Public Debate

@inbook{RN23750,

title = {Strategier mot diskriminering og rasisme: Likestilling som mål, rettighetsfesting og holdningskampanjer som middel?},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Holdningsdannelse og etniske minoriteter},

pages = {36-44},

publisher = {Dansk Flygtningehjælp -},

address = {København},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23680,

title = {Citizenship and Political Rights in the European Union: Consensus and Questions},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Reiner Bauböck and Josef Melchior},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-citpoleu.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union},

pages = {43-51},

publisher = {Institut für Höhere Studien.},

address = {Wien},

abstract = {Proceedings of the Austrian Dialogue on Political and Social Rights in the EU. 

1) Fragments of a Democratic Theory of Europe 

acceptable argument for democracy and majority rule must show that such distribution of political control are to our knowledge the most reliable mechanisms for securing and promoting the interests of all affected parties to an acceptable degree. Such a defence is comparative and cautious. All those affected by social institutions, should have an equal say in how these institutions should operate. Majority rule among all affected parties, carefully circumscribed, is the best flawed institutional arrangement securing the equal worth and respect of all affected parties. An argument of this form also seems to hold at the European level. 

For citizens in the European Union today, domestic democratic arrangements are insufficient. The domestic electorate and the affected no longer match. 

2) Can such a theory command consensus? 

Four objections can be mentioned, all of which can receive adequate response. 

a) No appeal to shared history or destiny? 

b) Stretches altruism and empathy too far? 

c) Outsiders? 

d) Means of Will Formation? 

3) Challenges to such a Democratic Theory of Europe 

a) Theory of justice for Europe: what are common good and civic virtues? 

b) The future of the Member States and state citizenship 

c) Allocation of powers among individuals, states, and EU institutions 

d) Outsiders: Non-EU permanent residents},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23690,

title = {Democracy and Federalism in the EU: a Liberal Contractualist Perspective},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Andreas Follesdal and Peter Koslowski},

url = {msFollesdal-1997-fed-dem.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy},

volume = {ARENA Reprint 98/9},

pages = {231-253},

publisher = {Springer},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {The status of states in the European Union raises fundamental normative questions for a theory of federalism. The normative issue of concern here arise in federal arrangements where member states differ in population size, as in the EU. The central decision procedures may accord all member states equal power, or make the voting power of all Europeans equal, but not both. Should states or citizens be equal? 

	A normative theory of federations must address two main topics. Institutions should recognize and authorize communities or states only insofar as such allocation of authority are sound ways of securing the interests of some individuals of these states. Standards of legitimacy must be developed, either to hold for all federations, or to serve as guides for the elaboration of specific criteria for each particular federation. Unfortunately, neither kind of principles have yet been developed. 

	Secondly, federal arrangements appear to run afoul of the norms of equal political rights and majority rule. Consider: by entrenching the equality of states, a minority of voters living in several less populated states may override a majority of the citizens in the federation. This clearly runs counter to the normative bases for majoritarian voting procedures, which insist that the vote of each individual should count the same. 

I sketch a contractualist defense for the equal political rights of states within federal arrangements. On this view it is consistent with liberal contractualism that small states in federal arrangements wield powers out of proportion with their population size. This contractualist argument is contingent on empirical claims which must eventually be supported by evidence beyond the auspices of normative political theory; the task here is only to sketch the argumentative strategy and defend it against certain objections. 

	Section II sketches some fragments of a contractualist normative theory, focusing on the motivational assumptions and the case for majority rule. To allow a better grasp of the normative implications of this view, section III considers some of the arguments traditionally offered in favor of federal arrangements. Section IV brings liberal contractualism to bear on the puzzle of federalism.},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Federalism, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23700,

title = {Democracy and the European Union: Challenges},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Follesdal Andreas and Peter Koslowski},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-dem-bkgd.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy},

pages = {1-10},

publisher = {Springer},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {The legitimacy of trans-state institutions in the European Union can hardly be determined without keen regard for whether and why they should exist, and whence they arose. 

Theories of democracy have not only endorsed universal suffrage, but also justified more specific details. The commonplaces include constitutionally specified procedures and constraints, including the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers; transparency; accountability of elected representatives to the electorate; and majority rule. 

