

Equality of Education and Citizenship: Challenges of European Integration

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Abstract What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.

Keywords Human rights · Education · Equality · Citizenship · European integration · Equality of result · Equality of opportunity

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What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders, and across religious and other normative divides?

The importance of equality, education and citizenship, and their interlinkage, can hardly be overstated. Witness the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which insists on the

right of everyone to education ... directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and [which] shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. ...

(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity..
(Art 13)

Likewise, the Convention on the Rights of the Child underscores the commitment to equality of educational opportunities of various kinds—be it of opportunity, according to capacity, or to the individuals' potential:

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, ...

c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity
(Art. 28)

The widespread support for equality of citizenship education notwithstanding, I shall argue that the precise content must be rethought under European integration.

European integration raises at least three philosophical concerns: (a) The requirements of multiple citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity yet secure equality and commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among citizens in a Union, as compared to in a unitary state.

The following reflections address some of these challenges. I argue that the expansion of democratic rule to the EU has several implications for the content and standards of obligatory education. All must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain 'citizenship norms'. One important reason is to promote trust and trustworthiness in the population.

This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union.

I shall also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. This objective is especially difficult to measure under conditions of multiculturalism that are likely to prevail in Europe.

“On citizenship—Domestic, Cosmopolitan and European” introduces citizenship beyond state borders, historically and in the European Union. “On Citizenship and Trust in

the EU” explores further the intricate connections between citizenship and trust to defend the need for inculcating at least certain values. We then turn to consider some commitments that citizens must share, in “The Basis of Citizenship”, and we sum up several reasons for education in “Four Reasons for Education”. “On Equality” explores reasons for equality among compatriots, and “Five Challenges” considers several challenges to this account of equality and citizenship at the European level. The chapter concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.

On citizenship—Domestic, Cosmopolitan and European

Talk of citizenship beyond state borders is not new. Competing conceptions emerged in ancient Greek and Roman political thought. Diogenes appealed to his cosmopolitan citizenship to deny any local obligations, including duties to pay taxes. For him dual citizenship seemed legally impossible. In comparison, the Roman Empire recognized and even encouraged dual citizenship with loyalty both to the local community and to Rome. Still, to be a citizen of Rome usually only provided status or *passive* citizenship in the form of protection, rather than *active* citizenship rights to political participation enjoyed only by the patrician class. Dual loyalties among the populations of the Empire caused unresolved conflicts (Toynbee 1970; Clarke 1994). Can European Union Citizenship avoid such legal and moral tensions of multiple citizenship?

European Union Citizenship is closer to the Roman practice than to the Greek. Union citizenship carries clear legal implications for freedom of movement and trade, and supplements, rather than replaces, national citizenship. Yet the European Union must address challenges of institutionalisation and tensions among loyalties. Reflection on these roles and challenges of Union citizenship also illuminate some issues regarding global citizenship—still more of a moral idea than a legal grant of active political rights. Both Union citizenship and global citizenship create aspirations to a democratic political order with a scope beyond existing states, and face challenges regarding institutions and political culture aspiring to treat all affected individuals as equals.

European Union Citizenship

Union Citizenship was a conceptual innovation of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, reaffirmed most recently in the stranded Constitutional Treaty (Art II-8). Every person who is a national of a Member State of the Union is also a Union citizen.

Union citizenship confers four main rights. They include both protections—passive rights—and some political controls—active rights, including:

- The right to move freely among, and stay in, other Member States;
- The right to vote and run in local and European Parliament elections in the Member State where one resides.
- Protection in a non-EU country, by the diplomatic or consular representatives of other Member States if one’s own Member State is not represented;
- The right to petition the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman, and to address and get answers from Union institutions in any of the official language.

The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) clarified that Union citizenship does not replace but complement national citizenship. Important questions remain: how to teach such citizenship, and how to maintain and exercise dual political loyalties? Should citizens be taught to vote at EU elections in accordance with their own interests, their co-nationals', or those of all Europeans? And what indeed does justice require among Europeans?

To alleviate some of these issues it is helpful to reflect more systematically on the multiple reasons to value education, and the content of education to citizenship in particular: What is the point of going to school? To address this we must first consider the need for trust.

On Citizenship and Trust in the EU

Several scholars hold that Union Citizenship was introduced precisely to engender popular support and allegiance to the Union (Closa 1992: 1155; Shaw 1997; Wiener 1997; Follesdal 2001b).

This need has increased as Community-level institutions increasingly shape the lives, circumstances and aspirations of Europeans, who are directly subject to Union law (Weiler 1991; MacCormick 1997). Many citizens and organisations were further critical because the EU appears to be beyond democratic control. And individuals and governments become more interdependent. Consider that national vetoes intended to protect vital interests have slowly been abolished. So a minority that loses in decisions is now required to act contrary to their own interests, possibly against the majority of their fellow domestic citizens, out of respect for the majority decisions made in European institutions (Scharpf 1997: 21). Political parties and party families in European Parliament—and voters—must be trusted to consider the plight of non-nationals.

