Introduction

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Democracy, like so many objects of desire, is a moving target. The contemporary wave of transitions from authoritarian rule has swept more countries than ever before to the promised land of democracy. But now that these polities have reached democratic shores, often after years of intense struggle, they are discovering that they cannot just lean back, relax, and enjoy the democratic sun. Instead, they find themselves haunted by old demons that they had hoped to exorcise with democratic rule: violations of human rights, corruption, clientelism, patronimialism, and the arbitrary exercise of power. These lingering maladies point to the weakness of the rule of law (rulers stand above the law instead of being subject to it), and they reveal the weakness of public accountability (rulers are free to act as they please, instead of being embedded in and constrained by an institutional infrastructure of “checks and balances”).

As a consequence, we are witnessing today a growing awareness that liberal democracy requires governments that are not only accountable to their citizens but also subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. In addition to being restrained from below, the state must subject itself to multiple forms of self-restraint. Modern democratic constitutionalism requires elected political leaders, the state, and even the sovereign citizenry to agree to a complex series of “self-binding” mechanisms.1

Moreover, to the extent that the long-term survival of democracy depends upon both elite and mass commitment to its norms and procedures, there is perhaps no more common and profound obstacle to the consolidation of new democracies than widespread corruption, human rights violations, illegality, and abuses of authority by the holders of state power at all levels. These patterns of arbitrary and particularistic behavior undermine public esteem for democracy and discourage democratic actors from com-
mitting or habituating themselves to the legal rules and constitutional procedures of democracy.²

The growing body of literature on the democratic defects of the third-wave democracies draws attention to the fact that the absence or weakness of institutional restraints on the state also greatly diminishes the quality of democracy. As the structural imperfections of the new democratic polities are increasingly undermining the initial euphoria over their felicitous birth,³ scholars are giving more and more systematic attention to the serious harm that unrestrained public officials, from presidents to police officers, do to democratic quality. It is becoming increasingly clear that without working systems that can provide "credible restraints" on the overweening power of the executive, democratic regimes tend to remain shallow, corrupt, vulnerable to plebiscitarian styles of rule, and incapable of guaranteeing basic civil liberties. In short, they tend to remain "low-quality" democracies.⁴

Thus, scholars now tend to perceive public accountability as a key attribute of both democracy and democratic quality, as well as an essential ingredient in democracy's long-term viability. High hopes indeed rest on the shoulders of accountability. Contemporary advocates for extending and deepening public accountability assert that doing so will help make economic reform programs coherent as well as sustainable,⁵ facilitate effective democratic governance,⁶ and combat corruption.⁷

Deficiencies of accountability are often more visible, dramatic, and urgent in new than in long-established democracies. But as we know, problems of democratic quality are by no means confined to fledgling democracies. In this sense, our decision to limit this book's universe of cases to "new democracies" (including semidemocracies) is based on pragmatic rather than theoretical considerations. The current mood of political disenchantment and cynicism reigning in many established democracies may, at least in part, be traced back to serious failures in securing public accountability. Institutional solutions are often temporary, and institutional failures as well as changing social, cultural, political, economic, and technological contexts impose new imperatives for institutional adaptation and reform, even in polities with some history of effective public accountability.⁸

Whether in new or old democracies, contemporary demands for public accountability usually share (at least implicitly) one core assumption: elections—however competitive, free, and fair—are by themselves too weak to guarantee "decent" government. They are a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for keeping state power under control; protecting civil liberties; making public officials follow established rules and procedures; keeping them responsive to citizen preferences; making them observe norms of fairness and efficiency in the appropriation and expense of public money; and deterring them from exploiting public office for private gain. As a consequence, from multiple perspectives and for multiple reasons,
current debates on democracy and accountability are recovering and rein-
corporating classic insights:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to con-
trol itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
the government: but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxil-
iary precautions.9

In this book we choose to call these “auxiliary precautions” institutions
of “horizontal” accountability. The concept, developed by scholars such as
Guillermo O’Donnell and Richard Sklar,10 refers to the capacity of state
institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of gov-
ernment. Its “locus classicus” is the interbranch relations among the judi-
ciary, executive, and legislature. These separated powers are supposed to
constrain, check, and monitor one another. Today, however, the functional
differentiation of the state has gone well beyond this simple tripartite divi-
sion of powers. The list of “agents of accountability” has expanded to
include institutions as variegated as election commissions, electoral tri-
bunals, auditing agencies, anticorruption bodies, ombudsmen, administra-
tive courts, constitutional courts, human rights commissions, and central
banks. Horizontal accountability complements, but is to be distinguished
from, “vertical” accountability, through which citizens, mass media, and
civil associations seek to enforce standards of good conduct on public offi-
cials.11

This book adopts an unconventional analytical perspective. It barely
touches upon the key issue in most other discussions of horizontal account-
ability: executive-legislative relations. Instead of analyzing the role of par-
liaments in overseeing the executive, it focuses on independent, nonelec-
tive, specialized bodies of oversight (which may form part of any of the
three branches). These autonomous institutions of accountability are typi-
cally insulated from state officials and from the people as well. Clearly,
such institutions may come to clash with the principles of vertical account-
ability. As long as they are unaccountable themselves, agencies of account-
ability are therefore vulnerable to charges that they are undemocratic or
that they overstep their boundaries. Thus, in studying autonomous agents of
accountability we must be especially attentive to the ancient question: who
shall guard the guardians?

Counteracting the natural tendency toward scholarly specialization,
this volume does not limit its focus to just one type of institution. Rather it
brings together areas of research normally foreign to one another—elector-
al administration and dispute adjudication, judicial systems and constitu-
tional courts, anticorruption bodies, and central banks—with the goal of finding significant commonalities and inducing fruitful cross-fertilization.

This book has multiple purposes and approaches the issue of horizontal accountability from various angles. Part 1 discusses conceptual and normative aspects of public accountability. Each subsequent part contains a general historical overview, and most parts conclude with a chapter on international factors. The empirical case studies provide descriptive accounts, evaluative judgments, and explanatory hypotheses about the institutionalization of horizontal accountability. And the concluding chapter formulates some general theoretical propositions on the conflicts and constituencies of institutional reform.