The European Union is a new subject for theories of legitimacy, and poses fundamental challenges to the established concepts and principles of democratic theory. The mere existence of the EU proves that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative reflection. Indeed, the very conception of sovereignty is at stake in current disputes about the proper scope and legal powers to be transferred to central European institutions, without divesting traditional member states of all powers. Pivotal parts of the decisions of the EU are subject to neither watch nor control by the citizens of member states, neither directly nor by their representatives. Furthermore, what control and accountability there is runs counter to received democratic theory. 

The project of European integration may be only the latest fain attempt at embodying the ancient ideals of democratic rule in polities far from the Greek polis. But the democratic deficit of the European Union need not herald tragic choices among incompatible values. For the issue of designing political institutions of Europe, it is simply too early to tell. 

Creative and politically astute research and negotiations may increase the range of institutional alternatives. And careful and well-informed deliberations in normative political theory must be brought to bear on the range of alternatives. The present volume contributes to this important task.},

keywords = {Democratic theory, EU - European Union, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN15900,

title = {Do welfare obligations end at the boundaries of the nation state?},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Andreas Follesdal and Peter Koslowski},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-welfboun.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and reform of social policy},

pages = {145-163},

publisher = {Springer},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {Shifting notions of sovereignty may affect the scope of application and content of principles of just distribution: the scope of our welfare obligations may legitimately be affected by state borders. The article takes for granted the egalitarian commitment of many welfare states, and pursue the international implications of this commitment. In section 2 I summarize various arguments offered in favor of the Priority of Compatriots. In section 3 I present several arguments against domestic inequality. Section 4 argues that a further claim to equal shares, is a reasonable demand to make among citizens of democratic welfare states. John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) offers what is perhaps the most convincing defense of the liberal egalitarian welfare state. However, his contribution takes as its prime subject domestic justice, leaving aside the implications for global distribution. My defense of equal shares is compatible with Rawls' account, and it allows us, in section 5, to bring the arguments against inequality and for equality to bear on the issue of global and regional distribution. I conclude that legitimate global regimes must secure the satisfaction of the basic needs of all, but not necessarily secure equal shares for all participants. 

In section 6 I consider some peculiar normative issues arising within the European Union, where states have partly pooled their sovereignty. I suggest that the shared institutions of the EU support claims to equal shares among the inhabitants: the same egalitarian arguments appear to hold among them as hold among fellow citizens of a state. Equal shares of political power, of social opportunities, and of income and wealth, among citizens in the EU is a requirement of justice, based on the nature of their social co-operation under the four freedoms. Thus a legitimate EU may not be limited to maintaining a free market: 'real' convergence and solidarity within the EU must go beyond the alleviation of poverty, towards securing equal standards of living. State sovereignty must therefore be restricted, for the benefit of central institutions aiming to secure equality. 

The claims to equality I sketch do not exhaust the normative relevance of political borders. In conclusion, in section 7, I therefore note countervailing considerations and further important areas of normative reflection regarding a theory of global distributive justice. For instance, our concern for equality comes into conflict with another important of our interests: democratic self-governance, allowing a diversity of social arrangements.},

keywords = {EU - European Union, John Rawls, Publications},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN17020,

title = {The standing of illiberal states: Stability and toleration in John Rawls' "Law of Peoples"},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {P. Koller and K. Puhl},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1997-lawpeopl.rtf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Current Issues in Political Philosophy: Justice in Society and World Order},

pages = {165-174},

publisher = {Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky},

address = {Vienna},

series = {Schriftenreie der Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft vol. 24.},

abstract = {Based on "The Standing of States" 1996. 

John Rawls' "Law of Peoples" (1993) extends the theory of Justice as Fairness to the relations between states. A satisfactory extension must alleviate worries about stability of the world order, as well as delimit the scope of toleration towards non-liberal states. These concerns are important, but the account of liberal toleration presented in '"Law of Peoples" fails to offer a satisfactory response. Moreover, it is incompatible with the normative individualism underpinning Rawls' approach regarding domestic justice. The Law of Peoples awards moral standing to some political communities, "hierarchical societies", which deny basic liberties and justify institutions by appeal to one comprehensive conception of the good. A more satisfactory alternative theory of justice for international relations justifies more extensive universal asprations and distributive implications. It is argued that this alternative theory of global justice is not unduly liberal, and does not threaten the stability of a just world order.},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23780,