Suspicion that others will exploit rather than reciprocate one's efforts can easily prevent or unravel complex practices of co-operation. Trust is therefore crucial for 'social capital'—'social connections and the attendant norms and trust' (Putnam 1995: 665; Putnam 1993; Loury 1987; Coleman 1990).

To prevent suspicion and ensure stable cooperation, actual compliance is not enough: each must also appear trustworthy, so that others can count on their compliance (Hardin 1996). Institutions such as those of the European Union can be an important means for fostering such trust even among strangers, by engendering *impersonal reciprocity*, of the form:

I'll do this for you, knowing that somewhere down the road *someone else* will treat me in the appropriate way.

Such *impersonal* reciprocity is fostered by confidence in the general compliance with social institutions. Institutions can monitor and sanction defection, and thus reduce the temptation to free ride. This reduces the likelihood of defection by those who do not mind co-operating as long as they are assured that others do likewise.

A further important source of such confidence is inculcation to certain norms and values by public educational institutions (Putnam 1993: 184; Rawls 1993: 168). Institutions can shape our identities—how we conceive of ourselves, our values, norms and interests. Trustworthiness is further enhanced if individuals do not act on the basis of calculations, but instead are socialised to regard certain behaviour as obvious and appropriate

(Stinchcombe 1986; March and Simon 1993; Olsen 2000). Education to citizenship norms is one central mechanism that may foster such trustworthiness.

Europeans must have reason to believe that they all comply with common laws, and that their new institutions and rules deserve compliance even by minorities who are outvoted. A fundamental challenge to the future European Union is therefore that Europeans develop and maintain trust in one another and in their common institutions.¹ When Member States pool more powers and become more interdependent, they can less easily buffer vulnerable groups from untoward effects. For instance, many worry about increased risks of unemployment and marginalisation of ‘inefficient’ workers—and question governments’ ability to tax capital to finance unemployment benefits. Some such worries seem well founded (Pierson 1998). Democratic majority rule on its own does not provide mechanisms that protect minorities against such harms. In order to reduce this risk, it is of great value if citizens in the EU have a well-developed sense of justice and commitment to solidarity across Member State boundaries—what Melissa Williams calls ‘political agency’. This will help ensure that Union citizens vote for national and European politicians who in turn will consider the plight of all Europeans, beyond their own electorate.

To be sure, such citizenship education is no panacea. Majorities may ignore pleas of the marginalised. And, as Meira Levinson argues, many minorities—be they racial, ethnic, economic, or linguistic—are unlikely to be persuasive in ‘deliberative’ settings unfamiliar to them. As a result, even well intending majorities may frame those pleas in ways that distort the concerns (Levinson 2003).

In response, we must grant that citizenship education cannot exhaust the trust-building measures minorities need. At least two other measures merit mention. Human rights constraints can assure all that majorities will not trespass on certain vital interests of any citizen. The 2000 EU *Charter of Fundamental Rights* makes this commitment more visible (cf. Follesdal 2006). Second, another important source of socialisation across Member State borders is the public contestation among political parties. Their attempts to gather votes across sub unit borders shape the range of conceivable policy options. One way may be to give voice to outrage over mistreatment of minorities, in ways designed to evoke the sense of justice of the broader public. This incentive will alleviate some of the concerns of the marginalised. Political party competition may “not so much *make* politicians and the voters they represent respect the public interest as ... *remind* them to do so.” (Goodin 1996, 341). Such appeals to citizens’ sense of justice may be needed even when no human rights are violated, e.g. if some groups lose out systematically. The over all effects may be drastic (Barry 1991).

I thus conclude that one important function of education to Union Citizenship can be to contribute to build assurance and trustworthiness, by fostering citizenship norms in ways that are publicly known.

The Basis of Citizenship

But is it realistic that Europeans will act on feelings of solidarity and charity across hundreds of miles? The shared culture and common heritage of Europeans seems too thin to support the required trust, especially when compared to the national heritages that bolsters compliance within each European welfare state: No ‘demos’ in Europe (Preuss 1995), neither shared destiny nor common values. Indeed, the very search for such a

¹ I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing the issues that resulted in the following two paragraphs.

common ethnic or cultural base worries many Europeans with memories of far to many wars on precisely such grounds.

However, a satisfactory account of Union citizenship need not build on a broad base of common identity, culture and history. Instead, it can build on a shared sense of justice and more limited commitments to the equal dignity of all Europeans, motivated by a 'desire ... to arrange our common political life on terms that others cannot reasonably reject.' (Rawls 1993: 124; Ackerman 1980: 69ff.; Weiler 1995; Preuss 1996: 275; MacCormick 1996: 150; MacCormick 1997: 341; Habermas 1998). Surely, Union citizens also need information about European history and culture, so as to understand the impact of political decisions on Europeans of different faiths and cultures. But such information is different from inculcation to a broad set of historically shared values.