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The book begins with an essay exploring the conceptual terrain. In his analysis of the term accountability, Andreas Schedler suggests that it represents a broad concept encompassing many neighboring terms, such as oversight, monitoring, auditing, control, exposure, and punishment. Schedler holds that, semantically, the concept of accountability stands on two distinct pillars: answerability and enforcement. It denotes the obligation of public officials and agencies to provide information about their actions and decisions and to justify them to the public and to specialized accounting bodies with the authority to monitor their conduct (the answerability dimension). It further describes the capacity of an accounting party to impose sanctions on the accountable party in cases of manifest misconduct in office (the enforcement dimension). Both aspects usually go together, but some exercises of accountability may involve just one of them. Ombudsmen, for instance, often have no more than a mandate to investigate and issue recommendations without a corresponding power of enforcement; conversely, most citizens cannot interrogate electoral candidates in person but reward or punish them only through their vote. After exploring the concept’s semantic topography, Schedler outlines several ways of constructing subtypes of political accountability (by looking at the accountable agents, the accounting agents, and the criteria of accountability); he pays special attention to the conceptual ambiguities that beset the distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability.

Next, Guillermo O’Donnell explores the normative foundations of the concept, tracing its origins in the history of ideas. He contends that modern liberal democracies (or “polyarchies”) have not grown out of a single dominant strand of political thought. They embody varying mixes of three different traditions, in part complementary, in part conflicting: republicanism, liberalism, and democracy. The first emphasizes virtue; the second, freedom; and the third, equality. Although all three traditions converge in valu-
ing the rule of law, O’Donnell sees the “monistic” democratic tradition as essentially hostile to horizontal accountability, while republicanism and liberalism are supportive of two different types of accountability: resisting encroachment is primarily a liberal concern, and combating corruption is a republican one.

There follow three comments on O’Donnell’s chapter: Richard L. Sklar relates it to the age-old discussion of constitutionalism versus democracy, expressing his satisfaction that political scientists are no longer leaving constitutional analysis solely to lawyers. He also introduces the notion of “celestial” accountability, the appeal to metaphysical entities that has been giving energy and purpose to so many “heroes of accountability” around the world. Philippe C. Schmitter pleads against restricting the notion of horizontal accountability to intrastate relations. It should be used in a wider sense, he argues, covering relations between state and civil society as well. Schmitter also draws attention to the potential trade-offs that may arise between accountability and other values, such as efficiency and governability. Marc F. Plattner goes back to the history of political thought and tries to disentangle the complex normative traditions that lie behind the idea of public accountability. The conclusions he reaches are somewhat different from O’Donnell’s, emphasizing the liberal origins of horizontal accountability but also its compatibility with the democratic principle that the people are the source of all political authority. This animated round of discussion concludes with a brief response by O’Donnell to his commentators.

The subsequent parts of the book analyze the (more or less successful) enforcement of horizontal accountability in four empirical fields: electoral administration and dispute settlement (Part 2), judicial systems (Part 3), anticorruption bodies (Part 4), and central banks (Part 5). Each of these parts opens with a brief history of the institutional field in question. Robert A. Pastor reviews the scant literature on independent electoral commissions. Herman Schwartz recapitulates the history of the judicial review. Michael Johnston reconstructs the development of autonomous agencies set up to combat public corruption. And Sylvia Maxfield traces divergent paths to central bank independence in emerging market economies and evaluates some of its effects. We believe that these historical accounts, despite their brevity, are quite useful, as they explore fields that have been neglected by both historians and political scientists. The historical information they present is often tentative and incomplete, but it is more than has been available up to now. The agencies of accountability this book analyzes are relatively new ones. Even if their antecedents may be traced back to earlier periods, they have all made their careers after World War II. And at least in the realms of electoral administration and corruption control, most of them have been created in the so-called developing world, where the wish to see such organizations insulated from the rest of the state apparatus has appar-
ently been most intense. Their full histories are still to be written, and the book's brief historical accounts are not only treasures of information but invitations for future research.

In the field of electoral administration (Part 2), the chapters by Todd A. Eisenstadt and E. Gyimah-Boadu both describe regime changes without government changes—the tortuous transition from an authoritarian system that enjoyed considerable popular support toward free, fair, and competitive elections. Since the two countries they examine—Mexico and Ghana, respectively—are cases of "democratization through elections," the building of impartial and credible electoral institutions represented the key operation, the "Archimedian point," of regime change. In both cases, opposition parties were the driving force behind the process. And in both cases, having in place a trusted electoral commission (as well as, in the Mexican case, a reliable electoral tribunal) constitutes an extremely valuable asset for the future. The mere existence of these institutions is likely to impede a regression toward authoritarian rule.

Part 2 closes with a chapter on the international dimensions of electoral administration and dispute settlement. Pastor analyzes the role of international monitors and mediators in national elections, showing how the rise of external election monitoring in new democracies has undermined the traditional legal concept of national sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. He describes a plethora of new international actors and outlines some conditions of their successful intervention in transitional elections. Above all, he contends, international monitors must have an invitation, they must know the country, they must be sensitive to the prevailing structure of conflict, and they must deliver comprehensive, contextualized, and impartial judgments about the electoral process they have been observing. In his concluding section, Pastor provides an overview of recent efforts to collectively defend fledgling democracies and discusses the strategic alternative of "consolidating" versus "extending" democracy in the world.

Part 3 reviews efforts to enhance judicial independence on three continents. In her contribution, Pilar Domingo describes the myriad technical and organizational deficiencies that beset Latin American courts: the lack of human capital, inappropriate or inoperative appointment procedures and rules of promotion, administrative inefficiency, financial dependence, and low remuneration. Yet she stresses cultural and political obstacles to judicial reform in the region, such as the tradition of judicial subordination and executive encroachment and the corresponding resistance to change by judges and presidents. Nevertheless, Domingo identifies several potential constituencies for reform: entrepreneurs, the media, and civil associations. She concludes her chapter with an evaluation of Latin America's most recent wave of judicial reform in the 1990s.

Jennifer Widner responds to the scarcity of data about judicial independence in Anglophone Africa with methodological creativity. On the basis of
in-depth interviews with leading judges and of surveys among lawyers in Botswana, Tanzania, and Uganda, she reconstructs the complex bundle of strategies judges in these countries use to foster judicial independence. In the end, she comes to reject theories that explain comparative variations in judicial independence with reference to environmental factors. These theories may work in the Western industrialized countries, she contends, but they do not look very plausible in Anglophone Africa. Instead, she proposes some hypotheses that grant greater explanatory weight to citizen attitudes as well as to factors internal to the courts—above all, judges themselves and their jurisprudential practice.