title = {The Welfare State under Siege},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Hans De Geer and Silfverberg},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Citizens' Trust and Authorities' Choices - Ethics in the Public Service},

pages = {65-70},

publisher = {Stockholm School of Economics, Center for Ethics and Economics},

address = {Stockholm},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN16140,

title = {Minoriteters levekår: Hva må vi vite, og hvorfor? En normativ opptakt},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Tor Aase},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Metodologiske tilnærminger til studiet av fordommer og diskriminering},

publisher = {Norges forskningsråd},

address = {Oslo},

series = {SEFOS},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN15360,

title = {Hvordan sikre likeverd når noen er likere enn andre},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal and Lars Gunnar Lingås and Liv London},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Likhet eller likeverd? En kritikk av det nye kristendomsfaget i grunnskolen},

pages = {115-134},

publisher = {Humanist Forlag},

address = {Oslo},

abstract = {Artikkelen tar for seg en av livssynspluralismens store utfordringer: spørsmålet om religionsfrihet i skolen, slik den kommer til uttrykk i den nye Læreplan for faget "Kristendomskunnskap med religions- og livssynsorientering". Jeg vil argumentere for at det er et stykke igjen før vi har en læreplan som vi bør godta i et samfunn som skal være tuftet på likeverd og respekt for livssynsforskjeller. Et kristent livssyn preger både formuleringer og innholdsbestemmelsen av faget på uforsvarlige måter. Departementets forslag og Stortingets vedtak går klart ut over det en livssynsmajoritet bør tillate seg i et rettferdig samfunn. 

Livssynspluralismens utfordringer kan også gi en økt innsikt i hvordan Norge 'europeiseres'. Vi har lenge vært underlagt lovgiving på det europeiske plan, lovgivning som etterhvert får økende betydning. Dette bør få virkninger både for innholdet i landets lover, for mandatene til offentlige utvalg, og for saksbehandling og høringsrunder. Et slående eksempel på dagens praksis er diskusjonen -- og fraværet av diskusjon -- av skolens kristne formålsparagraf.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN16130,

title = {Minority Rights: A Liberal Contractualist Case},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Juha Raikka},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1996-minorit.rtf},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Do We Need Minority Rights? Conceptual Issues},

pages = {59-83},

publisher = {Kluwer Law International},

address = {The Hague},

abstract = {This article seeks to bring liberal contractualism to bear on some of the philosophical issues raised by the claims regarding cultural protection by minorities in Europe. The aim is to explore what our commitment to equal respect entails with regards to legal protection and promotion of minority cultures. Section 1 presents some of the central philosophical and practical challenges facing such a normative theory of cultural rights: aThe interests in culture, bScope of toleration for groups, cThe significance of choice of minority status, dThe case for human rights protecting minority culture. 

 Section 2 sketches a liberal contractualist perspective regarding the value of cultural membership within a liberal framework. Section 3 develops some responses to the philosophical issues. I suggest that we may insist on the value of cultural membership, and in particular that individuals have an interest in controlling cultural change. However, this interest does not support claims that institutions must ensure equal contexts of choice for all citizens. Equal capabilities or opportunities of this kind is beyond what justice requires, partly due to problems of measurability. However, the interest in controlling cultural change may in principle ground rights of several kinds. 

- rights may be needed to provide a threshold of legal protections enabling minorities to explore, share and convey their culture to each other. Examples may include parents' right to teach their children about their culture, their language and their religion. 

- rights may be needed to protect a culture from undue outside forces with regards to change and development. Such rights may prohibit government interference in internal minority affairs except to protect individuals' human rights. In other circumstances, minority representation on political bodies may be appropriate, particularly because the conflicts can arise in unpredictable ways. 

