

Global Citizenship

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Introduction

Globalization describes the processes of widening and deepening relations and institutions across space.¹ Increasingly, our actions and practices systematically and mutually affect others across territorial borders (Held 1995: 21). Since these processes affect our opportunities and our possible impact, globalization also affects what we ought to do – as ‘global citizens’. This paper explores some of the implications for our conceptions of citizenship beyond the state. In particular, these processes affect assertions about what our institutions should enable us to do, as citizens of multiple political units. I present a number of arguments to support the view that individuals should be able to exercise some democratic voting rights and some human rights vis-à-vis governance structures above the nation state under our conditions of globalization. After a brief overview including a historical backdrop, section 2 sketches some components of global citizenship, and section 3 considers several objections to this notion.

I start from the normative premise that human beings are rights-deserving subjects of equal moral worth. I then ask: what are the appropriate normative answers to globalization? Globalization challenges perceived obligations of states, citizenship and non-state/private actors such as NGOs and corporations, and gives rise to normative and institutional solutions of a varied kind. In particular, what are the implications for our conceptions of citizenship beyond the state?

1 Globalization and normative cosmopolitanism

Global citizenship invokes the notion of citizenship. Such talk of citizenship beyond state borders is not new (Follesdal 2002). Indeed, we find several competing conceptions in

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ancient Greek and Roman political thought. When asked which was his country, Socrates allegedly insisted that he was a citizen of the world, rather than an Athenian or a Corinthian. Likewise, when asked where he came from, Diogenes answered “I am a citizen of the world”. But their notion of citizenship beyond the city-state was meagre and vague. For Socrates and Diogenes, citizenship of the world did not include *any* legal rights beyond borders. In contrast, as Athenian citizens – the privileged set of free men – they would enjoy active rights to political participation. Global citizenship was thus of a quite different kind than traditional citizenship rights and duties.

In comparison, the Roman Empire recognized and even encouraged *dual* citizenship, with loyalty both to the local community and to Rome. This arrangement allowed citizens of Rome freedom of movement and trade within the Empire. Still, the Roman notion of dual citizenship had its drawbacks, both for the individual and for the political order. To be a citizen of Rome usually only provided status or passive citizenship in the form of *protection* – some of what we now think of as human rights – rather than *active* citizenship rights to political participation, enjoyed only by the patrician class. Dual citizenship also created dual loyalties in the populations of the Empire, which led to unresolved conflicts (Toynbee 1970, Clarke 1994).

Similar challenges face our own conceptions of citizenship as we seek responses to the changing role of the unitary nation state in the global legal, political and economic order. Two central changes to the capability set and responsibilities of the state are often subsumed under ‘multilevel governance’, namely *public authorities at several territorial levels*, and the *roles of private actors* in the exercise of public authority (Caporaso 1996; Marks, Hooghe et al. 1996). Both of these changes merit particular concern among empirical political scientists and for normative political theory alike. We live as individuals under rules imposed by public authorities at several territorial levels: the state, regional political orders such as the EU, and the rules of international bodies such as those of the UN Security Council. How - if at all - can we sustain political obligations towards several such units and maintain influence over them as members of several ‘commonwealths’ (Erman and Follesdal 2012)? What happens when these political orders conflict, and what ‘shared identity’ does each require? Can and do all of them need to be democratically accountable? Can this multiplicity of territorial sites of political authority enhance human rights in ways that respect, protect and promote these rights? Or do these developments hinder the prospects of democracy and human rights?

Second, multilevel governance is used to signify the increased formal and informal influence of non-state, private actors in public regulations, in sectors ranging from banking

and investment to the Internet and the pharmaceutical industry (Follesdal, Wessel et al. 2008).

How can we best respond to the challenges of fragmentation, dispersion or even evaporation of responsibility formerly firmly placed with the state? There are risks that gaps emerge in the protection and promotion of others' vital interests as well as deep conflicts among different sites of authority in the multilevel political order. As citizens of democratic states we are both subjected to and co-authors of several of these changes.