Schwartz turns his analytic attention to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. After outlining the differences between the U.S. system of decentralized constitutional review and the continental European tradition of centralizing the judicial review of legislation in a specialized court, he sets out to describe and explain the “surprising success” of the new Eastern European constitutional courts. In the successful postcommunist experiences that he reviews (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, but not Russia), self-assertive constitutional courts were able to defend and maintain their fledgling independence against hostile or at least recalcitrant executive. What, he asks, distinguished these success stories from the unqualified “failures” of other constitutional courts that were subdued by unaccountable, authoritarian presidents (as in Belarus or Kazakhstan)? Schwartz’s answer is cautious but clear: it is democracy that makes the difference. Authoritarian rulers do not accept any separation of powers. In nineteenth-century Western Europe, the historical sequence of political development allowed the rule of law to develop first and democracy to come later, but today it is only in democratic settings that governments can be forced to bow to the rule of law.13

In Part 4, two chapters report on specific national efforts to control corruption. John R. Heilbrunn focuses on Francophone Africa’s showcase of political democratization, the Republic of Benin. A “culture of corruption” pervaded public administration in Benin under authoritarian rule, and the first two democratic governments (under presidents Nicéphore Soglo and Mathieu Kérékou, the former dictator who returned to power by defeating Soglo in an election) faced strong pressures to do something about it. While several Anglophone African countries have met demands for public probity by implementing (generally ineffective) anticorruption legislation, Benin’s democratic governments adopted a more innovative two-track strategy. On the one hand, they organized a series of meetings between governmental and nongovernmental actors (somewhat grandiloquently called “États Généraux”) that aired the prevalent discontent and formulated some possible solutions. On the other hand, Kérékou (whose long period of dictatorial rule had been ridden with corruption and scandals) founded a presidential commission “to improve the moral standards in public life.” The commis-
sion is not independent from the president, and its initial performance has
made it appear more an instrument of power than a check on power. Yet it
does have some “positive attributes” and may eventually (though probably
against the intentions of its creators) develop some genuine independence
and effectiveness.

Jon S. T. Quah analyzes the not-so-brief history of anticorruption ini-
tiatives in South Korea and Thailand. Both countries have relied on what
Michael Johnston describes as the “ICAC approach.” That is, they have
created (more or less) independent, Hong Kong-style commissions to bat-
tle against corruption. Both countries, however, were apparently unsuccess-
ful in controlling corrupt behavior, even if South Korea seems to be well
ahead of Thailand in the fight against this “endemic disease.” Quah traces
the differences between the two countries to differences in political leader-
ship and political will: “The political leadership must be sincerely commit-
ted to the eradication of corruption,” he writes. In Thailand, however, he
finds the political elite “unconcerned” about corruption, adopting measures
that range from “inadequate” to “hopeless.”

The international anticorruption chapter, by Fredrik Galtung and
Jeremy Pope, provides a comprehensive overview of the activities of
Transparency International (TI), a Berlin-based transnational nongovern-
mental organization dedicated to combating corruption throughout the
world. Galtung and Pope give an insider’s account of TI’s operation since
its founding in 1993; they describe TI’s evolving network of national chap-
ters, analyze the organization’s efforts to design and implement “national
integrity systems,” and review its main tool for raising public awareness
about corruption—the Corruption Perception Index. TI’s impressive suc-
cess, the authors conclude, resides in a nonconfrontational approach that
emphasizes broad coalition building among all people willing to join the
protracted struggle against corruption. TI’s most significant contribution,
Galtung and Pope assert, has been “bringing civil society back in” to the
struggle against corruption, thereby “challenging the monopoly previously
claimed for governments and international agencies.”

Part 5 deals with central banks. Juliet Johnson recounts the inglorious
performance of the Central Bank of Russia after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Until mid-1993 the bank enjoyed full legal and practical autonomy,
she notes, and it made full use of it—in a way that inflicted considerable
damage upon the Russian economy. The bank acted in an authoritarian and
incompetent manner, deliberately counteracting the government’s econom-
ic reforms. The bank’s management, endowed with a heritage of weak
human capital and socialist ideology, disdained the task that independent
central banks are supposed to pursue with single-minded purity: the battle
against inflation through restrictive monetary policies. Only when the bank
was subject to presidential-cum-international authority in mid-1993 did it
start acting in a more reasonable, responsible, and coherent fashion.
Johnson’s analysis shows the folly of blindly embracing central bank autonomy for its own sake. It forcefully recalls that the value of central bank independence is not intrinsic but instrumental. The success of independent central banks is contingent on expertise, incentives, and economic worldviews that cannot be taken for granted.

In his international chapter, Paul Collier assesses the international financial institutions’ record of imposing macroeconomic policy restraints on African governments in the absence of domestic “agencies of restraint” (such as autonomous central banks). His conclusion is devastating: external conditionality has been totally unsuccessful in establishing credible restraints on those governments, which are still handicapped by a strong collective reputation for unreliable behavior. In Africa, property rights are still perceived as insecure, and the perceived risks of investment continue to impede economic growth. In order to alleviate “the African credibility problem,” Collier argues, international financial institutions must radically redesign their lending policies. Instead of imposing conditions based on future behavior, they should attach their credits to past performance; and instead of threatening negative sanctions, they should reward good behavior. As Collier passionately argues, externally imposed macroeconomic constraints are not credible; only self-restraints are. But to establish credible self-restraints, African governments need access to external conditionality on a different basis—one that is transparently voluntary.

Finally, in his concluding chapter, Schedler weaves together two recurring themes of the book: the conflicts and constituencies of accountability. He contends that the institutionalization of horizontal accountability is a conflictual enterprise that involves the strategic interaction between two antagonistic groups of actors: “conservatives” and “agents of change.” He then identifies four different types of “heroes of accountability,” who may trigger four correspondingly different modes of reform: members of the political elite may initiate reforms “from above”; civil society actors may trigger reforms “from below”; the personnel of existing institutions may carry out reforms “from within”; and international actors may promote reforms “from outside.” The binary distinction between proponents and opponents of change and the fourfold classification of the sources of change are both of great simplicity, yet they offer a promising framework for analyzing processes of institutional change in other areas of politics as well.

Notes

1. See, e.g., Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 248. For a succinct argument that democracy and constitutionalism constitute interdependent elements (rather than conflicting ones, as much conventional wisdom holds), see Holmes, “Constitutionalism.” On the logical as well as empirical affinity between
liberalism and democracy (despite some historical instances of separation; see also Plattner, "Liberalism and Democracy.")

2. See, e.g., Diamond, *Developing Democracy*. On the notion of democratic consolidation, see Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?"


8. See, e.g., Weir, "Primary Control."


11. Readers may wonder why, despite its centrality, the term horizontal accountability does not appear in the title of this book. The reason is intelligibility. This technical term, when mentioned to people who are not familiar with the specialized literature, just earns blank stares, followed by the urgent request to translate it into common sense language.