Another challenge is that such trust and loyalty among fellow Europeans must co-exist with particular trust and loyalty among co-nationals of each member state. Citizens must thus have two political loyalties. Such challenges can be met, e.g. within many federations that instil and maintain both sub-unit loyalty and 'overarching' loyalty among the citizenry (Simeon and Conway 2001 #35280). The curriculum would have to be shaped to promote both loyalties, rather than only one. The account sketched below explores this somewhat 'impersonal' motivation: a sense of justice, an interest in doing our moral duty and expressing respect for others, rather than a sense of community, 'thick' identity, or a feeling of empathy toward all Europeans. On this view, the motivating force for complying with rules is not centrally a feeling of altruism, but rather a sense of justice, *a preparedness to comply with those institutions that apply to us and that are just* (Rawls 1980: 540). Day-to-day compliance with laws and other commands is required by the duty to honour others' legitimate expectations, and the sense of justice as it binds us to the institutions that surround us. This is a different motivation for individuals' compliance than 'sentiments of affinity', the emotional bonds between individuals.

But can such an 'abstract' sense of solidarity based on universalistic principles of social justice motivate and be sustained over time (Preuss 1995, 275)? In response, note that many existing nation states are too large for empathy among all citizens (Calhoun 1996: 3; Goodin 1988).

I submit that to maintain durable trust among citizens they must be habituated to three sets of commitments.

Commitment to institutions

First, citizens must be committed to their institutions and the decisions and rules that their officials make. In practice, this means that they must generally be prepared to abide by the laws and other rules that apply to them. In this way they respect the legitimate expectations of those around them who depend on their compliance. In Europe, this requires knowledge both of domestic and community legislation.

Commitment to Principles of Legitimacy

Citizens must also have reason to believe that others will continue to comply in the future. Such trustworthiness, essential for stability, can be maintained by a publicly known, generally shared commitment to comply for what each person regards as good reasons. The second commitment is therefore to principles of legitimacy for institutions.

Principles of legitimacy, duly worked out for multi-level polities, serve several roles in accounting for stability. One is to provide critical standards for assessing existing, concrete institutions. Another is to secure some shared bases for compliance with just institutions, since these principles provide justification for such existing institutions.

Commitment to a Thin Political Theory

The third common commitment is to the immediate premises for such principles, for instance in the form of a conception of citizens as equal members of the polycentric political order. One such ‘thin’ political theory is John Rawls’ suggestion to regard social institutions as a system of co-operation among individuals regarded—for such purposes—as free and equal participants (Rawls 1971). That particular conception does not work for the European Union with federal features, where Member States and the EU split and share sovereignty. A shared conception of the proper roles of Member States and the Union seems necessary to allocate powers between them. One such principle may be a specified version of the Principle of Subsidiarity, which places the burden of argument on those who seek a centralised decision (Follesdal 1998).

There are at least two reasons for this third kind of commitment. Consensus on institutions and principles is insufficient to convince others of one’s trustworthiness. We also need assurance that all regard themselves as having reasons to continue to comply in the future. Moreover, the trust needed in a democratic European Union also concerns the creation of new institutions and legal rules, to be guided by such shared conceptions.

Four Reasons for Education

In light of these commitments to institutions, principles and conceptions of citizenship, education should have at least four aims.

Education to Self Knowledge

One task must be to foster the ability of each student to live a life she finds meaningful, compatible with her own world view. She must become able to explore her talents and opportunities alone and together with others. So she must understand her talents, strengths and weaknesses relative to the constraints and opportunities the social institutions will provide later in life. Geographical and personal variation suggest room for local adjustment and variation across locations and persons. Yet increased mobility across Europe will require Europeans to know more about the various opportunities offered.

Education as Tool

Education is a tool both for the individual and for others. Education can give us background knowledge for our choice of careers, pursuit of interests, and for participation in politics. We must understand the possibilities and constraints offered by society and the natural environment around us. An important challenge is to prepare students for European

and global societies of tomorrow, who apparently need more citizens with higher education to secure the Union's vision of a "Knowledge society".

Every individual must also be familiar with central cultural frames of reference. We must jointly determine this content, presumably including first some understanding of the Christian, Muslim, Jewish and other faiths, familiarity with the history of European states, and of global, European and local heritages of arts and crafts. Second, we must consider what tomorrow's citizens should share of culture, to make laws and regulations responsibly—both domestically and at the European level. These needs are major challenges to teachers: how best to convey the beliefs and practices, of majorities and minorities, to all citizens, without influencing them unduly?

Education as Ticket

For many students education and academic evaluations also function as tickets of admission to higher education and positions of authority. For this purpose education is by necessity a scarce good, 'positional' or 'status' goods that by their very nature cannot be distributed equally. However, insofar as evaluations are such tickets, they should be calibrated across Europe—as indeed planned in the Bologna process.

Education to Citizenship

Finally, citizens need a common set of norms and principles—the norms of citizenship, for lack of a better name. They include respect for others, respect for democratic decision-making, truth, toleration, and some others.² This basis must be known to be common grounds in order to promote and maintain justice, domestically, in the European Union, and globally. Moral education, also in the schools, must aim to foster these civic norms.