A brief sketch of some of the normative premises I rely on in the following argument is also appropriate. The invocation of 'citizenship' brings with it a normative commitment to political equality, i.e. the equal standing of all individuals in the political order, including democratic control over the institutions that shape their lives. We may call this underlying normative commitment *Normative Cosmopolitanism*. It is universal in scope, insisting that if someone is affected, he/she should receive equal consideration regardless of race, gender, social status or citizenship. How do we specify such "equal consideration?" I here explicate this commitment to the equal dignity of all individuals, as individuals' "desire ... to arrange our common political life on terms that others cannot reasonably reject." (Rawls 1993, 124). A central premise is thus the motivation of the individuals. For the purpose of developing these normative standards for the notion of global citizenship, I assume that the individuals act on a *duty of justice*. That duty entails that they are committed "to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves" (Rawls 1971, 115). This commitment is operative at least in circumstances where each citizen has reason to believe "that others will do their part." (Rawls 1971, 336).

Normative cosmopolitanism and the duty of justice in particular does not require that citizens aim to establish global institutions. However, those equally affected by practices and institutions should also have an equal say in how the institutions should be shaped. Such arguments apply *inter alia* at the European level. Europeans are now so interdependent due to their common institutions that they must also have an equal say in how they are governed (Follesdal 1997b; Follesdal and Hix 2006). The institutions of the Union, including Union citizenship, must be shaped to ensure such democratic accountability.

This line of argument can serve as a model with regard to claims to institutionalise global citizenship. Globalisation reduces and shifts the significance of state borders, due largely to the digital and trans-national economy. Our decisions increasingly affect others across borders, increasing the interdependency among people in different states. Insofar as global

regimes have global implications, normative cosmopolitanism requires that they must also be under sufficient political control where all have an equal say. The fact of globalisation, if indeed a fact with drastic implications on individuals' life chances, supports a normative requirement to address the global democratic deficit.

The requisite legal protections and controls may take at least two forms, reminiscent of the classical distinction between passive and active citizenship. Firstly, there may be institutional arrangements that provide *immunity* to individuals and communities against severe damage wrought by others. A wide range of human rights and practices of a scope for state sovereignty are examples of such protections. Secondly, individuals may enjoy institutionalised influence in the form of political rights over the institutions and regimes. National citizenship typically provides both forms of controls. Europeans also enjoy both forms of controls: Passive rights are expressed in the form of European human rights regimes – including the European Convention on Human Rights, and – in the EU – the Union Charter on Fundamental Rights. Active rights are enjoyed in the form of voting rights of two kinds. Firstly through democratic control over domestic governments represented in the EU Council. Secondly by directly elected representatives to the European Parliament. Union citizenship ensures Europeans political influence residing in Member States other than their own through the latter institution.

Hitherto, insofar as global citizenship is institutionalised at all, it primarily consists of passive rights in the form of universal human rights standards that protect individuals regardless of which state they live in. Elements of the United Nations may be enhanced to provide equal political influence over various regimes, but such global political rights are not well developed yet, and it remains an open question what sorts of institutions, with what sorts of democratic control, are normatively required.

The discussion of Union citizenship indicates that institutionalising active global citizenship faces several challenges.

Global political authorities do not automatically alleviate the problems of globalisation – on the contrary, such bodies can easily be abused to the further detriment of the powerless. To ensure that a global political order expresses respect for all on a footing of equality, the institutional design is of utmost importance. Moreover, if these decision-making bodies are to enjoy compliance and support, they must be trusted to make just decisions. If they are to be representative and effective, most global citizens must be committed to a common normative basis. The account of global citizenship sketched below suggests that such a basis need not draw on a broad shared history and culture. Nevertheless, several commitments

must be broadly shared, including a conception of the proper tasks of state governments, regional bodies such as the EU, and global institutions. Such a shared political culture must be fostered, and maintained. The risks of abuse of such global institutions are obvious, particularly in the absence of global arenas for political deliberation and habituation. But gradual development in this direction may still be feasible – and the alternatives may be even worse, judged from the point of view of normative cosmopolitanism.

In the following I first elaborate on some components of such a conception of global citizenship, and then consider some objections to the concept.

2 Global citizenship: Democratic vote, human rights and participation in trust-building institutions

In this section I make a case for why individuals may claim some democratic voting rights and some human rights vis-à-vis governance structures above the nation state, under our conditions of globalization. I also argue that global citizenship should help engender much needed trust: being a member of organisations and a citizen of states that participate in international regimes are components of ‘global citizenship’

Given the history of citizenship in the West, one central component of multiple citizenship in multilevel governance seems to require some democratic element. At the same time, we should not fall into the trap of blurring the distinction between democratic theory and broader normative political theory. Instead, the challenge is to contribute to a deeper dialogue between theories of global democracy and theories of global justice.