12. Schedler, "Hard to Observe," pp. 5-8, offers a sketchy working typology of democratic transitions according to the electoral fate that former authoritarian rulers suffer (or enjoy). In an era of free and fair elections, former authoritarian elites may disappear from the electoral arena, form a minor opposition party, establish themselves as the leading opposition force, or be maintained in office through the polls. Both Mexico and Ghana represent the last variant of maximum continuity between authoritarianism and democracy.

13. For another recent elaboration of this point, see Plattner, "Liberalism and Democracy."
Conceptualizing Accountability

ANDREAS SCHEDLER

What is the essence of politics? What is the key variable of political science? Common sense gives us a clear answer: it is power. But as the earlier classical theorists knew: in politics, first comes power, then the need to control it. "In framing a government... the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." Beginning with the ancient philosophers, political thinkers have worried about how to keep power under control, how to domesticate it, how to prevent its abuse, how to subject it to certain procedures and rules of conduct. Today, it is the fashionable term *accountability* that expresses the continuing concern for checks and oversight, for surveillance and institutional constraints on the exercise of power. All over the world (wherever the term is halfway translatable), international financial institutions, party leaders, grassroots activists, journalists, and political scientists have discovered the blessings and adhere to the cause of "public accountability."

Without doubt, the term sounds appealing. Its field of application is as broad as its potential for consensus. And its semantic root, the notion of accounting, is nicely ambivalent; it evokes narrative accounts as well as bookkeeping. But do we know what it means? Are we clear about its semantic boundaries and do we comprehend its internal structure? Not surprisingly, my answer is no: due to its relative novelty, accountability represents an underexplored concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing.

This chapter does not set out to relate the concept of accountability to the history of thought. Chapter 3 by Guillermo O’Donnell and the related comments by Richard Sklar, Philippe Schmitter, and Marc Plattner accomplish a good deal of such philosophical reflection. The pretense of this
chapter is more limited. It aims at reconstructing the meaning of the concept as we currently use it. In essence, it claims that the notion of political accountability carries two basic connotations: answerability, the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties. This two-dimensional structure of meaning makes the concept a broad and inclusive one that, within its wide and loose boundaries, embraces (or at least overlaps with) lots of other terms—surveillance, monitoring, oversight, control, checks, restraint, public exposure, punishment—that we may employ to describe efforts to ensure that the exercise of power is a rule-guided enterprise.

A Two-Dimensional Concept

The attractiveness of accountability derives from its breadth. The concept is a comprehensive one. Rather than denoting one specific technique of domesticating power, it embraces three different ways of preventing and redressing the abuse of political power. It implies subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts. I treat the first dimension under the heading “enforcement” and sum up the last two dimensions under “answerability.” The three aspects together—enforcement, monitoring, and justification—turn political accountability into a multifaceted enterprise that copes with a considerable variety of actual and potential abuses of power.

Answerability

As with most terms we use in everyday language, we usually assume that we understand what we say when we talk about accountability, and that others do so as well. Related discussions therefore regularly proceed on the basis of implicit understandings, without recourse to any explicit definition of the concept. Yet whenever authors do define the term explicitly, they tend to associate it with answerability as its “closest synonym.” Accountability, one encyclopedic definition tells us, is “the ability to ensure that officials in government are answerable for their actions.” We think this provides a valid starting point. The notion of answerability indicates that being accountable to somebody implies the obligation to respond to nasty questions and, vice versa, that holding somebody accountable implies the opportunity to ask uncomfortable questions.

But what kind of answers to what kind of questions? In principle, accounting agencies may ask accountable actors for two kinds of things. They may either ask them to inform about their decisions or they may ask them to explain their decisions. They may ask either for reliable facts (the
informational dimension of accountability) or for valid reasons (the argumentative dimension of accountability). Accountability thus involves the right to receive information and the corresponding obligation to release all necessary details. But it also implies the right to receive an explanation and the corresponding duty to justify one’s conduct. On the one side, exercising accountability therefore involves elements of monitoring and oversight. Its mission includes finding facts and generating evidence. On the other side, the norm of accountability continues the Enlightenment’s project of subjecting power not only to the rule of law but also to the rule of reason. Power should be bound by legal constraints but also by the logic of public reasoning. Accountability is antithetical to monologic power. It establishes a dialogic relationship between accountable and accounting actors. It makes both parties speak and engage them both in public debate. It is therefore opposed not only to mute power but also to unilateral speechless controls of power.

The etymological ambivalence of accountability, which stems from the double connotation of accounts, sustains both dimensions. Financial accounts contain detailed information prepared according to certain standards of classification and accuracy that make them both readable and reliable for outsiders. Narrative accounts are legitimating tales that present some relieving end as the compelling outcome of previous developments. Or more formally, they represent “definitional transformations of contested action.” “Explanations that excuse or justify questionable behavior by proposing a normative status for the behavior.” The informational dimension of accountability relates to the first connotation of accounts—bookkeeping; its discursive or explanatory dimension relates to the second one—storytelling.

Enforcement

Up to now we have described the exercise of accountability essentially as a discursive activity, as a sort of benign inquiry, a friendly dialogue between accounting and accountable parties. Yet answerability, and the double quest for information and justification it implies, is not the whole story of accountability. Political accountability involves more than the generation of data and the interplay of arguments. In addition to its informational dimension (asking what has been done or will be done) and its explanatory aspects (giving reasons and forming judgments), it also contains elements of enforcement (rewarding good and punishing bad behavior). It implies the idea that accounting actors do not just “call into question” but also “eventually punish” improper behavior and, accordingly, that accountable persons not only tell what they have done and why, but bear the consequences for it, including eventual negative sanctions. Exercises of accountability that expose misdeeds but do not impose material conse-
quences will usually appear as weak, toothless, "diminished" forms of accountability. They will be regarded as acts of window dressing rather than real restraints on power.

The "tight coupling" of accountability and the availability of sanctions reflect neoinstitutionalist common sense about the conditions of effective institutions. According to much of the new institutionalist literature, for rules to be effective they must be accompanied by mechanisms of monitoring that prevent the eventual violation of rules from going unnoticed (the informational function of accountability). But they must also count with mechanisms of enforcement that "get the incentives right" by keeping acts of cheating from going unpunished (the enforcement dimension of accountability).  