- Transparency regarding the use of government discretion is often important. Minorities' interests may support a requirement that governments develop a public policy regarding treatment of minorities, or that the government funds impact statements to discover harmful effects on minorities' culture. Thus one might argue that states should have international reporting obligations concerning the institutions that regulate minority cultures. Such obligations provide domestic minorities with leverage against governmental abuses. International audiences and public expressions of commitments reduce the risks that a government will abuse its domestic authority. Reporting also provides states of good will with a forum for receiving constructive suggestions about institutional design.},

keywords = {Human Rights},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23660,

title = {The standing of states: On John Rawls' "Law of Peoples"},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Peter Koller and Klaus Puhl},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Current issues in political philosophy},

publisher = {The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society},

address = {Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria},

note = {Volume ID: 4 

Call Number: (A)},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN23640,

title = {Kontrakt og evalueringsskjemaer},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Anton Havnes},

url = {http://www.admin.uio.no/sfa/sls/studenteva/studenteva.html},

year  = {1996},

date = {1996-01-01},

booktitle = {Studentevaluering av undervisningen: Idehefte},

pages = {5-8, 16},

publisher = {Pedagogisk forskningsinstitutt, Universitetet i Oslo},

address = {Oslo},

keywords = {Debate},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN13480,

title = {Bærekraftig utvikling og internasjonal rettferdighet (Sustainable Development and International Justice)},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Oluf Langhelle and William Lafferty},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {Bærekraftig utvikling -- om utviklingens mål og bærekraftens betingelser},

pages = {77-92},

publisher = {Ad Notam Gyldendal},

address = {Oslo},

abstract = {Dersom det oppstår konflikter mellom grunnbehovene til verdens fattige og hensynet til miljø, bør grunnbehov gis første prioritet. Dette er Brundtlandkommisjonens standpunkt. Artikkelen tar sikte på å forsvare og utdype denne prioriteringen, som jeg skal kalle menneskerettighetenes primat for utviklingsstrategi. Utviklingsstrategier bør sikre grunnbehovene for dagens fattige, gjennom å respektere menneskerettighetene -- om nødvendig på bekostning av å sikre miljøet.},

keywords = {Climate, Policy advice},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN14520,

title = {Forskningsetikk -- moralfilosofiske perspektiver},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1995-forsketi.rtf},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {Seks innlegg om forskningsetikk i samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora},

pages = {7-22},

address = {Oslo},

series = {NESH - Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komite for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN12830,

title = {Om forskningsetikk i miljø- og utviklingsforskning},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Tove Strand Gerhardsen and Anette Haug},

year  = {1994},

date = {1994-01-01},

booktitle = {Etiske problemstillinger innen miljø og utvikling},

pages = {7-13},

address = {Oslo},

series = {Norges forskningsråd},

keywords = {Climate, Policy advice},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN12800,

title = {Velvære, ressurser eller muligheter? Hvilke krav stiller normative teorier til måling av levekår?},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Fredrik Engelstad},

year  = {1994},

date = {1994-01-01},

booktitle = {Levekår og fordelingsproblemer},

pages = {30-53},

address = {Oslo},

series = {Institutt for samfunnsforskning},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN12820,

title = {Philosophers as ethics consultants: Contributions to a code of ethics},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Andreas Follesdal and Heidi Hoivik},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1994-consultant},

year  = {1994},

date = {1994-01-01},

booktitle = {Ethics and Consultancy: European Perspectives},

pages = {253-260},

publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},

address = {Dordrecht},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN7120,

title = {John Rawls},

author = {Andreas Føllesdal},

editor = {Eriksen Trond Berg},

year  = {1993},

date = {1993-01-01},

booktitle = {Vestens Tenkere},

volume = {Bind 3},

pages = {439-451},

publisher = {Aschehoug},

address = {Oslo},

keywords = {John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN9250,

title = {Human worth and human rights based on John Rawls' contractualism},

author = {Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Jon Wetlesen},

url = {http://follesdal.net/ms/Follesdal-1992-humanwor.rtf},

year  = {1992},

date = {1992-01-01},

booktitle = {Menneskeverd: Humanistiske Perspektiver},

pages = {109-127},

publisher = {Universitetet I Oslo},

address = {Oslo},

series = {Skriftserie for HFs etikkseminar <1>},

abstract = {I sketch how international human rights can be understood and be justified on the basis of human worth within a contractualist perspective similar to that presented in John Rawls' theory of domestic distributive justice. The present sketch addresses the subject of the relationship between states, and the role of human rights in that regard (cf. Follesdal 1991 for a more elaborate presentation.) I shall be particularly concerned to show that the contractualist tradition, which emphasizes human worth and certain institutional kinds of equality among citizens, nevertheless can permit larger economic inequalities among individuals of different states.},

keywords = {Human Rights, John Rawls},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}