We face two risks when schools seek to foster norms: Too little, and too much. The educational system must ensure that close to all citizens have the commitments necessary for a stable and trusting just society. Moral relativism or self-interest is not enough. But the power of schools and teachers to educate must not be abused to shape individuals' character or commitments more than is necessary for a just and stable society: citizens may disagree about many components of the good life, and still live in harmony and mutual respect. Such respect may be fostered by discussions among students of different faiths and world views (Roth 2001).

Some may object to any attempt at inculcation of norms by public power. Yet I have indicated some reasons for public assurance of the general acceptance of a limited set of such norms and certain values. One central argument in support of this claim is the need for trust and trustworthiness among citizens. To illustrate where this view might be different from others, consider William Galston's claim, that citizens should be encouraged to certain 'political virtues' including the willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991). This particular requirement does not seem necessary, as long as a sufficient number of citizens are so inclined (cf. Williams 2003).

² For lists of similar sorts and discussions concerning the proper inculcation of virtues and norms, especially in the liberal tradition, cf. Rawls 1971, 122; Galston 1989 and 1991; Spinner 1994; Kymlicka 1999; Gutmann 1995; Macedo 1990. For discussion of dilemmas concerning education to cosmopolitan virtues and norms, cf. the collection Nussbaum and respondents 1996.

On Equality

We now turn to the issues of distributive justice among nationals, and among Europeans, as concern education. If the commitment to institutions securing equality regarding education extends only among citizens, there may be no normative defence for intra-European distributive justice. And inversely, if norms of equality should apply among all Europeans, what room is left for special obligations among compatriots of a single Member State?

Many of us hold that the social institutions at large and schools especially, must secure and express equality in some sense or other. This finds expression in the ICESCR quoted above. In one fundamental sense this ideal seems correct. The equal dignity of all must be secured by the institutions: They must be defensible to those subject to them as participants and contributors of equal worth—domestically, within the EU, and as subjects of global economic and political structures. This commitment finds expression in the Kantian claim that individuals should never only be treated as means, but also always as ends with intrinsic worth.

But that abstract claim gives few answers about how to structure institutions, and does not obviously require equal treatment, equality of results, or some other form of real equality. Yet many would agree that the schools should further equality among the sexes, and among different ethnic and cultural groups. Should education also be provided equally, and promote equality, across European member states? And if so what kinds of equality should be secured?

These questions are clearly of great practical importance. Society must secure the equal worth of all, among individuals with different talents and interests, and in different local environments. At the same time it is difficult to secure local and individual adjustment of the education, if the content of tests and criteria for evaluation are the same for all. What kinds of equality are important at the national and European levels, and in which areas do equal dignity require local and personal variations?

Satisfactory answers must consider several challenges. First, many European states have populations who share a fairly homogenous majority culture but with minorities with divergent religious or cultural values. We should therefore consider very carefully how to secure equal dignity when some groups are more equal than others.

Second, other ideals than equality should be secured—and may conflict with equality. For instance, where should teachers allocate scarce resources? Teachers should hardly give all students attention sufficient to bring them to a middle grade, and actively prevent excellence. But should teachers give all their efforts and attention to the worst off students in an attempt to bring them up to the level of the other students? This would seem detrimental to all other students, perhaps to the teacher's long-term commitments, and problematic for the knowledge base and competitiveness of European work force in the long run.

A final practical concern is that focus on the joint responsibilities of families, the schools and teachers will require increased documentation of efforts, opportunities and assessments provided to each student. Such documentation requires clear minimum standards and operational levels of achievement regarding the appropriate kind of equality.

I shall argue that, on reflection, the ideal of *equality of result* does not seem defensible for education. Good arguments for equality in the educational system seem instead to support two other ideals: equality of opportunity and securing of certain minimum level. All should have the same chance to obtain higher education, regardless of social, ethnic or geographical background. Schools have an important task of securing equality of oppor-

tunity, but this is very different from equality of result. An important normative and pedagogical challenge is to determine whether equality of opportunity has been achieved in a society with marked pluralism of conceptions of the good life. With different values, individuals may have the same opportunity set but select differently among those capabilities in ways that should be respected.

Some minimal thresholds of knowledge and competences should also be secured for all students. This is a plausible view—but has little to do with equality as an ideal. An important task for researchers, politicians and teachers is to determine these minimum standards to be secured in schools, for all future citizens of Europe. This is of outmost importance if we are to resolve dilemmas concerning where to allocate important resources and attention.

These two objectives emerge when we consider carefully some other possible arguments against various forms of inequality.³

Remove Destitution and Dire Need

A fundamental claim of justice is that the social institutions should secure a minimum level of living for all. Education is central for this goal, particularly in complex societies with extensive division of labour. We need education to get paid work, and education about how to get help when needed. These are important aims, but they do not support claims to *equality*. Instead, the educational systems must bring everyone up to a level of knowledge and skills sufficient to meet their needs, mainly in the labour market.