Academic writers are often quite emphatic in stating that the capacity to punish forms an integral part of political accountability. But political actors, too, usually have a very keen sense for the pivotal importance of effective enforcement mechanisms that will enable agencies of accountability to act forcefully. For example, in Taiwan, the Control Yuan (a branch of government that is charged with investigating the conduct of public officials) is able to "impeach" a public official—in effect, to indict and refer the official to the legal authorities for further investigation and possible prosecution. But because the ministry of justice is controlled by the ruling party, this means in practice that government officials (especially high-ranking ones) are rarely seriously punished. The one structural change that senior officials of the Control Yuan most want is the independent authority to prosecute and impose sanctions on offending officials.

Similarly, during Nigeria's Second Republic (1979–1983) an elaborate code of conduct required public officials to report their assets. A Code of Conduct Bureau was set up to investigate the authenticity of these reports as well as charges of bribery and other wrongdoing. However, the Code of Conduct Bureau lacked the staffing to adequately investigate violations of the code by public officials, and the parallel Code of Conduct Tribunal never sat (because the national legislature never enacted the enabling legislation). Because politicians feared no consequences for corrupt behavior, gross abuses of public offices, such as bribery, embezzlement, extortion, and vote buying, quickly escalated out of control and generated the public disillusionment with democracy that helped bring about the military coup of December 1983.

Concerning the nature of possible sanctions, in the world of politics, the destruction of reputation through public exposure represents one of the main tools of accountability. But the pool of sanctions is much wider. The severity of the sanction depends on the severity of the offense. In politics, removal from office often represents the most drastic consequence of misconduct. Both instruments, publicity and dismissal, appear as entirely
appropriate punishments for a wide range of bad behavior. But as soon as actors violate legal dispositions, neither public criticism nor job loss appears sufficient. Illegal behavior, such as corruption or human rights violations, calls for appropriate legal sanctions. When presumptive agents of legal accountability, such as the Mexican National Human Rights Commission, for example, do not have prosecutorial powers but can only issue nonbinding statements of an advisory nature, many observers will feel that the soft and quasi-voluntary version of “accountability light” they practice does not deserve its name and that, in essence, inconsequential accountability is no accountability at all. If a police officer kills someone in custody without due cause and still walks free, it does not satisfy the principle of accountability if a journalist documents this abuse of authority or if a human rights ombudsman recommends that the officer be arrested and stand trial. Unless there is some punishment for demonstrated abuses of authority, there is no rule of law and no accountability.

A Radial Concept

We may sum up the preceding reflections in the following one-sentence definition of accountability: A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct. In experiences of political accountability, usually all three dimensions—information, justification, and punishment—are present. However, they do not form a core of binary “defining characteristics” that are either present or absent and that must be present in all instances we describe as exercises of accountability. They are continuous variables that show up to different degrees, with varying mixes and emphases. Furthermore, even if one or two of them are missing we may still legitimately speak of acts of accountability.

To begin with, sanctions form an aspect of accountability many consider to be indispensable. Yet some “agencies of restraint” come to equate accountability fundamentally with answerability. For instance, a good number of valuable agencies of accountability, such as the Chilean and the South African truth commissions set up to investigate human rights violations under predecessor regimes, have relied on only a “soft” form of punishment—namely, the public exposure of criminal action.

Furthermore, contemporary discussions on the autonomy versus accountability of central banks (e.g., with respect to the fledgling European Central Bank) reveal ideas of accountability that are entirely detached from notions of punishment. Central bankers, if they accept the idea of accountability at all, equate it to the mere need to publicly explain their decisions after the fact. In general, most expressions of “vertical” accountability
where mass media and civil associations act as accounting agencies rely on purely discursive forms of contestation and constraint, with no possibility of applying "negative sanctions" other than public disapproval.  

The same way accountability may be divorced from sanctions, in some cases it may be an exclusive matter of sanctions. Accountability understood as enforcement may be cut off from questions of answerability. The Indonesian students who demanded the demise of General Suharto in early 1998 did not request further information, nor did they desire to hear any discourses defending the long-reigning president. Or, less dramatically, the idea of electoral accountability—of voters holding politicians accountable at periodic elections—is also primarily related to the possibility of punishing past behavior by "throwing the rascals out" (even if between elections incumbents may continually disclose their actions and justify them). Whereas in the first case, an outrageous as well as transparent violation of social norms makes any additional information superfluous and any additional justification useless, in the second case, the communicative asymmetries between elite actors and mass publics render any dialogic idea of accountability impractical.

The above examples illustrate that it is possible, in principle, to find instances where the idea of accountability is dissociated from one of its core dimensions—be it enforcement or answerability—without necessarily creating "diminished subtypes" of accountability as a result.  

A Modest Concept

Political accountability may be a broad and comprehensive concept. But it is also a modest concept. In part, its modesty stems from its potential one-dimensionality. As argued above, certain instances of accountability do not include aspects of answerability, while others go without elements of enforcement. But more fundamentally, political accountability is a modest enterprise insofar as it accepts the reality of power as well as the relative opacity of power.

The Uncertainties of Power

The guiding idea of political accountability is to control political power, not to eliminate it. In this sense, political accountability presupposes power. Far from harboring utopias of power disappearing, withering away, the
notion of political accountability enters a world of power. Agencies of accountability strive to keep power from running wild; they strive to bound, to discipline, to restrain it. Their mission is to make power predictable by limiting its arbitrariness and to prevent or redress the abuse of power in order to keep its exercise in line with certain preestablished rules and procedures. The existence of power provides their very raison d’être. Without power, without the capacity to make decisions and the corresponding capacity to attribute decisions, it does not make any sense to talk about accountability. Nobody can hold anybody accountable for things beyond that person’s control. I cannot hold you accountable for the bad weather (unless I subscribe to prescientific meteorological theories), nor can I hold you accountable for the wrong weather forecast (unless you are working in the meteorological office).

We might also say that accountability presupposes personal responsibility. The two terms look very similar and are often treated as close synonyms. Yet if one equates accountability with responsibility to someone, one has to concede that there is no perfect overlap with responsibility for something. In fact, the latter presupposes the former, but the inverse is not true. Accordingly, responsibility for something may go entirely without responsibility to somebody. The premodern absolute ruler could be (and could admit to be) responsible for lots of things but still reject having to respond to anybody (but God and history). In modern times, the presumptive burden of responsibility has become an easy formula to legitimate political power (equivalent to the idea of risk taking in economic life). And it has also become a formula to shed off prospective accountability: I am the one responsible so I make decisions based on the way I feel I should; I need not tell anybody about those decisions before I make them; nor do I have to respond to anybody except to my personal conscience. In essence, while accountability forces power to enter into a dialogue, the notion of responsibility permits it to remain silent. While accountability builds on the modern idea that power and knowledge are separate goods, the notion of responsibility allows powerful actors to maintain the illusion that they know what they are doing and, therefore, to dismiss irritating questions that do nothing but disturb their solemn and responsible exercise of power.

