
The Theory of Global Justice thus illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualist theories. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods. |
