Follesdal, Andreas: On Federalism, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Nepal. In: Bk, Man Bahadur; Bishwakarma, Chakram (Ed.): Dalits in Federalism (in Nepali), Dalit Welfare Organization, Kathmandu, 2009. @inbook{RN48765,
title = {On Federalism, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Nepal},
author = {Andreas Follesdal},
editor = {Man Bahadur Bk and Chakram Bishwakarma},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
booktitle = {Dalits in Federalism (in Nepali)},
publisher = {Dalit Welfare Organization},
address = {Kathmandu},
keywords = {debate, federalism, Human Rights, Nepal, Policy advice},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
|
Follesdal, Andreas: On Federalism, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Nepal. In: Nepalnews.com, 2008. @article{RN48718,
title = {On Federalism, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Nepal},
author = {Andreas Follesdal},
url = {http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2008/others/guestcolumn/nov/guest_columns_06.php},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-01-01},
journal = {Nepalnews.com},
keywords = {debate, federalism, Human Rights, Nepal, Policy advice},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
Follesdal, Andreas: Federal Inequality among Equals: A Contractualist defense. In: Metaphilosophy, pp. 236-255, 2003, (ARENA 01/21
Notes: Føderale ordninger innebærer ofte en spenning mellom idealer om likhet og politisk selvstyre, siden individer i ulike deler ofte har forskjellig levestandard. Slik føderal ulikhet kan synes uforenelig med likhetsorienterte kosmopolitiske teorier. Artikkelen argumenterer mot dette, så lenge ulikhetene ikke forårsaker fattigdom, avmakt eller urimelige prosedyrer.
Call Number: (A)). @article{RN26700,
title = {Federal Inequality among Equals: A Contractualist defense},
author = {Andreas Follesdal},
url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-2001-fed-inequality.rtf},
doi = {10.1111/1467-9973.00184},
year = {2003},
date = {2003-01-01},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
pages = {236-255},
abstract = {Federal political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitans. The paper argues that individuals' interest in equal shares of income and wealth may be legitimately weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by their sub-unit, as long as the inequalities do not engender misery, domination or unfair procedures. The reasons for sub-unit autonomy include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision-making. These arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate sub-units in legitimate federal orders.},
note = {ARENA 01/21
Notes: Føderale ordninger innebærer ofte en spenning mellom idealer om likhet og politisk selvstyre, siden individer i ulike deler ofte har forskjellig levestandard. Slik føderal ulikhet kan synes uforenelig med likhetsorienterte kosmopolitiske teorier. Artikkelen argumenterer mot dette, så lenge ulikhetene ikke forårsaker fattigdom, avmakt eller urimelige prosedyrer.
Call Number: (A)},
keywords = {federalism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Federal political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitans. The paper argues that individuals’ interest in equal shares of income and wealth may be legitimately weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by their sub-unit, as long as the inequalities do not engender misery, domination or unfair procedures. The reasons for sub-unit autonomy include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision-making. These arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate sub-units in legitimate federal orders. |