Remove Stigmatising Status Inequalities

Some forms of inequality appear as a public stigmatisation, difficult to accept if we are also committed to the equal dignity of all. In earlier times in much of Europe, higher education was only available to men, and mainly to those whose families could afford secondary education. To be excluded from education opportunities for reasons of gender or poverty may be perceived as such a public expression that these citizens are inferior.

Note again that the argument from stigmatisation does not rule out all inequalities, but only those that are indefensible. Certainly citizens whose education fails to equip them with certain skills, character traits and knowledge would have reason to feel inferior. But again, this is not really an argument for equality: there is no clear sense in which the students are made *equal* as a result. Again, the aim is instead to bring all above a certain level, and to ensure that it is accessible to all, as stated in ICESCR Art 13.2.c:

Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education

³ I here draw on, among others, T.M. Scanlon's and John Rawls' work (Scanlon 1997; Rawls 2001) regarding reasons against inequality.

Avoid Domination

A third reason to worry about inequalities is the fear that those in power can dominate the rest of us: control our options, our choices, and perhaps even our self-understanding. Lack of education, or drastic inequalities in the quality of education, can result in such domination.

We can prevent domination in at least two ways. One strategy would be to allow inequalities in education, but prevent them from having worrisome consequences by ensuring that education does not serve as a tool to obtain influence. This may require that education no longer serves as a ticket to professions and positions of power. However, this arrangement seems neither feasible nor attractive. To remove the risk of domination by the educated by decreasing the value of education would easily entail to dumb down those in positions of power and influence. The question should rather be what criteria and training is most appropriate for those in authority. An alternative strategy seems better: to remove the sources of worrisome inequalities through provision of education for all up to the level required to prevent domination. This strategy may indeed require some limits on the differences in levels of competence, in effect justifying constraints on permissible inequalities. Note that insofar as European integration entails that some Europeans may dominate others across member state borders, differential education levels across the EU may have to be kept within limits.

Secure Fair Procedures

Many goods and burdens are distributed by procedures, such as markets, courts, etc. If such arrangements are to function acceptably, the participants must often start from positions of rough equality. For instance, all those who need something in the market must have something to barter, all sides using the judicial system must have access to competent legal advice, and so forth. With regards to education, this concern applies in at least two areas: to secure the common interests of society at large—for each of us—, and in order to secure fair treatment of individuals.

Let's assume that the distribution of higher education should be based on the talents and interests of the students as expressed by grades and requests for admissions, rather than be distributed according to criteria such as gender or social background. This relatively uncontroversial claim suggests that primary and secondary education must be available to all, independent of their geographical location, gender, ethnic or social background. Special efforts may be required to secure that such selection procedures work according to plan.

Similar considerations support the need for a well-educated public if a democracy is to work fairly. Well-functioning democratic arrangements require that all affected parties have access to public debates, or at least that their interests are represented during the process of mutual accommodation and understanding. This requires that the general population has a fairly high level of minimal education.

Such arguments constrain acceptable differences in starting positions, and may require extra efforts in response to special educational needs. We should scrutinize the impact of differential access to education for students' later functioning as democratic citizens on a footing of equality. European integration may require more extensive education, for democratic procedures to work across member state borders, since citizens must be able to communicate and comprehend the plight of Europeans across borders.

Equal Distribution of Products of Cooperation

A further argument for equal shares is that those who participate equally in producing goods also have equal claim to benefit from them. Such an argument for equality holds for those goods that can be regarded as produced through cooperation—at the domestic, European and global level. This claim can support equality of access to professions and positions of power in society—and the requisite education needed.

Such goods as professions and institutionalised power are in an important sense created through our joint practice as citizens. Educational resources—professionally trained teachers, pedagogical materials—are goods in certain ways created through and dependent upon common efforts, that all therefore have fundamentally equal claims to. A principle of fair distribution of such goods would therefore seem to be that all should have equal access to these goods. At least, their access should be independent of differences that are irrelevant for the social benefits of having such positions in the first place. I submit that equality of opportunity expresses such a basis of distribution.

We have considered five arguments for various kinds of equality and against various forms of inequality. We have not found any argument for equality in general, and no argument for equality of result. Absent other arguments it seems that *equality of result* within the educational system does not seem required. There is no support for Procrustian conclusions that all students should get the same final grades. A commitment to maintain an educational system that respects the equal dignity of all still has important implications. The minimal threshold that all students should enjoy with regards to knowledge, skills and citizen norms is high, particularly in a complex, democratic Europe. There are important limits on permissible inequalities, to prevent domination and to secure fair procedures, across Europe. And equality of opportunity is important: students with similar talents should obtain similar chances to pursue higher education and professions.

Five Challenges

Consider three objections to this account, and two challenges.

Multiple Citizenship—Conflicting Loyalties?

Historically, citizenship has often been regarded as exclusive. Many states have traditionally prohibited multiple citizenships, perhaps from a fear that individuals will otherwise suffer from conflicting loyalties and split identities. Union citizenship is explicitly a second citizenship. This might foster mistrust rather than trust.