If accountability indeed addresses agents who hold power and dispose of some margin of discretion, it follows that accountability should not be confused with narrow notions of regulation, control, or steering. Holding power accountable does not imply determining the way it is exercised; neither does it aim at eliminating discretion through stringent bureaucratic regulation. It is a more modest project that admits that politics is a human enterprise whose elements of agency, freedom, indeterminacy, and uncertainty are ineradicable; that power cannot be subject to full control in the strict, technical sense of the word; and that even in a hypothetical world of perfect accountability, political power would continue to produce harm,
waste, and any other kind of irreversible “public bads” that even ideal agents of accountability could only ascertain, expose, and punish but neither repair nor undo.

Agents of accountability want to reach (partial) control over political decisionmakers. If they already were in (full) control, their mission would make no sense any more. If I control somebody, there is no point of making that person accountable to me. Accountable for what? For the things I induce him or her to do? Robots that assemble automobile parts in a Chrysler factory cannot be considered plausible addressees of accountability. The same applies to government officials who carry out decrees. They are supposed to do their work well (and may be held accountable for it), but they are not accountable for the rules they apply. Accountability concerns agents, not subjects. It concerns those who exercise power, not those who are subordinate to it. Or, more precisely, it concerns subjects only as far as we ascribe some degree of freedom to them. In an analogous way, it concerns public employees only as far as we envision administrative organizations not as mechanical conveyor belts of decisions from top to bottom, but rather as loci of decisionmaking at all hierarchical levels.

The Opacity of Power

Accountability as answerability aims at creating transparency. By demanding information as well as justification, it wants to shed light into the black box of politics. In this it is similar to notions such as oversight, supervision, and monitoring. But again its project is less ambitious. Agents of accountability do not pretend to supervise everything. In fact, they assume that nothing close to close oversight is taking place and accept that their genuine field of competence consists of unobserved and often unobservable actions. In this sense, accountability (as answerability) presupposes imperfect information. If the exercise of power were transparent, there would be no need for holding anybody accountable. The demand for accountability (as answerability) originates from the opacity of power. In a world of perfect information, it would be pointless to ask political actors what they have been doing, or intend to do, and why. We would already know. In Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, any pretense to exercise accountability is void. From its high center, we can see everything and intervene anytime. We do not have to ask anything. We just watch and punish. In the real political world, however, most things are not accessible to direct observation. And even if informational barriers to the political process did not exist, we could still not look into the future (which creates the need for retrospective accountability), nor could we look into decisionmakers’ heads (which creates the need to ask for justifications).

When agents of accountability intrude into the opaque realms of power, they are concerned with the classical arcanae imperii, the dark playgrounds of power shut off from public scrutiny for no other reason than the
self-contained arrogance of power. At the same time, however, legitimate realms of secrecy exist where decisionmakers deliberate and decide behind closed doors. We may think, for example, of central bankers setting exchange rates or court judges forming their judgments. Subjecting such zones of legitimate confidentiality to procedures of accountability should not open them to the eyes of the general public from beginning to end. But it should oblige the involved participants to give ex post explanations and reveal the grounds for their decisions to the public.

We should add that usually if it wants to be effective and perceived as such, democratic accountability must be public. As a rule, only public accountability can achieve its aim of curbing power, while confidential accountability, exercised behind closed doors, tends to be perceived as a farce, a caricature of accountability. For example, Soglo, former president of Benin, disclosing his personal assets secretly has hardly qualified him as a champion of accountability.

This "publicity principle" applies not only to accountable actors but also to accounting agencies. This makes accountability distinct from supervision, for instance. The supervisor may remain in the dark, the unseen eye. The agent of accountability must come to the forefront and open itself to second-order observation: the observer observed. In this sense, institutions of accountability are vampires in reverse. They can live only as long as they act in the daylight of the public sphere, and they crumble and die as soon as they enter the shadows of privacy and secrecy.

The public nature of accountability serves all three aspects of accountability: information, reasoning, and punishment. It does more than bring the "forceless force of the better argument" upon the conduct of the accountable party. It also involves an important form of sanction. It exposes cases of misconduct to public opinion, which often provokes highly damaging reputational consequences.

Who Is Accountable for What?

In all walks of life we can hold people accountable for all kinds of things. In our private lives we wade in a constant stream of accountability initiatives. People hold their children, parents, partners, friends, neighbors, colleagues, and fellow citizens accountable for any kind of presumptive misbehavior—for political incorrectness, insubordination, disorderliness, bad memory, drinking and smoking, sexual misconduct, sinful behavior, lack of courtesy, strategic errors, factual ignorance, whatever. Because there are lots of rules that guide our private lives, there are lots of opportunities for private agents of accountability to step in to monitor and enforce compliance.

The vast realm of private accountability, of course, falls outside the jurisdiction of this book, which is concerned with political accountability.
in its wide sense—with acts of accountability addressed to public officials (the whole personnel employed by the modern state: politicians, civil servants, judges, police officers, military officers, diplomats, etc.). In its narrow sense, the term political accountability covers the activities of only the professional category listed first: politicians, such as cabinet members, legislators, and party leaders.

Parting from the broad concept of political accountability, which concerns the behavior of any public official, one might introduce a number of further subtypes according to the political subsystems that are subject to accountability. The referents and the labels of these subtypes will depend on the analytic distinctions one chooses to draw. A conventional way of slicing the modern political world would produce at least the following broad categories: governmental, legislative, bureaucratic, judicial, and military accountability.

Looking at the addressees of accountability (who is accountable?) is one way of ordering the wide field of political accountability. Inquiring into the criteria of accountability (accountable for what?) is another way. So, if we hold public officials accountable, what do we hold them accountable for? What yardsticks do we use? How do we define good and bad conduct in office? How do we accordingly define the abuse of office that the exercise of political accountability strives to prevent and punish?