We may have at least three reasons to value democratic institutions in multilevel governance. First, they are *intrinsically* justified to the extent that they are institutional arrangements that distribute fair shares of political influence over decision-making and over the shaping of our various shared institutions. Second, they are *instrumentally* justified to the extent that they secure several of our other interests. I submit that one of these is our interest in non-domination – that is, to avoid being subject to the arbitrary will of others. Thirdly, they are also *instrumentally* justified insofar as they help secure a just distribution of other goods – material and legal resources, opportunities etc.

As regards the last two aims, non-domination and distributive justice might in principle be realized *without* democratic institutions. Human rights may safeguard against some forms of domination. Within states, international and domestic human rights norms have constrained central authorities to protect individuals’ vital interests against standard social risks.

Furthermore, democratic institutions help constrain drastically unequal distribution of benefits. There are empirical grounds for claiming that democratic institutions are good practical devices to secure non-domination and a fair distribution of other goods: Democratic institutions are somewhat more likely to remain responsive to the best interests of all citizens - compared to alternative decision-making institutions. Such claims are contested, but seem defensible at least when it comes to democracy within unitary states (Sen and Dréze 1990; Przeworski, Shapiro et al. 1999; Shapiro 2003).

In a multilevel political order, the case for democratic governance may arise only for some issues, and the conditions for effective democratic decision-making may be absent. We may first of all ask whether these three arguments are relevant for multilevel governance. The arguments may indeed apply to some extent at regional and global levels, to secure a fair share of control and influence and to prevent domination. Consider the following: in a multilevel world order, it may well be that only *some* issues and aspects of individuals' well-being need to be heeded globally – while many concerns will be the tasks of regional, national or sub-national political bodies. Some optimistically point to evidence that for a number of issues there are already signs of widespread if not global concern. Evidence ranges from tax payer contributions and political party support for international development assistance, emergency relief, environmental measures and political consumerism action, to emerging transnational civil society organizations in areas such as human rights and the environment (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 2003; Ruggie 2004). Furthermore, some point to evidence that there is a sufficiently vibrant public debate that shapes individuals' preferences and sense of justice, necessary for democracy, also at levels above the nation state – such as at the European level (Risse 2014). Human rights may also serve similar roles against authorities above the state. But we may have to consider carefully the reasons there might be to hold that all of these regulations merit the label 'human rights' (Follesdal 2006).

The upshot of this brief sketch is that there may be a case for maintaining that individuals may claim some democratic voting rights and some human rights vis-à-vis governance structures above the nation state under our conditions of globalization.

A further role of global citizenship may be to foster and maintain just global institutions, based on the duty of justice mentioned above. Such institutions are of great value, not least in order to create and maintain the mutual, legitimate trust required among individuals under conditions of globalization. I shall therefore suggest that we should include among the components of 'global citizenship' being a citizen of a state that helps establish and participates in such international institutions and regimes.

Trust is important when individuals must co-operate, but often they will only do so when they expect the others to do their part. Suspicion that others will exploit rather than reciprocate one's efforts can easily prevent or unravel complex practices of co-operation. Trust is therefore crucial for 'social capital' - 'social connections and the attendant norms and trust' (Putnam 1995: 665; Loury 1987; Coleman 1990).

Robert Putnam argues that the operative norm in trust is what he calls 'generalised reciprocity', fostered in civil society:

(N)ot 'I'll do this for you, because you are more powerful than I,' nor even 'I'll do this for you now, if you do that for me now,' but 'I'll do this for you now, knowing that somewhere down the road you'll do something for me'. (Putnam 1993, 182-83)

To prevent suspicion and ensure stable cooperation, actual compliance is not enough: each individual must also appear trustworthy, so that others can count on their compliance (Hardin 1996). I submit that some normatively legitimate institutions at levels above the state can be an important means for fostering just institutions among and within states, and may help foster trust and trustworthiness even among strangers, by engendering *impersonal reciprocity*, of the form:

I'll do this for you – or refrain from doing this to you - knowing that somewhere down the road *someone else* will treat me in the appropriate way.

A wide variety of *treaties* and *international courts* may serve to stabilize such expectations (Helfer 2006). *Impersonal* reciprocity is fostered by confidence in the general compliance with social institutions – including abstract, aggregated political systems (Inglehart 1970, Giddens 1995). Institutions can monitor and sometimes sanction defection, thus reducing the temptation to a free ride. In turn, this reduces the likelihood of defection by those who are motivated by a duty of justice, and who do not mind co-operating as long as they are assured that others do likewise. These arrangements are especially important when establishing practices, as in the European Union at present and in various sectors of international cooperation, where institutions are crucial for facilitating stable co-operation.