In response, note that the basis of citizenship sketched above is not exclusionary, and does not rely on a broad cultural basis or a thick sense of national identity and pride. It is compatible with other, concurrent commitments and loyalties: it is not exclusive (cf. Williams 2003). Conflicts may still occur insofar as Member State governments and Union institutions issue conflicting orders or legislation with no final arbitration body. But such risks are reduced by clear competence division, the European Court of Justice, and clear human rights constraints.

What Room for Patriotism and Political Allegiance?

Another objection to this account of citizenship education might be drawn from arguments by Martha Nussbaum (1996). She raises the inverse concern: Perhaps such normative theories cannot justify any political allegiance at all.

Insofar as the commitment to equal moral status is part of a ‘moral cosmopolitan’ view, justification is owed to every person in their own right (cf. Pogge 1992, 1994; Beitz 1994). There is a tension between moral cosmopolitanism in this sense and special responsibilities toward some individuals: One cannot “embrace universalism in ethics while continuing to give priority to one’s compatriots in one’s practical reasoning.” (Miller 1995a: 64).

But the normative theory laid out here does not entail *institutional* cosmopolitanism. The global distributive pattern of benefits and burdens may well be dependent to some extent on the borders of states or other political units. Indeed, I have suggested above that claims to equality may differ precisely due to the risk of domination and any participation in the production of goods.

Still, can such normative theories account for political allegiance at all? David Miller questions whether universalist liberal theories support “unconditional obligations to other members that arise simply by virtue of the fact that one has been born and raised in that particular community” (Miller 1995a: 42; cf. Tamir 1993: 105). Likewise, “the idea that unchosen ties to a community or tradition can carry moral weight may seem, at the very least, completely alien in spirit.” (Scheffler 1999: 273).

In response, recall the first of the threefold bases of citizenship outlined in Section 3: a commitment to their institutions and the decisions and rules of officials. Citizens must be prepared to abide by the laws and other rules that apply to them. I submit that a determination of the duties of citizenship, on this view, includes three tasks:

- Determination of the social facts concerning the institutions: the rules of the practices, and whether they are generally complied with so as to shape expectations. A thoroughgoing justification of our duties toward these institutions must refer in part to our shared history, the general acceptance of these rules and so forth.
- Criteria of normative legitimacy. A determination of whether this practice is legitimate, such that it generates a moral duty on participants to meet the corresponding expectations of others. Thus, respect toward non-Europeans within the global order may limit the content of duties owed to one’s own Member State and the EU.
- Criteria of applicability: whether this practice in fact applies to this person, according to the social facts, be it by promising or by being born into certain positions.

These three issues must be addressed in order to determine the duties of citizenship of an individual. For instance, citizens have special duties such as abiding by the laws of their own Member State and of the EU insofar as both include such requirements, are just sets of institutions in the sense of satisfying the relevant principles of legitimacy; and third, apply to that individual. This would seem compatible with Nussbaum’s concerns, since moral allegiance to the global community will then be compatible with political allegiances to one’s own Member state and the EU.

Note that this threefold account is compatible with many views that insist on the relevance of historical and cultural context. Tamir holds that justifications for political obligations must be grounded partly contextually (Tamir 1993: 134). And it would appear to be a version of what David Miller calls Ethical Particularism, an ethical universe “in which agents are already encumbered with a variety of ties and commitments to particular

other agents, or to groups or collectivities, and they begin their ethical reasoning from those commitments.” (Miller 1995a: 50).

I submit that Miller’s criticism against “ethical universalism” does not apply against the normative account presented here. Miller holds that “No ethical universalist can allow ‘because he is my brother’ to stand as a basic reason for action.” (Miller 1995: 50). I deny this. *Within* any set of institutions, individuals justify their actions by appeal to the rules of the set of institutions in place, drawing on the social facts of the practice—be it the unconditional responsibilities of siblings, or those of citizens. One’s own culture may well spell out the content of these special duties and thus give reasons that are properly said to bind us. However, these rules and practices do not give a *complete* justification of the duties. We may at times be asked to offer a justification of aspects the existing culture as well—be it the limits to those obligations among family members, or among compatriots, that hold unconditionally within those limits. That justification will be of a more universalistic nature, that explains why some—though not all—particularistic bonds are compatible with moral cosmopolitanism (Cf. Follesdal 2000, 2001b).

Accommodate Difference or Secure Equality?

Can a normative commitment to equality accept inequalities within federations? Political orders with federal elements often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy. Such arrangements have been presented as solutions to a wide range of perceived problems suffered by unitary governments, in order to secure peace, institutional innovation, efficiency, liberty and the like. Yet many forms of local autonomy will allow inequality across sub-units, in apparent conflict with ideals of equality. For instance, individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions, partly as result of the political powers enjoyed by these sub-units. On the other hand, with sub-unit autonomy citizens wield more political influence over the sub-unit agenda than they would have enjoyed under a unitary political order.