It is obvious that we may hold public officials accountable for lots of things and that our acts of accountability may be inspired by many potentially conflicting principles. A quick search through different standards of accountability suggests that we should distinguish at least the following varieties of political accountability (in its broad sense): political accountability (in its narrow sense) assesses the appropriateness of both substantive policies and policymaking processes, but it also brings judgment on the personal qualities of political actors; administrative accountability reviews the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts; professional accountability watches over ethical standards of professionalism, such as medical, academic, and judicial professionalism; financial accountability subjects the use of public money by state officials to norms of austerity, efficiency, and propriety; moral accountability evaluates political acts on the basis of prevailing normative standards (independent of formal rules and regulations); legal accountability monitors the observance of legal rules; and constitutional accountability evaluates whether legislative acts are in accordance with constitutional rules.

**Accountable to Whom?**

Who are the agents of political accountability? Who are its social carriers and what are its institutional forms? It depends. Different forms of account-
ability rely on different enforcement mechanisms. The responsibility for exercising both political and moral accountability applies to citizens, civil associations, mass media, and opposition parties. Both administrative and financial accountability are often entrusted to specialized agencies, such as ombudsmen, administrative courts, accounting offices, and anticorruption organizations. Ethics commissions and disciplinary courts are common institutions of professional accountability. And judicial systems are in charge of guaranteeing legal as well as constitutional accountability. As this quick listing makes clear, distinguishing between different accounting parties constitutes a useful basis for constructing further subtypes of accountability. But we may easily drown in a sea of innumerable agents of accountability unless we drop some conceptual anchor that puts order into the potential proliferation of subtypes.26 Guillermo O’Donnell’s seminal distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability provides, I think, such a heuristic ordering device.27

The notion of vertical versus horizontal relations of accountability parts from the conventional spatial metaphor of power, the classic image of pyramidal hierarchies: height correlates with resources, “above” equals power, “below” equals powerlessness. In this sense, vertical accountability describes a relationship between unequals: it refers to some powerful “superior” actor holding some less powerful “inferior” actor accountable. Or vice versa! The concept is indeterminate in this crucial aspect of directionality. It leaves open whether accountability is meant to flow “top down” or “bottom up,” whether it forms part of the normal exercise of power or whether it implies an inversion of usual power relations. The classic instance of the former is bureaucratic accountability, in which higher-ranking public officials (“principals”) try to control their lower-ranking subordinates (“agents”). In representative democracies, the most important variant of the latter is electoral accountability, in which citizens hold judgment over their representatives through periodic elections.28

By contrast, horizontal accountability, taken literally, describes a relationship between equals: it refers to somebody holding someone else of roughly equal power accountable. In democratic theory, the division of power—the executive, legislative, and judiciary constraining each other through the classic “checks and balances”—represents its prototypical expression. Yet demanding a “rough equality” of power for horizontal relations of accountability establishes a tough criterion, an overly tough one. Power is a (relational) property that is hard to measure, and trying to identify instances of roughly equal political power in the real world of democratic politics is probably an impossible mission.

In addition, an accounting party, if it is to be serious, cannot stand on equal footing with the accountable party. At least in its sphere of competence, it must be even more powerful. And certainly within the boundaries of its jurisdiction, which may be very narrow, it must be, as O’Donnell puts
it (in this book), "legally enabled and empowered" to impose sanctions on the accountable party, to punish improper behavior on its behalf. Relaxing the defining criterion of rough equality in order to replace it by some looser category, such as an approximate "equivalence" of power, does not change this "paradox of horizontal accountability," of specialized agencies holding actors accountable who are immensely more powerful on all accounts except in the agency's specific sphere of competence. Besides, accountability as answerability does not even include the power to punish but only the right to get an answer. In terms of power, it may take place under extremely asymmetric conditions.

Some authors take these methodological and conceptual difficulties into account by complementing the binary spatial metaphor of verticality versus horizontality with some intermediate category, such as "diagonal" or "oblique" accountability. This solution, however, does little to clarify the matter. How should one determine, in precise terms, intermediate angles of inclination between horizontal and vertical lines of accountability?

If indeed in relations of horizontal accountability the agent and the addressee of accountability need not possess comparable power resources but in fact may represent actors of grossly unequal powers, it does not seem helpful to comprehend horizontality in a literal way as a relationship between actors of equal or equivalent power. Rather, it seems more productive and of more general applicability to stipulate that the accounting party must be independent from the accountable party in all decisions that concern its field of competence. Ideally, both parties form "relatively autonomous powers" that do not stand in a relation of formal subordination or superiority to each other. In other words, horizontal accountability presupposes a prior division of powers, a certain internal functional differentiation of the state.

Defining horizontality in terms of autonomy resolves one main conceptual problem that has accompanied the concept of horizontal accountability. Another problem concerns the concept's basic domain of application: where are the autonomous agents of horizontal accountability to be located? Just in the state? Or also in civil society? It is clear that vertical accountability may take place within the state as well as within civil society and across the boundaries of the two spheres. Tax officials who stage sit-ins in front of the finance minister's office are an example of vertical accountability within the state; union members who accuse their long-standing leaders of corrupt behavior are an example of vertical accountability within civil society, and officers who vote incumbent parties out of office are an example of vertical accountability running from civil society to state. In principle, horizontal accountability too may take place both within and across state and civil society. A judge compelling a military officer to testify...
journalist denouncing nepotism within the bar association represents an example of horizontal accountability within civil society; and the chamber of commerce questioning the constitutionality of selective price subsidies may count as an example of horizontal accountability from civil society to state.32

The controversial question is, however, whether we should reserve the notion of horizontal accountability to intrastate relations, as O’Donnell proposes, or else also include in the category civil society actors that hold state agencies accountable, as authors such as Richard Sklar, Philippe Schmitter, David Stark, and László Bruszt suggest.33 Both conceptualizations of horizontal accountability seem quite legitimate. The main objection against the second option of extending the notion of horizontal accountability to civil society–state relations resides in the structural asymmetry between state and nonstate actors. Civil associations may represent strong “factual powers” (poderes fácticos). But they can never match the state’s monopoly of legitimate physical violence or its privileged position as the source of law—of uniform, centrally defined, collectively binding rules. Thus, speaking of horizontal relations between the two spheres always sounds like something of a euphemism. In addition, ascribing one clear meaning to the notion of horizontal accountability carries the benefit of avoiding conceptual ambivalence. Accordingly, most authors in this book follow O’Donnell, insofar as they assume that all cases where civil society actors (citizens, civil associations, or mass media) try to hold state agents accountable fall into the category of vertical accountability, reserving the notion of horizontal accountability to all acts of accountability that take place between independent state agencies.

As Robert Pastor (in this book) has forcefully reminded us, all the notions of accountability discussed so far share one basic presupposition: they take for granted that political accountability works within the confines of national political systems. As a consequence, they overlook international actors (governmental as well as nongovernmental ones) as possible agents of accountability. Since these external actors do not fit easily into the vertical/horizontal dichotomy constructed along the distinction between state and civil society, they represent, as Pastor puts it, a “third dimension” of accountability.