Social practices and institutions *rely on* norms of impersonal reciprocity, but can also *foster* them - though slowly. Institutions not only enable cooperation and shape individuals' strategies, but they can shape our identities: How we conceive of ourselves, our values, norms and interests. This is another way that institutions can create and sustain trust. They shape individuals' interests and perceptions of alternatives, and can foster trust in others' benevolence (Becker 1996). Trustworthiness is further enhanced if individuals do not only

act on the basis of calculations, but instead are socialised to regard certain behaviour as obvious and appropriate (Stinchcombe 1986, March and Simon 1993, Olsen 2000).

I submit that we should include among the components of 'global citizenship' being a citizen of a state that helps create and participate in institutions that contribute to a more just international political and legal order. Such actions by individuals and by their organizations and states also help stabilize fair co-operation.

3 Global Citizenship: a Fata Morgana?

An immediate objection to global citizenship as including political rights and other human rights and as contributing to trust might be that this is implausible. It is unrealistic to believe that individuals globally will act on feelings of solidarity and charity across hundreds of miles (Preuss 1995: 275). The global shared culture and common heritage seems too thin to support the required trust, especially when compared to the national heritages bolstering compliance say within the European welfare states (Miller 2000). There is no 'demos', not even in Europe: that is, no population with a shared sense of destiny or broad set of common values.

However, I submit that a 'thick' common basis of shared beliefs, values and traditions is not needed. There are states without 'thick' shared values and sense of community. Indeed, the search for a common ethnic or cultural base for 'belonging' has worried many Europeans in discussions of the desirability of a 'Union Citizenship', due to the memory of past wars based on such grounds.

Instead, I submit that a satisfactory account of global citizenship need not build on a broad base of common identity, culture and history. Recall the normative premises laid out in section 1, suggesting that the account assumes a shared sense of justice and more limited commitments to the equal dignity of all individuals, motivated by a "desire ... to arrange our common political life on terms that others cannot reasonably reject." (Rawls 1993, 124).

From this point of view, the motivating force is not a feeling of altruism, but a sense of justice, a preparedness to comply with those institutions that apply to those of us that are just (Rawls 1980: 540). Day-to-day compliance with laws and other commands is required by the duty to honour others' legitimate expectations, and by the sense of justice as it binds us to the institutions that surround us. This is a different motivation for individuals' compliance than 'sentiments of affinity', the emotional bonds between individuals.

A central question in this account is whether this inherently 'abstract' sense of solidarity based on universalistic principles of social justice can motivate and be sustained over time. However, this concern should be alleviated by considering that also existing nation states are usually too large to foster empathy and sympathetic concern for the wellbeing of all others (Calhoun 1996, 3; Goodin 1988). Yet many such states still seem to enjoy support from their citizens – at least for the time being. The account I sketch below assumes this more 'impersonal' motivation: a sense of justice, an interest in doing our moral duty and expressing respect for others, rather than from a sense of community, 'thick' identity, or empathy.

Global Citizenship: Commitment to institutions and to a political theory

For trust among global citizens, I submit that they must be habituated to three sets of commitments.

Firstly, citizens must be committed to their institutions and the decisions and rules that their officials make. In practice, this means that they must generally be prepared to abide by the laws and other rules that apply to them. In this way they respect the legitimate expectations of those around them who depend on their compliance.

Citizens must also have reason to believe that others will continue to comply in the future. Such trustworthiness, essential for stability, can be maintained by a publicly known, generally shared commitment to comply for what each person regards as good reasons. The second commitment is therefore to principles of legitimacy for the shared institutions.

Such principles of legitimacy, duly worked out for multi-level political orders, serve several roles in accounting for stability. One is to provide critical standards for assessing existing, concrete institutions. Another is to secure some shared bases for compliance with just institutions, since these principles provide justification for such existing institutions.