How, then, are we best to command the commitment to equality expressed in the ICESCR right to education, with respect for sub-unit autonomy?

In response, note that there are some inequalities that should be of concern, as noted above. The lowest quality of education should still secure a level of knowledge and skills sufficient to equip citizens to secure their needs as participants in a mobile European labour market. Differences in educational levels in Europe must also not allow domination, or threaten European-wide procedures that allocate privilege and positions.

But can inequalities across member states at all be defended? I believe that there may at least be one reason to defend limited inequalities. The gain in political influence provided by local autonomy and immunity can sometimes be advantageous even for those who are left worse off in such federal arrangements than they would be under a unitary political order (Follesdal 2001a). Their economic and other loss may be outweighed by the variety of benefits provided them by more political power at the local level, due to some sub-unit autonomy. This is especially so if such variations are unavoidable features of the immunity and autonomy required to protect against domination, and to ensure well-informed shaping of institutions and policies to local circumstances. The same interests that ground claims to equality may thus support sub-unit autonomy rather than a unitary political order. If this is true, our interest in equal shares of educational benefits and their economic consequences may legitimately be weighed against our interest in enjoying more political influence over matters controlled by our sub-unit.

Measuring Equality of Opportunity Under Value Pluralism

The pluralism of values within present European states make it more difficult to determine how far we are from reaching the requirements of a high minimum level, limited inequality of result, and equality of certain kinds of opportunity. We often try to determine whether equality of opportunity has been achieved by checking whether results are the same across groups: whether equally many men and women chose various careers, etc. However, consider the case where different groups in the population have different values and opinions about the good life. Such differences in result might not show lack of equality of opportunity, but rather that there are culturally conditioned choices. For instance, there may be systematic differences among majority and minority citizens with regards to choice of higher education.

This may be due to discrimination, lack of understanding by minority citizens concerning how society works, or an artificially low level of aspiration among minority youth. For instance, some studies suggest that youth with immigrant parents are excluded from the job market regardless of their level of formal education. Such causes are highly worrisome, and should be addressed politically and by society at large. However, some differences, such as gender bias regarding career choices might not be the result of problematic socialisation, discrimination etc. Some researchers say that young women with high grades who know that they can choose profession freely, still knowingly choose low paid care professions. Without more information about their perceived choices and deliberations it is difficult to conclude that their choices should cause worry. Instead, one might claim that the problem is the low pay for care professions. We have different conceptions of the good life yet deserve to live under institutions that treat us equal in dignity. It therefore becomes very important to determine who gets to be Procrustes, and determine what sorts of choices should be regarded as 'normal', and what should be grounds for worry.

What is the Minimum Content of Education that all Should Obtain?

We need to find agreement about what should be the minimal content of education provided to all—as grounds for self knowledge, as a tool, as a ticket—and not least, for virtuous citizenship. How much of the religious heritage of Europe must all future citizens of Europe know, in order to function as full and equal members of their society and of the European Union? What must they know about the history—the good and the bad—of their societies? And which are the necessary norms and ideals we must be sure that all citizens share, if we are to maintain the trust required for stable institutions? We need thorough discussions about these topics—about what must be shared, among individuals who otherwise differ with regards to values, religions, and citizenship. And we need careful reflection about *who* should have the power to determine this content. Again, someone must be Procrustes, in the sense of determining what should be the minimal content of education provided to all. It seems obvious that the teaching profession should contribute actively to the debate, since teachers are those who must face the dilemmas and make the priorities real-time, in the class-rooms, among students—citizens of the future—who are different, yet must be treated on a footing of equality. The challenges facing education are immense: the school is not only a school for present children, but also a school for democracy and just societies in the future. The dilemmas identified must be addressed, in the classroom, in society at large, and by politicians. The aim must be to treat students in ways that respect them as equals, and that prepares them to treat each other as equal

citizens later on. How to do this—to prepare students for the societies of tomorrow—is a task that is far too important to leave to the politicians alone.

Lessons for Global Citizenship

Union citizenship may help clarify the notion and possible political roles of global citizenship.

Union citizenship invokes the notion of citizenship. This commits the European political order to the equal standing of all individuals, including democratic control over the institutions that shape their lives. We may call this underlying normative commitment *Normative Cosmopolitanism*. It is universal in scope, insisting that if someone is affected, they should receive equal consideration regardless of race, gender, social status or citizenship.

Normative cosmopolitanism does not in itself require global institutions. But those equally affected by practices and institutions should also have an equal say in how the institutions should be shaped. Such arguments apply at the European level: Europeans are now so interdependent due to their common institutions that they must also have an equal say in how they are governed (Follesdal and Hix 2006). The institutions of the Union, including Union citizenship, must be shaped to ensure such democratic accountability.

This line of argument can serve as a model with regards to claims to institutionalise global citizenship. Globalisation reduces the significance of state borders, due largely to the digital and trans-national economy. Our decisions increasingly affect others across borders. Insofar as global regimes have such global implications, normative cosmopolitanism requires that they must also be under political control where all have a say. If there is globalisation with drastic implications on individuals' life chances, we should take steps to address the global democratic deficit.

