Dagfinn Føllesdal

@inbook{RN55603,

title = {Quine’s planned changes to Word and Object},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal and Andreas Follesdal},

editor = {Daniel Nagase},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-01-01},

booktitle = {Quine's 'Word and Object' at 65},

publisher = {Cambridge University Press},

address = {Cambridge},

abstract = {Though Quine finished Word and Object in 1959, his views of these themes continued to develop and change over the following four decades until his death in 2000. This contribution discusses three major shifts Quine intended in the argument of Word and Object to appear in the new edition: the public nature of meaning, the modalities, and propositional attitudes. The discussion of stimulus in Chapter 2 needed radical modification to reflect Quine’s changed insights about the public nature of language. Chapter 3 should be updated in line with his thinking in Roots of Reference. He there distinguishes between reception and perception. Thirdly, Chapter 6 about modality and propositional attitudes should be revised.},

keywords = {Quine-},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN52600,

title = {Conceptual change and reference},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Christoph Hubig},

doi = {https://www-degruyterbrill-com.ezproxy.uio.no/document/doi/10.1515/9783050073651-034/pdf},

year  = {1997},

date = {1997-01-01},

booktitle = {Cognitio humana: Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte},

pages = {351–367},

publisher = {Akademie Verlag},

address = {Berlin},

abstract = {...Frege, in "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung" and other works,argued that the there are three main kinds of expression: singular terms, general terms and sentences and that they all have a sense [Sinn] that determines their reference [Gegenstand, or Referenz], ...the three kinds of expression that Frege distinguished should not be assimilated to one another. They fall into two different groups with radically different semantics. The semantics of singular terms is quite unlike the semantics of general terms and sentences. While sense is primary in the case of general terms and sentences, reference is what matters in the case of singular terms.... 

The sense of a genuine singular term is designed to insure, through the vicissitudes 

of increased insight and changing scientific theories, that the term keeps on referring 

to what it presently refers to.},

keywords = {Reference},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN52603,

title = {Gödel and Husserl},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Jaakko Hintikka},

url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-8478-4_16},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {From Dedekind to Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Foundations of Mathematics},

pages = {427–446},

publisher = {Kluwer},

address = {Dordrecht},

abstract = {...Gödel's Nachlass ... shows that Gödel knew Husserl's work well and appreciated it greatly. ... What impressed him seems to have been Husserl's general philosophy, which would provide a systematic framework for a number of his own earlier ideas on the foundations of mathematics.},

keywords = {Gödel, Husserl},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN56674,

title = {In what sense is language public},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {On Quine: New essays},

pages = {53–67},

publisher = {Cambridge University Press},

address = {Cambridge},

abstract = {....my view is a very traditional and classical view, found in the history of philosophy from its beginning: Language is established and learned and used in public settings, where we are surrounded by publicly observable objects and events and other persons, who perceive and handle those same objects and events and are perceived by us to do so. Where I go beyond the tradition is in claiming that there is nothing more to meaning than what is produced through this public interaction.},

keywords = {Language and meaning},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN56672,

title = {Introductory note to Kurt Gödel, ’The modern development of the foundations of 

mathematics in the light of philosophy’},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Solomon Feferman},

year  = {1995},

date = {1995-01-01},

booktitle = {Kurt Gödel, Collected Works, Volume 3: Unpublished Essays and Lectures},

pages = {364–373},

publisher = {Oxford University Press},

address = {Oxford},

keywords = {Gödel, Husserl},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN52599,

title = {Husserl on evidence and justification},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Robert Sokolowski},

year  = {1988},

date = {1988-01-01},

booktitle = {Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological tradition: Essays in Phenomenology},

publisher = {The Catholic University of America Press},

address = {Washington DC},

abstract = {The problem of evidence and justification is central in Husserl's phenomenology. In nearly all his writings, from the earliest to the latest, it is a recurrent theme. 

At first sight Husserl might seem to be a oundationalist in matters of justification: one gets the impression that he held that one can reach absolute certainty, at least concerning some matters, and also that he regarded it as a main task of philosophy to attain such certainty. Philosophy should be developed as a "rigorous science" which could provide firm foundations for the sciences and for mathematics. Again and again Husseri emphasizes certainty, a priori knowledge, freedom from presuppositions, and intuition, or essential insight. 

In this paper, we will take a closer look at these matters. Afer a brief introductory exposition of Husserl's notions of intentionality and meaning e will review Husserl's notion of evidence and his changing views on the two kinds of perfection of evidence, adequate and apodictic. We will also examine Husserl's seemingly foundationalist statements, and we will conclude that in spite of appearances, Husserl never was a foundationalist. On the contrary, during the last twenty years of his life he developed more and more in the direction of a quite extreme holism, not only in the sciences, but also in mathematics and in ethics, the two disciplines which traditionally have been the strongholds of foundationalism. In fact, I will argue that Husserl's mature view in these matters was very similar to the views that Nelson Goodman, John Rawls and many others were to develop later. My main thesis will be that Husseri embraced what Rawls has called the method of 'reflective equilibrium.'},

keywords = {Husserl, Justification-, Methodology},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN56673,

title = {Meaning and experience},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Samuel Guttenplan},

year  = {1975},

date = {1975-01-01},

booktitle = {Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974},

pages = {25–44},

publisher = {Oxford University Press},

address = {Oxford},

keywords = {Language and meaning, Reference},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN56675,

title = {Quantification into causal contexts},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky},

year  = {1965},

date = {1965-01-01},

booktitle = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2},

address = {Reprint in Linsky, ed. Reference and Modality: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1971 ISBNs 19875017 019875017X},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}

@inbook{RN52617,

title = {Husserl and Putnam on Twin Earth},

author = {Dagfinn Føllesdal},

editor = {Michael Frauchiger},

booktitle = {Themes from Putnam: The theoretical and the moral face of realist philosophy},

publisher = {de Gruyter},

address = {Berlin},

series = {Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy},

abstract = {In 1968 Putnam put forth the "Twin Earth" example, which became one of his most widely discussed contributions, and he and many of his readers have struggled to find ways of dealing with the problems it raises. The example stimulated his interest in Husserl and made him move in a Husserlian direction. What he did not know, was that Husserl 55 years earlier had discussed basically the same example, in a manuscript from 1913, when he was preparing Ideas. This was discovered in 1993 by Christian Beyer, who in Oct.-Dec. 1994 at Stanford wrote the last chapter of Beyer 1996, where he mentions Husserl's use of the example in print for the first time. 

In this paper I am going through Husserl’s version of the example and discuss what light it throws on the issues he and Putnam consider, in particular the twin earth issues, reference, demonstratives, kinds and idealism. I am grateful to Beyer for his comments.},

keywords = {Husserl, Reference},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inbook}

}