I suggest that citizens must also share a third commitment, namely to some of the premises that in turn support such principles of legitimacy. In other words, a stable political order would seem to require agreement on a – vague – conception of citizens as equal members of the multi-level political order. Above I sketched parts of one such conception. To illustrate this commitment, consider John Rawls' suggestion that the social institutions should be regarded as a system of co-operation among individuals regarded for such purposes as free and equal participants (Rawls 1971). That particular conception is insufficient for the

challenges facing us under globalization, - or indeed for the European Union. The realistic scenarios are ones where States, regional and global institutions would somehow split and share sovereignty. A shared conception of the proper responsibilities of states, regional authorities and global institutions seems necessary to allocate powers between them, for instance by specifying the principle of subsidiarity further.

There are two reasons for this third kind of commitment. A consensus on institutions and principles of legitimacy is insufficient to convince others of one's trustworthiness regarding future compliance with these procedures. Others' present compliance does not by itself give us reason to trust that they will continue to respect the principles of legitimacy – we also need assurance that they regard themselves as having reasons to continue to comply in the future. Moreover, the trust needed now also seems to concern the creation and modification of institutions. That is: citizens must be able to trust each other not only when applying shared rules and following existing practices. They must also trust each other when *establishing* such institutions, e.g. when they craft treaties or constitutions. Such tasks must be guided and seen as guided by a sense of justice, including a commitment to a shared conception of the equal standing of individuals within the multilevel global political order.

Conflicting loyalties?

Historically, citizenship has often been regarded as exclusive. One is hopefully a citizen of one state – but only of one. Thus many states have traditionally prohibited multiple citizenships. One long-standing worry about multiple citizenships is that individuals will suffer from conflicting loyalties and split identities (Boll 2007, Vink and de Groot 2010). Thus European Union citizenship is explicitly a second citizenship, to *supplement* rather than replace citizenship in a Member State. By extension: Should we fear that global citizenship, instead of bolstering trust, will foster split loyalties?

In response, note that the basis of citizenship sketched above is not exclusionary. It does not rely on a broad cultural basis or a thick sense of national identity and pride. It is thus – at least in principle—compatible with other concurrent commitments and loyalties. Conflicts may still occur, of course, insofar as the state government, regional and international institutions issue conflicting orders or legislation, and there is no final judicial authority. Such occasions can be drastically reduced in several ways, e.g. insofar as courts with regional and international jurisdiction have the final word, on the basis of a sufficiently clear delineation of authority and competences.

I have suggested that one important task that global citizenship can fulfil is to facilitate the trust and trustworthiness required for stable compliance and support of global institutions. To secure such trust, all global citizens must share some common grounds that include the commitment to existing institutions and to shared principles of legitimacy. Moreover, citizens must also share the immediate grounds for principles, for instance conceptions of the ends of the political unity, and some conception of the proper relationship between individuals and the various regional and international political orders, which split and share sovereignty with the states. These three commitments would seek to avoid contested parts of specific religious or philosophical world-views. At the same time, the shared basis goes beyond “Constitutional Consensus” or a “Constitutional Patriotism”, that would seem only to require consensus on procedures for making and interpreting authoritative decisions (Baier 1989; Habermas 1998). Agreement on procedures seems insufficient to maintain the mutual trust necessary for constitutional changes and institutional development.

4 Conclusion

I have laid out a number of arguments why individuals should be able to exercise some democratic voting rights and some human rights vis-à-vis governance structures above the nation state, under our conditions of globalization. The normative premises supporting this conception of ‘global citizenship’ are basically a commitment to political equality, i.e. the equal standing of all individuals in the political order, including democratic control over the institutions that shape their lives. Under globalisation, I have argued that the same normative commitments have such implications for our shared institutions that specify rights and obligations above the level of the nation state.

Much remains to be done with regard to theories of global justice for multi-level systems of governance. But what are we to say to critics who point out that there are broad discrepancies between the institutions of the present world order – the present ‘global basic structure’ (Follesdal 2011) - and the requirements of normative international political theory? Such deviations do not necessarily entail that the theory is flawed. Discrepancies between existing institutions and normative theories may equally well be weaknesses of the institutions, - weaknesses that a normative theory highlights. That talk of global citizenship may increase conflicts, and not only induce support, should come as no surprise: governments have often discovered that citizenship rights have “the potential for exacerbating, as well as diminishing the conflict of classes” (Goodin 1988). Under conditions of globalisation, we must expect even more such conflicts and contestation concerning the extent, impact and improvement of international institutions that shape our lives across state borders. As citizens of two or more commonwealths – domestic, regional and global - our

commitments to political equality and a duty of justice require us to confront these challenges head on.

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