The requisite legal protections and controls may take at least two forms, reminiscent of the classical distinction between passive and active citizenship. First, institutions may provide immunity to individuals and communities against severe damage wrought by others. A wide range of human rights and practices of sovereignty are examples. Second, individuals may enjoy institutionalised influence in the form of political rights over the institutions and regimes.

National citizenship typically provides both forms of controls. Europeans also enjoy both forms of controls: Passive rights expressed in the form of European human rights regimes including the Charter on Fundamental Rights. Active rights in the form of voting rights, through democratic control over domestic governments in the European Council and Council of Ministers; and by directly elected representatives to the European Parliament.

Hitherto, insofar as global citizenship is institutionalised it primarily consists of passive rights in the form of universal human rights standards. Elements of the United Nations may be enhanced to provide equal political influence over various regimes, but such global political rights are not well developed.

The discussion of Union citizenship indicates that institutionalising active global citizenship faces several challenges.

Global political authorities do not automatically alleviate the problems of globalisation—to the contrary, they can easily be abused to the further detriment of the powerless. To ensure that a global political order expresses respect for all on a footing of equality, the

institutional design is of utmost importance. Moreover, if these decision-making bodies are to enjoy compliance and support, they must be trusted to make just decisions. If they are to be representative, this entails that most global citizens must be committed to a common normative basis. The account of Union citizenship sketched above suggests that such a basis need not draw on a broad shared history and culture. Nevertheless, several commitments must be broadly shared, including a conception of the proper tasks of state governments, regional bodies such as the EU, and global institutions. Such a shared political culture must be fostered, and maintained. The risks of abuse of such global institutions are obvious, particularly in the absence of global arenas for political deliberation and habituation. But gradual development in this direction may still be feasible—and the alternatives may be even worse, judged from the point of view of normative cosmopolitanism.

Present global regimes regarding issues such as trade, environment and human rights fall short of the normative standards of global justice. These conflicts cannot be resolved by dismissing any attempt at bringing normative political theory to bear. Resources, competence and political will are required to increase the legitimacy of the political orders both in Europe and globally. Reflections on Union citizenship and global citizenship might motivate and guide such changes.

Conclusion

The present reflections have focussed on the role of education to foster citizenship norms for securing trust, and contributing to compliance with legitimate institutions. This concern for trust seems to have fuelled the call for Union citizenship. Similar needs arise at the global level in the wake of globalisation, and global citizenship might be considered a solution.

If Union citizenship is to secure trust and trustworthiness in the population, a common normative basis is required. I have suggested that this basis need not primarily focus on a common history and culture and a broad sense. Instead, three commitments may suffice: to the institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union where Member States and Community institutions split and share sovereignty. These three commitments would seek to avoid contested parts of specific religious or philosophical world-views. At the same time, the shared basis goes beyond “Constitutional Consensus” or a “Constitutional Patriotism” that require consensus on procedures for making and interpreting authoritative decisions. Agreements on procedures are not enough to develop the mutual trust necessary for constitutional changes and institutional development. Such trust also requires that all citizens have and are known to have a sense of justice, and a commitment to a shared conception of the equal standing of Europeans within the polycentric European political order. Such common citizenship norms, combined with education providing all citizens with basic information about the prevalent value systems and living conditions across Europe, may suffice to ensure trust and stable compliance among Union citizens who are increasingly interdependent. The European educational systems should promote such common grounds.

The focus on Union citizenship in the educational system and elsewhere leads to increased concern for standards of legitimacy for the European Union. With regard to the

educational system, I have argued that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. But the actual institutions fall short of these standards. Insofar as Union Citizenship highlights these deficits it may reduce rather than enhance the support and mutual trust of Europeans.

Critics may point out that there are broad discrepancies between the institutions of the European Union, including Union Citizenship, and such requirements of normative political theory. But such deviations are not necessarily a flaw of the theory. That talk of citizenship may increase conflicts, and not only induce support, should come as no surprise: governments have often discovered that citizenship rights have “the potential for exacerbating, as well as diminishing the conflict of classes” (Goodin 1988).

Indeed, one reason to expect further conflicts is the implications of European integration for the distribution of educational opportunities within the EU. I have argued for a high minimal threshold that all students should enjoy with regards to knowledge, skills and citizen norms is high, particularly in a complex, democratic Europe. Limits on permissible inequalities stem from the need to prevent domination and to secure fair procedures among Union citizens also across Europe. Equality of opportunity also seems to be a requirement of justice, so that across the EU, students with similar talents should enjoy similar opportunities for higher education. Currently, the educational contents and opportunities across the EU seem to fail these standards. What are we to do in the face of such discrepancies?

The response should not be to refrain from discussing and socialising students to the normative political ideals and standards of democratic governance. Long-term trust among Union citizens depends on resolving the legitimacy deficit of the Union. However, it remains to be seen whether there is political will and resources for such changes.

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