Second-Order Accountability

When agents of accountability develop into powerful actors, when their criteria of judgment are controversial, and when it is difficult to monitor their performance, we face the problem of second-order accountability: how can we hold institutions of accountability accountable themselves? This prob-
lem seems particularly pressing with the kind of institutions discussed in this book: specialized, nonelective, autonomous state organizations that are supposed to pursue their narrow missions with professional single-mindedness, while they are nevertheless vulnerable to inefficiency and abuse the same as any other locus of power.34

Of course, one may reformulate the challenge of second-order accountability as a challenge of n-order accountability. Since any second layer of institutional accountability is susceptible to the same kind of failures as the first layer, we face the possibility of an infinite regress. There are two ways to avoid it. We may establish reciprocal accountability: two agents, A and B, “check and balance” each other. Or we may establish recursive accountability: A is accountable to B, who is accountable to C, who is accountable to A again. It is hard to imagine that, at least in the long run, insulated and isolated institutions of accountability can survive unless they are embedded in such recursive cycles or systems of accountability. As O’Donnell puts it (in this book), “achieving a significant degree of . . . accountability requires the coordination of several agencies, each of them subject to divide et impera strategies.”

Conclusion

Where did our surveying expedition into the structure of meaning of the concept of political accountability take us? Let us sum up the main coordinates of our conceptual journey. Political accountability, we stipulated, represents a broad, two-dimensional concept that denotes both answerability—the obligation of public officials to inform about their activities and to justify them—and enforcement—the capacity to impose negative sanctions on officeholders who violate certain rules of conduct. In experiences of political accountability, both aspects are usually present. Yet instances exist where either the call for sanctions dominates (accountability as enforcement) or the quest for information and justification (accountability as answerability). Given that the notion of accountability is not built on the illusion that power is subject to full control and can be opened up to full transparency, but rather accepts and addresses the uncertainty and opacity of power, we characterized it as a modest concept. After clarifying the basic meaning of accountability, we stepped into the vast field of different subtypes of accountability. We sketched some ways of distinguishing different forms of accountability, according to its addressees, its criteria, and its agents. Given the thematic focus of the book, our discussion centered on the distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability. It defined the somewhat vague and metaphorical notion of “horizontality” as a relationship between state agencies that must possess a certain degree of mutual independence, rather than equivalent power resources.
This review of the concept’s semantic field and internal structure should establish a reliable basis for the other chapters in the book, even if not all authors adhere to exactly the same interpretation of accountability and its subtypes. In more general terms, it should also provide useful analytical tools for understanding and advancing academic as well as political discussions on political accountability—this obscure object of political desire and institutional design.

Notes

In academic life, it represents a rare and precious event when an author receives several pages of detailed, sympathetic, and constructive feedback on a draft. I thank an anonymous reviewer and Larry Diamond for writing such comments. Without their insightful and often fundamental criticism, this chapter would be very different from what it is now. My sincere thanks to both of them.

1. The Federalist Papers, no. 51.
2. For a brief historical review of moral and institutional solutions to the problem of corrupt power, see Fontana, “The Roots of a Long Tradition.”
3. Richard Sklar even asserts that “the norm of accountability appears to be the most widely practiced of democratic principles” (Sklar, “Developmental Democracy,” p. 714).
5. Hickok, “Accountability,” p. 9. See also Sklar, this volume.
6. See Plattner, “Comments,” and Sklar, this volume. This twofold answerability refers to past as well as to future acts. Especially in political contexts, accountable agents have to stand up not only for what they have done (retrospective or ex post accountability) but also for what they plan to do (prospective or ex ante accountability). See also Maravall, “Accountability,” and Schmitter, this volume.
7. Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, define accountability as “monitoring” (p. 195), thus equating it with the “informational” dimension. Yet, at other places, they use the term accountability interchangeably with deliberation (p. 189), thus equating it with the “dialogic” dimension.
9. Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, emphasize the connectedness of both aspects of accounts. They develop the metaphor of democratic politicians opening accounts, asking voters for credit, and giving accounts in order to maintain their creditworthiness in an original and insightful way (see pp. 192–196).
11. See, e.g., Ostrom, Governing the Commons.
12. See, e.g., Collier, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Sklar (this volume); Maravall, “Accountability.”
15. On the distinction between horizontal and vertical accountability, see below.
17. On “classical” and “radical” concepts, see Collier and Mabon, “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited.”
18. The preceding reflections do not apply for "accountability as enforcement." As we noted above, rule violations may already be in the open as public facts that are not opaque; neither does the punishment of those violations add to the transparency of politics.

19. As reported by Galtung, "Developing Agencies of Restraint," p. 11.

20. Of course, there are exceptions to the general rule of publicity. The "bureaucratic" accountability of subordinates to superiors usually remains an internal affair within the administrative organization concerned. And in some traditional realms of state secrecy, such as foreign intelligence services, accountability, if it takes place at all, does so in a confidential way, closed off to the eyes of the general public.


23. Much of "professional accountability" pertains to the sphere of civil society. At the same time, the category represents a weighty aspect of the accountability of public officials, and the more so, of course, the larger the public sector in a given country.

24. Note that the last three categories—moral, financial, and legal accountability—represent entirely crosscutting forms of political accountability that may strike any actor in the political system, be it a party leader, the head of government, a member of parliament, a judge, a simple state official, or whomever.

25. This volume basically covers the last two forms of accountability: legal and constitutional.

26. The picture would look even more complicated if we were to include forms of accountability not only to concrete actors but also to ideal, subjectless categories: to history (historical accountability), to our personal conscience (super-ego accountability), to God in heaven (celestial accountability), or to past generations (ancestral accountability). I owe the term "celestial" or "heavenly" accountability to Richard Sklar (this volume).

27. See O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy." For a similar early conceptualization under the heading of "lateral" accountability, see Sklar, "Developmental Democracy."


29. See, e.g., Schmitter, this volume.

30. See also Schmitter, this volume, p. 62, note 4.


32. For an insightful discussion of the many forms, sites, and protagonists of accountability, within the state as well as within civil society, see Sklar, "Developmental Democracy."


34. For a refreshing recognition of the need for second-order accountability with relation to central banks, against the prevailing mainstream that favors maximizing unqualified central bank independence, see Johnson, this volume. Schütz, "Independence Versus Accountability," and Whitehead, "Models of Central Banking."